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A note on the text 
In this study, I draw on sources from several languages. This makes tran-
scription an arbitrary business. I have sought to adhere to a consistent line of 
transcribing Russian names and words in accordance with a y-based translit-
erating system. This means that both the ‘hard’ (‘jery’) and ‘soft’ (’i krat-
koe’) Russian ‘i’ are replaced with ‘y’ (‘dostoynyy’), whereas the common 
two-letter ending of Russian last names is replaced with only one ‘y’ 
(Baranovsky). The y-based system is reflected also in words like ‘rossiy-
skaya’ (not ‘rossiiskaia’; in nominative) and ‘rossiyskoy’ (not rossiiskoi’; in 
genitive). Soft signs are replaced with ’. With regard to the Russian s-
sounds, I stick to common usage (i.e., zh, sh, ch, ts): For instance, Zhiri-
novsky (not Shirinovsky), but ‘vneshnaya’. 
Still, exceptions have been made with regard to a few Russian names. I 
use Yeltsin (not Yel’tsin or El’tsin); Andrei (not Andrey) Kozyrev; and 
Zagorski (not Zagorsky). This choice has been conditioned by common us-
age or by the observation that these authors themselves apparently prefer to 
use the i-form when publishing in English.  
With regard to dating of sources, periodicals and newspaper articles are 
denoted in the bibliography by year-month-day with reference to the day of 
their publication (i.e., 2001-09-15). Internet sources are dated in the same 
manner, although here reference is made to the day when the author 
downloaded the files from the web. 
Acronyms and abbreviations 
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe 
CFE – Conventional Forces in Europe 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSBM – Confidence and Security Building Measure 
CSCE1 – Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
EAPC2 – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
EC/EU3 – European Community/European Union 
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1  OSCE from January 1995 
2  Successor to NACC from 1997 
3  EU from 1992 
1.0 Introduction 
The break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War entailed fun-
damental changes in our conception of world politics. There seems to be a 
general agreement among scholars of International Relations (IR) that these 
developments largely terminated the bipolar structure that had for decades 
served as an important premise for the study of IR in general and of many 
security issues in particular. There is less consensus with regard to what con-
stitutes the new international structure and how IR can best be accounted for 
today. This study takes as one of its starting points IR theory and contempo-
rary debates around concepts like ‘international structure’, ‘power’ and ‘se-
curity’. 
A second point of departure is the recent revival of an old debate in Rus-
sia on the question of national identity. Throughout the last centuries, this 
debate has basically turned on diverging perceptions of Russia’s relative 
sameness with, and distinctiveness from, ‘Europe’ and a broader ‘West’ 
(Davies 1997; Neumann 1996). One contentious question has been the de-
gree of ‘westwardness’ perceived appropriate for Russia’s foreign policy. A 
related issue has centred on whether Russia should copy the political and 
economic models of the (‘advanced’) West, or, in light of the country’s spe-
cific cultural and ideological heritage, pursue a distinctly ‘Russian way’. 
These questions resurfaced with the birth of a new Russia in 1991. In terms 
of geography, post-Soviet Russia covers vast areas of the European and 
Asian continents. However, with regard to the question of national identity, 
it makes sense to regard Russia as integral to, yet still something apart from, 
Europe (Baranovsky 2000a). This study inquires into the implications of re-
newed debate in Russia on national identity and foreign policy for the con-
struction of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.4 
The aim of this study is twofold. First, I want to show how some recent 
developments in IR theory can be applied in analyses of Russia’s foreign and 
security policy. Hence, the study is an attempt to answer calls made by some 
scholars to bridge the gap between IR theory and analysis of Russia’s for-
eign and security policy (Hopf (ed.) 1999; Pursiainen 1998).5 Second, in 
light of the puzzling combination of partnership and discord that has charac-
terised Russian–Western security relations during the last decade, I want to 
cast light on the link between national identity and foreign policy with out-
look to providing a better understanding of Russia’s approach to institution-
alised security cooperation with the West from 1991 to 2000. 
                                                     
4  The term ‘security architecture’ denotes a whole complex of international institutions (re-
gimes, organisations, norms/informal rules etc.) that regulate security relations among 
states. See Chilton (1995) for a discussion of its emergence as metaphor in European and 
Russian–Western security discourse. 
5 Pursiainen (1998:1–7) claims that the study of Soviet/Russian foreign and security policy is 
‘theoretically underdeveloped’, ‘non-scientific’ and ‘often isolated’ from developments in 
IR theory and, more generally, the social sciences, and that the majority of recent studies 
have been conducted in an ‘area-study’, ‘policy-oriented’, ‘descriptive fact-gathering’ and 
‘journalistic’ manner. A similar criticism is reflected in the Hopf (ed.) (1999:ix) volume. 
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1.1 Demarcation of central issues and dimensions 
These introductory paragraphs call for some clarifications with regard to the 
exact scope of this study. First, the analysis centres on events stretching from 
the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Union in the second half of 1991 to 
President Yeltsin’s retirement on the eve of year 2000. However, in light of 
some recent developments in Russia’s foreign policy, and particularly what 
has been interpreted as policy changes in the wake of 11 September, I will 
briefly indicate in the concluding chapter how the theoretical framework ap-
plied here may be relevant also in analyses of Russia’s foreign policy under 
President Putin and beyond. 
Second, although focus is on security relations between Russia and the 
West, the spatial delimitation of this study is supra-regional in the sense that 
it encompasses the Euro–Atlantic and Euro–Asian regions as defined by 
membership to OSCE on 1 January 2000. Accordingly, the terms ‘Europe’ 
and ‘European region’ include areas that are conventionally not conceived of 
as part of Europe proper (i.e., North America, the Caucasus, Central Asia). 
These terms will be qualified if I speak of Europe in a more conventional 
sense (i.e., to the west of the Urals) and of European sub-regions (i.e., West-
ern Europe, CEE). 
Furthermore, my primary focus is on Russia’s relations with NATO and 
OSCE as the two perhaps most important components of a still emerging se-
curity architecture in Europe. During the 1990s, security relations between 
Russia and the West largely developed in and around these two bodies, 
which served as points of contact for dealing with issues defined in terms of 
security.6 Accordingly, I investigate how Russia has sought to position her-
self vis-à-vis these two security bodies, and how and to what extent she has 
sought to influence the relationship between NATO, OSCE and herself along 
the following three dimensions: 
1. Russia’s ‘weight’ in decision-making processes 
The first dimension pertains to Russia’s relative access to institutional ar-
rangements that may in turn serve as instruments and arenas for voicing 
Russian interests and concerns and for influencing developments in Europe. 
Defining features of Russia’s ‘weight’ is her formal status and level of parti-
cipation in decision-making processes. Hence, my focus is partly on ques-
tions concerning Russia’s membership in, or formal association with, OSCE, 
NATO and other frameworks for security cooperation with the West that 
were derived from the Western alliance (i.e., NACC/EAPC, PfP, Founding 
Act/PJC). However, a related issue concerns the relative importance envis-
aged by Moscow for OSCE, NATO and NATO-affiliated bodies as arenas 
and instruments for regulation of European security matters. Accordingly, 
this first dimension also concerns the desired weight of the various institu-
tional arrangements themselves as seen from Russia. 
                                                     
6  With regard to European security, EU is perhaps of no less significance than NATO and 
OSCE. However, the approach chosen here, which focuses on Russia’s relations with the 
West defined explicitly in terms of security and how to handle post-Cold War security 
challenges, premises that EU has played a marginal role in this regard; has had only lim-
ited ambitions in the security field; and has until recently been subject to little interest in 
Russia as a security actor (Leshukov 2000; Barabanov 2000; Baranovsky 2002). This may 
legitimise a relative downscaling of Russia’s relations with this institution.  
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2. The functional ‘scope’ of OSCE, NATO and related structures 
The second dimension concerns the functional area of responsibility desired 
by Moscow for NATO, OSCE and other cooperative bodies derived from 
these, or the type and extent of different security issues and ‘cases’ perceived 
to be relevant or appropriate for the different institutional arrangements. 
Here I will focus on Russian views with regard to the treatment of ‘hard’ vs. 
‘soft’ security issues respectively, and particularly on Moscow’s approach to 
the institutional handling of peacekeeping and conflict management, which 
emerged as one of the most important security issues in post-Cold War 
Europe.7 
3. The geographical ‘domain’ of NATO, OSCE and related structures 
The third dimension concerns the geographical domain or area of influence 
desired by Moscow for various institutional arrangements. Central questions 
in the analysis will be how, why and to what extent Russia has sought to in-
fluence scenarios of NATO enlargement and a role for the Western alliance 
out of area. However, there is obviously a close link between the second and 
third dimensions. Thus, the discussion will also focus on Russia’s use of 
various institutions and arenas (NACC, PfP, OSCE, CIS, PJC) to deal with 
security issues outside the territory of NATO’s member states.8 
The analysis examines apparent tensions and contradictions in Russia’s 
policy, which have contributed to making both partnership and discord in-
gredients to Russian–Western security relations (Baranovsky (ed.) 1997; Ar-
batov, Kaiser and Legvold (eds) 1999). For instance, how can we understand 
Russia’s intense opposition to NATO enlargement and the alliance’s out-of-
area operations in light of Russia’s own formalised cooperation with this in-
stitution (i.e., NACC/EAPC; PfP; PJC/the Founding Act)? How can we con-
ceive of Moscow’s enduring position that OSCE should be the cornerstone 
of Europe’s security architecture, considering what many observers have in-
terpreted as Russian obstruction of, and non-compliance with, OSCE deci-
sions and norms?9 This study seeks to answer these questions. 
1.2 Theoretical approach – a first cut 
In this study I shall apply the theoretical framework presented in A model for 
post-Cold War security thinking (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001).10 The report 
in question presents a particular way of conceptualising the dynamic inter-
play between attributes of states and the international system as conditions 
                                                     
7  A related issue that will not be dealt with separately here is Russia’s insistence on han-
dling certain security matters bilaterally, whereas others are brought to various multilat-
eral arenas.  
8  The terms ‘weight’, ‘scope’ and ‘domain’ originate from Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), but 
will be used here with the adaptations made in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001). 
9  The case of Chechnya is only one of many examples. As one Russian scholar puts it: 
‘While having a clear interest in upgrading the OSCE, Russia remains one of its most dif-
ficult participants’ (Baranovsky 1997:552). 
10  The report was published in Norwegian under the title ‘En modell for sikkerhetstenkning 
etter den kalde krigen’ (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001), and sought to substantiate theoreti-
cally a conceptual model that was developed by Anders Kjølberg at the Norwegian De-
fence Research Establishment in the early 1990s. 
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for state behaviour and outcomes in international politics.11 It draws on in-
sights from both (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism as two dominating per-
spectives on world politics (Morgenthau 1985 [1948]; Waltz 1979; Keohane 
1989; Keohane (ed.) 1986). However, by focusing on the role of ideas, 
norms and national identity for state interests and behaviour, it takes seri-
ously also some assumptions usually associated with constructivist theory or 
with a broader liberal perspective (Wendt 1999; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 
(ed.) 1996; Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Goldstein and Keohane (eds) 
1993). Hence, the analytical lens applied here both complements and chal-
lenges so-called mainstream paradigms. Pending a more detailed presenta-
tion in Chapter 2, I will present only a brief outline of the theoretical frame-
work at this point.12 
1.2.1 Assumptions: Agency, structure and purposive behaviour 
The distinction between agent and structure is essential for any understand-
ing of social behaviour. In a fundamental sense, agents and structures are in-
terrelated entities (Carlsnaes 1992:246). Yet it is not so clear exactly how 
they relate to each other. There are two problems to this issue. The first con-
cerns the very nature of agents and structures (Wendt 1987:339). This is an 
ontological question, and turns on how the two stand in relation to each other 
with regard to make-up or constitution. Here, I shall side with the social con-
structivist argument and see the relationship between agent and structure as 
one of mutual constitution (Wendt 1999; Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Hopf 
1998). I regard this as a necessary step for conducting this analysis, because 
it entails a possibility for detecting changes over time in the constitution of 
both agents (here: Russia) and structures (here: material and institutional fea-
tures of Russia’s ‘environment’), and for tracing both the causal and the 
temporal relationship between them.13 
The second question concerns the epistemological issue of integrating 
different types of variables into explanatory models or theories of social be-
haviour (Wendt 1987:339–340). The explanatory framework applied here 
attaches relatively much weight to structure compared to agency, and fo-
cuses on the manner in which features of a broadly conceived international 
environment affect foreign policy decisions. Yet this is not to say that struc-
ture is more important than agency, or that the former has greater explana-
tory force than the latter. It simply means that I am particularly concerned 
with how and to what extent Russia’s actions have been conditioned by at-
tributes of the (social and material) environment in which she operates. 
                                                     
11  An alternative approach might have been one of foreign policy analysis, with independent 
variables being (primarily) the type of political leadership and political culture; the char-
acter of bureaucratic structures, domestic institutions and decision-making processes; do-
mestic constellations of pressure groups etc. See Godzimirski (ed.) (2000), Malcolm et al. 
(1996) and Wallander (ed.) (1996) for recent examples of analyses along this line. 
12  Ongoing debates in IR theory encompass questions of ontological, epistemological, meth-
odological and normative character. See Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds) (1996) for an 
overview and discussion of some central developments and tendencies, some of which are 
also reflected in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001). 
13  The argument that agents and structures are mutually constitutive is central to the con-
structivist project (Checkel 1998:325; Hopf 1998). Alternative ways of approaching or 
‘solving’ this problem in foreign policy analysis would be to reduce one or both entities to 
be ontologically ‘given’ or ‘primitive’ (Wendt 1987:339).  
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Also, structure does not determine behaviour or outcomes. Structure can 
be regarded as a dispositional force that conditions the behaviour of agents/ 
states. I assume that states’ foreign and security policies express their goals 
and intentions: States are purposive agents. Their international behaviour can 
be understood as reflecting national interests defined through a process of 
domestic bargaining or by use of another decision-making procedure.14 
Agency, then, is conceived here as the freedom states or governments have 
to choose behaviour when taking into account domestic room for manoeu-
vring and structural constraints in terms of variations in costs and benefits 
related to different actions or policies.15 This is essentially a utilitarian un-
derstanding of behaviour, and implies that Russia’s approach to the construc-
tion of a post-Cold War security architecture in Europe – the current study’s 
dependent variable – is assumed to reflect rational means–ends calculations 
by the Russian government.16 
Accordingly, I also make the assumption that Russia will commit to co-
operative security arrangements with the West only when a cost–benefit 
analysis in Moscow produces an expected utility gain for Russia in compari-
son to status quo. In itself, the notion of status quo dictates certain analytical 
sensitivity to ‘path dependency’ or to assumed limitations in the extent to 
which agents may ‘interfere’ in history and bring about changes in their en-
vironment independently from already established structures and existing 
patterns of behaviour. As has been noted, Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy 
did not emerge in a vacuum or from an institutional tabula rasa (Robinson 
(ed.) 2000). At the outset of the 1990s, there was an ‘institutional overhang’ 
in terms of both domestic bodies engaged in policymaking and international 
cooperative arrangements to which Russia was a part (ibid.:8–9). In one 
sense, this overhang reflects a starting point for decision-making that may 
contribute to a certain degree of continuity in foreign policy in the sense that 
it structures the environment in which decision-makers operate and give 
birth to new policies and decisions.  
It is always difficult to ‘measure’ the effects of path dependency or the 
extent to which historical legacies and institutionalised patterns of behaviour 
constrain agents who want to bring about changes in their external environ-
ment. Yet it is fair to assume that ‘effects’ on a state’s foreign policy and in-
ternational outcomes stemming from path dependency or an established pat-
tern of behaviour may be particularly strong if the capacity of the state is 
weak or under condition of particular constraints on the state’s diplomatic 
resources (financial, personnel a.o.). This was arguably the situation in Rus-
sia during the 1990s (Robinson (ed.) 2000). The current analysis is con-
cerned with how we can understand Russian agency and behaviour at par-
ticular moments under conditions of institutional overhang and constraints 
                                                     
14  I am aware that some (self-proclaimed) liberal scholars prefer to speak of ‘preferences’ 
rather than ‘interests’ and that the difference between the two can be related to the ‘in-
commensurability thesis’ as a feature dividing the realist and liberal traditions (see Mo-
ravcsik 1997). This problem will not be addressed here. 
15  Although Putnam’s concept of ‘two-level games’ (1988) will not be explicitly applied 
here, his depiction of domestic–international interaction as condition for international out-
comes has inspired the current approach. 
16  The concept of ‘rationality’ applied here is obviously less strict than what we find in some 
game theoretical analyses of international cooperation. See Hovi (1998) or Axelrod 
(1984) for detailed discussions. 
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on Russia’s diplomatic capacities. Thus, I seek to reveal the rationale under-
lying not only Russia’s own initiatives at various stages, but also Russian 
decisions once questions regarding cooperative security arrangements with 
the West became part of their shared agenda. 
1.2.2 States, system and the international power structure 
States are the central units of the international system (Buzan 1991). The at-
tributes of states are important in shaping their behaviour. Yet the behaviour 
of states is affected also by the environment in which they exist, or by sys-
temic factors that constrain them from taking particular actions and dispose 
them towards taking others. Waltz (1979) assumes that the distribution of 
material capabilities – ‘the international structure’ – is the central systemic 
feature affecting outcomes of world politics.17 Others have argued that vari-
ous social or non-material features (norms, international institutions, culture 
etc.) also deserve attention, and that these are equally or perhaps even more 
important than material factors in shaping state behaviour and international 
outcomes (Bull 1977; Wendt 1999; Keohane 1989; Katzenstein (ed.) 
1986).18  
In A model for post-Cold War security thinking (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 
2001), we argue that the concept of ‘international power structure’ may be a 
useful starting point when trying to determine the relative importance – un-
der various systemic conditions – of different factors that affect state behav-
iour and therefore also outcomes in world politics. This term denotes an ac-
tor’s image of how power or the possibilities to influence actors and devel-
opments are distributed among states in a system (ibid.:8). The international 
power structure is not visible to the actors and has no objective existence per 
se. Actors cannot observe it, measure it, or count it. Rather, structure is here 
regarded as a perceptual or interpretive phenomenon. Images of power rela-
tions emerge through the feedback states receive on their behaviour. Accord-
ingly, consistent feedback over time can be regarded as a reflection of an in-
ternational power structure, which affects the behaviour of states by creating 
windows of (more or less) realistic opportunities or ranges of feasible actions 
and policies. 
This approach implies that states may see and interpret the power struc-
ture differently. In other words, the international power structure may look 
different to actors that are differently positioned with regard to the factors 
that determine power relations among states in a system or sub-system. I as-
sume that the Waltzian distribution of capabilities or material (military, eco-
nomic) resources will often be constitutive to actors’ images of power rela-
tions. I also assume that material resources in some ultimate cases represent 
a necessary condition for power projection. Accordingly, states will strive 
                                                     
17  Waltz (1979; 1986; 1996) constructed a theory of international politics (outcomes) and 
not a theory of foreign policy. The current approach sympathises with the view that his 
‘logic of behaviour’ may be relevant also for studies of states’ foreign policy (Elman 
1996). 
18  These scholars differ profoundly with regard to research focus and theoretical claims. 
Here I simply have in mind their common concern with ‘social’ or ‘non-material’ factors 
(the role of ideas; formal and informal institutional arrangements; international organisa-
tions; international laws, conventions and common understandings; norms and implicit 
rules of behaviour etc.) as opposed to Waltz’ rather materialist perspective. 
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towards improving their own (material) resource basis, be it through alli-
ances or a build-up of own capabilities. These are essentially realist argu-
ments (Morgenthau 1985 [1948]; Waltz 1979).  
Nevertheless, state behaviour will often be affected by norms or informal 
rules of behaviour; by the character and extent of formal institutions (organi-
sations); by geography; and by the distribution of technology within a sys-
tem (Keohane 1989; Buzan, Jones and Little 1993). In many international 
systems or sub-systems, norms and institutions are important in regulating 
how and under what conditions power can be projected, and also what type 
of power that can be applied. Similarly, geography and technology may of-
ten inhibit or encourage particular actions or patterns of behaviour. These 
factors can therefore be regarded as intermediate and arguably also systemic 
variables that should be accounted for when we analyse state behaviour and 
international outcomes.19  
The term ‘international power structure’ appears useful because it argua-
bly captures the important role of material factors that lie at the core of many 
(neo)realist readings of world politics, while at the same time being sensitive 
to other factors that are relevant for the character of power relations among 
states and therefore also for state behaviour. The current approach also ac-
knowledges the fact that actors in world politics are not only differently po-
sitioned in the international power structure, they may also interpret the 
power structure itself, and the relative importance of the various factors that 
constitute the power structure, in different ways. In this study, Russia’s pol-
icy is analysed from the perspective of how Russia has sought to influence 
the form and function of institutional arrangements that complement the dis-
tribution of material capabilities, and which are therefore relevant as power 
factors in the European system.20  
1.2.3 Centres, peripheries and security behaviour 
An international power structure can be depicted in terms of centres and pe-
ripheries. Such a structure is characterised by a type of power relations in 
which centres – states or groups of states – dominate and attract actors situ-
ated in the surrounding peripheral areas.21 The notion of ‘regional centres’ 
pertains to states or groups of states that are of limited relevance for the 
global structure, but which play a certain role for the character of interstate 
relations inside particular regions. However, the character of power and se-
curity relations within and between the world’s centres and peripheries may 
                                                     
19  Buzan, Jones and Little (1993) basically argue that Waltz (1979) confuses structure with 
system, and that he fails to capture important effects on state behaviour that originate at 
the systemic level, but which are not structural in a narrow, material sense (i.e., ‘distribu-
tion of capabilities’). In their own approach, the character and distribution of institutions, 
norms and technology – a system’s ‘interaction capacity’ – are integrated in the analyses 
as conditions for the type and quality of interactions and the patterns of behaviour that 
may emerge in a system. 
20  Thus, I sympathise with the constructivist claim that the international ‘environment’ (or 
‘structure’) in which states (and other actors) operate is social as well as material (Checkel 
1998; Hopf 1998). Yet this does not imply that every study of an IR issue should neces-
sarily deal with all (social and material) features of this environment. 
21  Models in terms of centres and peripheries are incorporated in many geopolitical ap-
proaches also in the Russian academic community. For a recent example, see Kolosov and 
Mironenko (2001:223–233), who combine a model of concentric circles with the notion 
of ‘sectors’ (of influence) going out from the ‘Russian heartland’. 
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differ profoundly with regard to the relative importance of military power, 
norms and international institutions. This makes the international power 
structure a very complex one.22 
A depiction of the international power structure along these lines bears 
relation to states’ foreign and security policies through the assumption that 
actors’ relative positions in this world of centres and peripheries influence 
their identities, interests and security perceptions. I shall use the term ‘secu-
rity logic’ to denote the security thinking and the related security strategies 
that can be derived from a particular reading of the international power 
structure and of one’s own place in this structure (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 
2001:15).23 The tool for analysing a state’s policy is derived from combining 
this conception of the international power structure with the notion of ‘secu-
ritisation’ formulated by scholars of the so-called Copenhagen school 
(Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1995). In brief, these authors argue that security 
manifests itself through ‘speech acts’ or the attachment (by actors) of a secu-
rity label onto a specific issue or phenomenon with the aim of legitimising 
certain political actions or influencing policies or outcomes. Security, in 
other words, is an intersubjective discourse that takes the form of presenting 
specific referent objects (a state, an identity, a role etc.) as existentially 
threatened (by a particular actor or development).  
Thus, if one accepts the assumptions that states may securitise issues like 
national identity or a particular role in world politics and that these are (at 
least partly) based on their readings of the international power structure and 
of their own place in this structure, an ‘existing’ world order or a power 
structure widely recognised to be in the making may produce different secu-
rity logics for states which regard their national interests differently as a con-
sequence of their (material and/or institutional) position in the system. With 
some adaptations, I shall use the basic logic underlying the ‘speech act’ ap-
proach as an instrument to analyse Russia’s policy.24 
1.2.4 Post-Cold War security thinking: A conceptual lens  
Today, the global world order can largely be described as unipolar. The 
West, with the US as its core, constitutes the dominant centre in world poli-
tics. In a European context, the West makes up a power centre and a highly 
institutionalised security community of which Russia is not an integrated 
                                                     
22  Just like alternative depictions of (conceivably) central features of world politics, a cen-
tre–periphery approach raises some important normative questions with regard to policy 
recommendations, let alone also the danger of contributing to the construction or re-
construction of particular worldviews that do not reflect the ‘real’ constitution of the 
world (i.e., an existing ontological order). These and other normative issues are beyond 
the scope of this study. I should remind the reader that the model applied here was devel-
oped in a policy-oriented environment, and that A model for post-Cold War security think-
ing (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001) was published by an institution intimately entangled in 
the formulation of Norwegian security and defence policy. 
23 See Chapter 2 for an elaboration on the concept of ‘security logic’, which is not a conven-
tional IR term, and which is intimately linked to the conceptual model applied in this 
study.  
24 The ‘Copenhagen school’ label seems to originate from the McSweeney’s (1996) article in 
Review of International Studies, where he forwarded criticism against the theoretical ap-
proach to security studies applied by a group of scholars associated with the Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute. 
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part, and to which Russia represents a periphery.25 A central argument in this 
study is that Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War secu-
rity architecture in Europe can be understood partly as an attempt to inte-
grate into this Western centre, which is characterised by order, stability and 
predictability. These represent values that are essential to any state pursuing 
the goal of national security. Yet integration into the dominating Western 
centre will also ensure Russia a voice, a place at the table and potentially 
some minimum weight in the handling of European security affairs in a 
situation where Russia’s relative power position, measured in terms of eco-
nomic resources and military capabilities, has deteriorated dramatically 
compared to that of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, cooperation with the 
West may provide Russia with a security dividend and serve as an appropri-
ate answer to many of Russia’s security concerns. 
 
Model for post-cold war
security thinking
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Model for post-Cold War security thinking (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001)  
 
However, Russia can also be depicted as a centre in her own right in relation 
to the West and to the post-Soviet space. There are actually two levels to this 
assertion. Firstly, Russia can be read in terms of her (real or potential) self-
sufficiency or ideological, economic and political independence from a 
broadly conceived West (Davies 1997; Neumann 1996). There is a strong 
                                                     
25  The term ‘security community’ is derived from Deutsch et al. (1957) and denotes a group 
of states that do not regard each other as potential military enemies and which do not per-
ceive the use of arms as a relevant means to solve conflicts between them. See also Adler 
and Barnett (1998) and Buzan’s (1991) notion of ‘mature anarchy’. 
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cultural–ideological dimension to this view, with Russia representing values 
that differ from, and stand partly in direct opposition to, those of (Western) 
Europe. Secondly, Russia has also been depicted as the heart of a distinct 
universe or an organic whole that essentially stretches beyond the borders of 
Russia proper (Trenin 2001). For centuries, Moscow has been a nucleus of 
power from which political influence and control have been spread into sur-
rounding geographical areas. Historical Russia has therefore been encircled 
by peripheries of her own, or by concentric circles of Russian domination, 
and with the level of Russian influence and control decreasing with increas-
ing distance from the Russian centre.  
These historical considerations – Russia as periphery and Russia as centre 
– lie at the core of my approach. The Cold War gave new impetus to the idea 
of a divided Europe through the construction of physical and ideological 
walls, by the competitive relationship it introduced between East and West 
as opposing political-economic systems, and by the rise of US–Soviet mili-
tary antagonism (Buzan 1991; Tunander et al. (eds) 1997). During this pe-
riod, the bipolar international structure to a great extent ‘defined’ the secu-
rity policies of European states. This has been described as systemic ‘over-
lay’ or the suppression of regional security dynamics resulting from super-
power antagonism and the physical presence of two power centres in Europe 
(Buzan 1991). 
This study purports that an East–West dimension is still relevant for the 
study of Russia’s security relations with the West. I basically argue that ap-
parent tensions and contradictions in Russia’s policy during the 1990s can be 
traced to the interplay between two different security logics derived from the 
centre–periphery and East–West dimensions respectively. On the one hand, 
the security logic derived from a depiction by the Russian policymaking elite 
of Russia as Europe’s periphery and from recognition of the West as a domi-
nating centre largely dictates a policy of integration into the Western centre 
and adaptation to the Western security structures. On the other hand, a depic-
tion of Russia as a separate centre, which reflects an alternative reading of 
Russia’s identity and of Russia’s place in the international power structure, 
induces a conception in Russia of relations with the West more in terms of a 
zero-sum power game. The security logic derived from this alternative 
worldview largely dictates policy measures aimed at balancing the influence 
of the Western centre. Accordingly, the two security logics give rise to dif-
ferent prescriptions for Russia’s foreign policy.26 
The model also incorporates a third dimension constituted by a Christian–
Muslim divide, and depicts Russia and the West on the same side of this 
split. This reflects a widely conceived difference in the values, norms and 
culture that dominate the Christian and the Islamic worlds respectively, and 
is inspired by the work of Huntington (1993). One hypothesis is that security 
identities and threat perceptions shared by Russia and the West on the basis 
                                                     
26  A similar way of conceptualising post-Cold War security thinking can be found in Geo-
politics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territory and Identity (Tunander et al. (eds) 
(1997)); see particularly Tunander’s chapter on what he calls ‘a synthesis of a bipolar 
friend–foe structure and a hierarchic cosmos–chaos structure’ (pp.17–44). The focus in 
their work on access to decision-making centres and on the role of ‘in-between structures’ 
(ibid.:6) has inspired the approach chosen in this study. Still, the notion of ‘security 
logic’, which reflects an actor’s (subjective) reading of ‘self’ in relation to ‘structure’, 
represents an important difference in our approaches.  
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of securitisation of norms and values associated with the notion of a distinct 
Christian civilisation should increase the potential scope for Russian–
Western security cooperation and facilitate the establishment and use of 
shared institutional arrangements to pursue shared interests.27 
This model should be seen as a conceptual lens, a mind-map or a depic-
tion of how actors may structure their identities, their threat perceptions and 
their reading of security relations with other actors. The basic logic underly-
ing the model is that where actors stand or see themselves in relation to the 
three dimensions is central in shaping their security thinking and therefore 
also their security behaviour. I will argue in this study that the three dimen-
sions in the model seem to capture facets of Russian security thinking that 
were central in shaping Russia’s security interests and behaviour during the 
1990s, and that the model can therefore be used to cast light on Russia’s ap-
proach to the construction of a post-Cold War European security architec-
ture. In Chapter 2, I will present the model in more detail, and put forward 
some hypotheses concerning expected (patterns of) behaviour with regard to 
institutional security arrangements.  
1.3 On sources and methodology: The importance of inter-
pretation28 
In one sense, this study contains nothing new. It does not reflect findings 
from interviews or archive materials that have never previously been exam-
ined. Rather, the analysis is based on findings from an unstructured collec-
tion of data from various Russian and Western newspapers, periodicals and 
web sites. I rely on a number of independent sources ranging from officially 
sanctioned doctrines or concepts regulating Russia’s foreign and security 
policy to analyses by Russian and Western scholars of matters pertaining to 
the theme of this study. Central sources are periodical and newspaper articles 
that convey information about Russian statements, initiatives, proposals, re-
sponses and decisions regarding Russian–Western relations in general and 
Russia’s policy vis-à-vis NATO and OSCE in particular. Texts reflecting 
Russia’s formal commitment to cooperative security arrangements with the 
West are also important. With regard to Russian political statements, utter-
ances by members of the executive branch of government constitute the 
main bulk of evidence (i.e., president, foreign minister, defence minister, 
high-ranking officials etc.), although inputs from a broadly conceived politi-
cal and intellectual ‘elite’ are also incorporated. 
Variations in the dependent variable will be traced largely by means of 
textual analysis and interpretation of these documents and of Russia’s com-
mitments to formalised security cooperation with the West. With regard to 
statements made by Russian officials or people in a broadly conceived elite, 
I have sought to evaluate both the contents and addressees of these. This re-
                                                     
27 This is of course not to say that there exists an undisputed ontological basis for the belief 
that the Christian and Muslim worlds can be regarded as two different civilisations, nor 
that Huntington’s argument (1993) is valid. My point here, which I will seek to elaborate 
in the analysis, is that state leaders tend to portray the world along the lines drawn up by 
Huntington, and that this has consequences for states’ security policies and behaviour. 
28  A more substantive chapter on methodology was incorporated in the original dissertation, 
which will become available in an electronic library on the home pages of Department of 
Political Science, University of Oslo, see: www.stv.uio.no.  
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flects my concern with being sensitive to the fact that sources may convey 
not only (more or less credible) information about a course of events, but 
also represent ‘performative’ or ‘speech’ acts (Dahl 1994:34–37; Buzan et 
al. 1998). In other words, some sources can be seen as attempts to influence 
Russia’s policy or the overall course of events.  
Although concern with textual analysis and the (instrumental) use of lan-
guage as means to influence policy is part of this study, I have chosen not to 
adhere to a stringent methodology of discourse. As I shall elaborate later, by 
regarding security as a speech act, I am concerned with how actors’ dis-
courses on security work within a social context and may induce particular 
security thinking and contribute to the adoption of policy measures. I sympa-
thise with the view that the construction of (competing) discourses may be 
relevant for many IR studies (Neumann 2001). Also, the observation that ac-
tors may use language instrumentally as means to influence policy is rele-
vant for this study. This is arguably the very essence of politics. 
Nevertheless, discourse methodology is applied here only implicitly. This 
choice has been conditioned by an observed weakness of discourse analysis 
related to the danger of reading too much into documents and texts and to 
put too much focus on the discourses themselves. As Buzan et al. (1998:177) 
point out: ‘Discourse analysis can uncover one thing: discourse.’ Discourse 
analysis is less helpful in uncovering the material and social structures that 
underlie the discourses themselves. Transferred to this study, discourse 
analysis is a poor instrument when we seek to reveal more or less plausible 
‘causes’, intentions and motives behind Russian policy and commitments. 
Since focus here is not on the different Russian security discourses them-
selves but rather on understanding or interpreting the rationale behind Rus-
sia’s foreign policy, I will pursue a more traditional political analysis of units 
interacting and of the various facilitating conditions that affected policies 
and outcomes. 
An analysis of this kind by necessity leaves much to the researcher’s in-
terpretation of sources in a given context. It is an extremely difficult exercise 
to ‘measure’ variables like identity, threat perceptions and amity–enmity 
considerations. And even if there exists an ‘objective reality’ or a distinct 
combination of factors that constitute the ‘real’ explanation of Russia’s pol-
icy, I cannot claim to have uncovered these. What I can do is to present my 
interpretation of events and one reading of Russia’s policy.  
This raises the challenge of securing reliability and validity, which can be 
seen as criteria for evaluating the quality of a scientific study. Given the 
largely interpretative approach chosen in this study, which departs somewhat 
from a more strict, positivist conception of science and the belief that there 
exist undisputed ‘hard facts’ and an ‘objective reality’ that can be uncovered, 
considerations regarding validity and reliability to a great extent rest on the 
credibility, confirmability and trustworthiness of the argument (Yin 
1994:32–38). Thus, relevant questions for judging the quality of this study 
are: Are the basic assumptions outlined above fair or reasonable? Is the ar-
gument consistent in the sense that the conclusions drawn are compatible 
with the assumptions made at the outset? Are the data relevant for the issue 
under study? Have I used the most important sources available? Are the 
sources applied sufficiently central to legitimate their application? Are my 
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interpretations of the meaning and importance of these sources reasonable or 
at least plausible? Confirmative answers to these questions may reflect high 
quality. Yet I cannot exclude that if another researcher sat down with the 
same material, he or she might still interpret some texts differently and at-
tach different meanings or relative importance to some sources. The final 
judge regarding the quality of this analysis is the reader.  
I should add one final comment with regard to the perceived relevance 
and centrality of some basic texts, and to the danger of attributing too much 
significance to particular documents. It has been argued that ideas are likely 
to shape policy more under conditions of uncertainty and when the external 
environment is in flux (Wallander 1996). The break-up of the Soviet Union 
and the eruption of new internal and external challenges for post-Soviet Rus-
sia sparked domestic debate on the question of national identity, and pre-
sented Russian leaders with the task of outlining a new foreign and security 
policy. As indicated above, I draw explicitly on some documents that were 
adopted at various stages in the 1990s, and which can be regarded as part of 
the doctrinal basis for Russia’s policy vis-à-vis external actors. I assume that 
these officially sanctioned doctrines or basic policy concepts are relevant 
and can be used to cast light on Russia’s approach to institutionalised secu-
rity cooperation in Europe. Foreign Minister Kozyrev wrote in 1993 that 
Russia’s newly adopted foreign policy concept ‘generalises key directions’, 
‘reflects fundamental interests’ and represents ‘a flexible system of guide-
lines for day-to-day foreign policy practice’.29 Similarly, then Security 
Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin (1997) wrote that the national security con-
cept adopted in 1997, which also includes assessments of and prescriptions 
for Russia’s foreign policy, can be seen as ‘the backbone’ and ‘ideological 
basis’ for the construction of Russia and of Russia’s security policy. Hence, 
these documents contain more than empty phrases. There is no saying that 
they were crucial or the only factors shaping policy. However, they reflect 
officially sanctioned views on Russia’s foreign and security policy, and were 
central in shaping domestic debate on questions of national identity, security 
and foreign policy. Thus, if treated with appropriate care, and if triangulated 
with other data, they appear particularly relevant for this study. 
1.4 Structure of the study 
These introductory sections indicate that I have made some choices that will 
have implications for the structuring and interpretation of the empirical data 
to be analysed. These choices entail several questions of ontological and 
epistemological character, some of which will be dealt with in Chapter 2. By 
seeing constructivism as well suited for developing a theoretical framework 
that takes account of insights derived from both realist and liberal theory, I 
may cause confusion and perhaps even anger among scholars who see them-
selves as members of a particular IR ‘camp’, and who feel that there is little 
                                                     
29  See Kozyrev’s cover letter to then Chairman in the Supreme Soviet Committee for Inter-
national Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties Yevgeny Ambartsumov, which accompanied 
the text of the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept (‘Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii’ (1993)). 
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or no room for debate across theoretical divides.30 Of course, alternative 
theoretical approaches or analytical lenses could have been chosen. How-
ever, any modelling of state behaviour will fail to incorporate features – per-
haps even significant ones – of the phenomenon being analysed. I feel com-
fortable with the choices made here, and believe that they provide a good ba-
sis for analysing Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War 
security architecture in Europe. 
The rest of this study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the con-
cept of ‘security’ and presents in more detail the explanatory framework 
briefly introduced above. Chapter 3 analyses what I label ‘the formative 
years’ of Russian policy (1991–93). Here, focus is on the domestic debate on 
Russia’s national identity and national interests, which by 1993 had evolved 
into a certain consensus regarding main orientations in foreign policy. In 
light of this debate, Chapter 3 also examines Russia’s relations with NATO 
and CSCE during this early period. Chapter 4 analyses two later periods 
(1993–96 and 1996–2000), central to which were Russian opposition and 
policy responses to emerging NATO-centrism as the basis for Europe’s se-
curity architecture. Chapter 5 provides some concluding remarks, and points 
to questions for further research on the basis of a brief assessment of how the 
analytical framework applied here may be relevant for analysing develop-
ments in Russian foreign policy under President Putin and particularly in the 
wake of 11 September.31 
                                                     
30  Here I have in mind the notion of ‘incommensurability’ or the view that there can be no 
borrowing of basic assumptions from one worldview to another and that different (IR) 
theories (or paradigms) cannot be tested against each other because they ‘don’t speak the 
same language’ and don’t use the same terms/concepts (Wæver 1996:158–161). A second 
objection against integration of components from different world perspectives relates to 
the observation that these also reflect different normative programmes (ibid.:172; Little 
and Smith 1991). 
31  In a study of this kind, any classification of time periods will be arbitrary. None of the 
intervals applied here are ‘natural’ in the sense that the temporal boundaries reflect fun-
damental shifts in Russia’s policy or constitute sharp and unquestionable changes in the 
subject under study. Arguments may be presented in favour of choosing alternative inter-
vals. The rationale behind my choice is sought reflected in the analysis in Chapters 3 and 
4. 
2.0 Security: A framework for analysis 
This chapter introduces in more detail the theoretical framework that will be 
applied in the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. I start by looking at the very con-
cept of ‘security’ in IR theory (2.1). Section 2.2 provides a brief outline of 
how security has been conceptualised and studied within the realist and lib-
eral traditions. The main part of this chapter (2.3) is devoted to an in-depth 
presentation of some central components in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001), 
which portrays a way of incorporating insights from both the realist and lib-
eral traditions into analyses of state behaviour and international outcomes. 
On the basis of this framework I then (2.4) derive some hypotheses about 
Russia’s expected behaviour with regard to security cooperation with the 
West. 
2.1 The concept of ‘security’ in International Relations theory 
The concept of security is central to the study of IR. In one sense, it is what 
the study of world politics is all about. Nonetheless, as one scholar argues, 
there is ‘no common understanding of what security is, how it can be con-
ceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are’ (Haftendorn 
1991:15). In a similar mode, Buzan (1991:3–12) describes ‘security’ as an 
‘ambiguous’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘neglected’ and ‘essentially contested’ con-
cept.32 Consequently, there is also no single manual or universally recog-
nised prescription for how to conduct studies of security issues.  
Despite this lack of consensus as to what ‘security’ entails and how it can 
be studied, we may identify some connotations or features commonly at-
tached to this label. First, security relates to perceived or actual insecurity or 
to a feeling or condition of (intense) risk or (existential) threat against a ‘ref-
erent object’ (Buzan et al. 1998:36; Buzan 1991:26). Referent objects are 
essentially answers to the question: ‘The security of whom (or what)?’ These 
are things or phenomena that may be subject to risks and threats and that are 
perceived to have some legitimate claim to survival (i.e., a state, an individ-
ual, a nation, a culture, core values, etc.). Security, therefore, can be re-
garded as the absence of, or the pursuit of freedom from, risks or threats to 
acquired values or tangibles that are viewed as vital in some sense (Buzan 
1991:18).  
Semantically, the term ‘security’ has an absolute flavour to it. Neverthe-
less, security is often regarded (by actors) in relative terms. Security is 
something of which one can have more or less (Baldwin 1997:16). It makes 
sense, therefore, to speak about degrees of security and insecurity. This is of 
course not to say that security is a good of which one should always seek 
                                                     
32  The notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’ reflects the view that some scientific con-
cepts by necessity seem to entail unsolvable debates about their meaning and application 
(Buzan 1991:7). In other words, the disputes around a concept of this kind cannot be set-
tled by empirical investigation. 
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more. Although it may appear wise to introduce measures aimed at increas-
ing the perceived level of security, there will often be a price to pay in terms 
of political, economic or social costs (ibid.; Wæver 1995). Security must 
therefore often be traded or balanced with other core values, such as ‘free-
dom’ or a broader notion of ‘welfare’, or even with the security (or core val-
ues) of others (Herz 1950). What is to be avoided is excessive scarcity or to-
tal absence of security.  
Security should also be understood in relational terms (Buzan 1991). The 
concept has to do with the interplay among units. The ‘source’ of insecurity 
is often perceived to be a phenomenon outside of, or external to, the referent 
object. This leads one to think of security in terms of spatial proximity. For 
instance, if we are interested in security relations between states, geography 
becomes a relevant factor. Threats and risks are often felt more acutely over 
short distances. Yet a strict inside/outside divide is not always helpful when 
conducting security studies. Risks and threats may work over long distances 
and may arise also from within the referent objects themselves.  
Adding to this complexity, the concept of security has both an objective 
and a subjective side to it. Threats and risks may be ‘real’ in the sense that 
they exit objectively and independently of actors’ perceptions. This implies 
that a unit exposed to threats and risks may sometimes be unaware of their 
existence. In other words, the referent object of security – for example, a 
state – may be insecure even if it does not recognise that this is the situation. 
If that is the case, then ‘real’ threats in the international system – the exis-
tence of a hidden nuclear arsenal combined with an unexposed intention to 
use it for aggressive purposes – do not necessarily influence the behaviour of 
their potential or intended victims. The opposite is also true: Threats and 
risks may be constructs of mind. A state or an individual may feel insecure 
or threatened even though there may exist no ‘real’ basis or ‘objective’ rea-
sons for this feeling. The objective/subjective dichotomy, therefore, points to 
the importance of perceptions – and misperceptions – in international rela-
tions (Jervis 1976).  
Last, but no least, security implies concern with (potential) developments 
and events in the future (Baldwin 1997:17). Although the term ‘security’ of-
ten entails assessments of a present situation, it is intimately linked to 
(uncertain) forecasts about conditions in the future. These forecasts emerge 
from calculations of intentions and probabilities, and may often involve dif-
ferent scenarios for the future, be it in an immediate, medium or long-term 
perspective. Predictability, therefore, and (the obtainment of) credible infor-
mation about what is going to happen in the future, is often integral to ac-
tors’ security concerns. In one sense, predictability can be regarded as a uni-
versal core value, because it provides actors with the opportunity to address 
security issues and threats and to adopt policy measures in due time.33 
                                                     
33  See Baldwin (1997), Haftendorn (1991) or Buzan et al. (1998) for more detailed discus-
sions of ‘security’ in IR theory. The latter work also provides a useful introduction to the 
‘wide vs. narrow’ debate, which concerns the (analytical and normative) wisdom of ex-
tending the application of the term ‘security’ to encompass non-military and non-state is-
sues (i.e., environmental security, economic security, global security, societal security 
etc.). 
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2.2 Security in the realist and liberal traditions 
Realism and liberalism can be regarded as different perceptual lenses or as 
‘complementary views of the world’ (Kauppi and Viotti 1993:5). One may 
argue that the two images are theoretically equipped for dealing with differ-
ent aspects of world politics, and that they are not equally fit for addressing 
the same issues or for answering the same questions. Since they differ in re-
search focus, they also tend to ‘see’ different things (ibid.). Thus, depending 
on what is being studied, there is reason to assume that insights from both 
traditions could be useful in many analyses.34  
2.2.1 Realism: Anarchy, military power and the primacy of national se-
curity 
Realist analyses start from a state-centrist worldview and from the premise 
of international anarchy (Kauppi and Viotti 1993:5–7; Donnelly 2000; 
Frankel (ed.) 1996). Since the international system is essentially a self-help 
order, some realists regard security as the prime motive behind states’ be-
haviour (Waltz 1979). Others argue that lust for power is their main driving 
force (Morgenthau 1985 [1948]). In either case, realists assume that states’ 
pursuit of these objectives generate a struggle for power in the international 
system (Donnelly 2000). And since military capabilities are regarded as the 
ultimate means of power states can possess, concern with balancing (or out-
weighing) the military capabilities of others lies at the core of the interna-
tional power struggle. Thus, realists start from seeing states having incom-
patible interests, and assume that this fosters tensions and inhibits coopera-
tion among them. Realists also tend to focus on the potential for war and 
conflict in world politics. Accordingly, there are strong sentiments of pessi-
mism in the worldview of many realist writers.35  
Realism is a useful starting point for this analysis because it emphasises 
the important role of national security as a driving force behind state behav-
iour. Realists assume that ‘within the hierarchy of international issues, na-
tional security usually tops the list’ (Kauppi and Viotti 1993:7). This onto-
logical claim reflects the view that before states do anything else, they must 
make sure that they will survive as political-territorial units. As one scholar 
puts it: ‘Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may 
                                                     
34  A third main IR school or tradition is variably referred to as Marxism, radicalism, struc-
turalism or globalism (Kauppi and Viotti 1993; Wæver 1996). There is some discussion 
as to whether these three traditions or schools can be regarded as theories of IR. This am-
biguity arises partly from the term ‘theory’ itself, and partly from the related difficulty of 
defining a set of ‘liberal’, ‘realist’ and ‘globalist’ assumptions about how the world hangs 
together. For instance, Frankel (1996:xiii) asserts that ‘realism is a paradigm, not a the-
ory’. He speaks of realism as a ‘collection of assumptions’ and of ‘different realist 
schools’ belonging to a broader ‘realist family’ (ibid.:xiii–xiv). In his turn, Donnelly 
(2000:6–9) sees realism as an ‘approach’ that reflects a philosophical disposition, a mode 
of thinking, or a distinct, but still diverse, style or tradition of analysis. Here I regard both 
liberalism and realism as ‘worldviews’ or ‘perspectives’ rather than as ‘theories’ in a 
more strict, scientific sense. 
35  Some realists would not agree with this view. Glaser (1994) speaks explicitly of realists as 
optimists. Spirtas (in Frankel (ed.) 1996) identifies two different realist schools of ‘trag-
edy’ (systemic-driven) and ‘evil’ (motivation-driven), in which the former is apparently 
rooted in a more pessimistic worldview than the latter. 
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have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political 
entities’ (Waltz 1979:91).36 
The current approach sympathises with this argument. Concern with na-
tional security – and the means to achieve it – is assumed to lie at the core of 
Russia’s foreign policy conduct. I regard as relevant also the realist assump-
tion that states’ concern with security entails concern also with their (rela-
tive) power position. However, this does not imply that Russia has a fixed 
perception of what the actual or desired conditions for national security are; 
that power is regarded by Russia only in terms of military capabilities; or 
that Russia cannot formulate interests that go beyond the goal of mere sur-
vival. In fact, it is the very application of the term ‘security’ and the manner 
and extent to which national security, power considerations and other state 
interests have affected Russia’s policy that constitute the theme of this study.  
2.2.2 Liberalism: Anarchy revisited and security redefined 
Liberal approaches to IR have confronted realism along several dimensions: 
By challenging its state-centrist worldview; by questioning the utility of 
treating states as ‘unitary, rational actors’; and by disputing the (pessimistic) 
implications drawn by realists from international anarchy (Little 1996:74–
77; Kauppi and Viotti 1993:7–8; 228–232). To be sure, most liberals accept 
that ‘anarchy’ captures an important feature of world politics (Kauppi and 
Viotti 1993:231). They also acknowledge that anarchy may foster distrust 
and fear among states, and that this may pose an obstacle to international co-
operation and peace. However, rather than seeing anarchy produce a world 
of conflicting interests, liberal scholars assume that there exist a mixture of 
shared, complementary and incompatible interests among states (ibid.:233). 
Liberals have also been concerned with how anarchy is modified: By actors’ 
interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977); by the existence of international 
institutions (Keohane 1989); and by other factors – systemic or unit attrib-
utes – that contribute to make the world less brutal or conflicting. Accord-
ingly, liberal scholars tend to find greater scope for international cooperation 
(and peace) than their realist counterparts.37 
In a fundamental sense, therefore, liberalism paints a more complex pic-
ture of world politics than does realism. With regard to security, some im-
portant differences are reflected in their (relative) research focus. Firstly, 
there has been a tendency among liberal scholars to leave studies of mili-
tary/national security to the realists. Indicative to this, neither interdepend-
ence theory nor neoliberalism have been theoretically or empirically con-
cerned primarily with security issues. Secondly, to the extent that liberal 
                                                     
36  On the basis of this argument, Waltz (1979) assumes that states will be driven towards 
seeking a minimum of power defined as capabilities that may secure survival. Since the 
ability of states to survive in the ultimate case will depend on their material capabilities 
and their relative position in the international structure (weaponry, economy, alliances), 
the obtainment of these become central motives in states’ behaviour. 
37  Neorealism and the interdependence school are only two branches of a broadly conceived 
liberal worldview concerned with how anarchy is modified. Others would stress the im-
portance of shared identities, norms and informal rules of behaviour, or argue that ‘anar-
chy’ itself is socially constructed (Wendt 1992; 1999; Katzenstein (ed.) (1996)). There is 
arguably a close link between liberalism/neoliberalism and constructivism when it comes 
to criticism of a (material and conflict-oriented) realist worldview (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 
2001:23–25).  
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scholars have engaged explicitly in security studies, many have regarded se-
curity in collectivist rather than national or state-centred terms, or ap-
proached it through a prism of individual security (Buzan 1991). This argua-
bly reflects their concern with interdependence among various actors in 
world politics and their rejection of the idea that there exists a hierarchy of 
issues in world politics. Thirdly, whereas realists tend to see security and 
power in terms of military capabilities, liberal scholars have been more con-
cerned with ‘issue-specific capabilities’ and the role of institutions and 
norms as constraining factors on military power projection in world politics 
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1989). 
Liberalism has contributed with some useful correctives to the rather nar-
row frameworks of many realist writers. Here I shall draw particularly on 
insights from neoliberalism38 regarding the role of international (security) 
institutions. Institutions can be defined as ‘persistent and connected sets of 
rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activ-
ity and shape expectations’ (Keohane 1989:3). Keohane (ibid.:2–3) assumes 
that international institutions are important because they affect the environ-
ment states operate in: By increasing the flow of information and opportuni-
ties to negotiate; by improving the ability to make and implement decisions 
and to monitor each other’s compliance with agreements; and by inducing 
expectations with regard to interstate behaviour. And since actors in the in-
ternational system are differently positioned with regard to formal and in-
formal institutional arrangements, they can also be expected to behave dif-
ferently (ibid.). 
In a work devoted to the particular role of security institutions, Haften-
dorn et al. (eds) (1999) have outlined some important security dividends for 
states that can be derived from participation in such arrangements. Most 
fundamentally, access to security institutions is an investment in information 
that may reduce uncertainty and increase predictability and thus enable states 
to design security strategies appropriate to their situation (ibid.:1–4). Institu-
tions not only provide information about the interests, capabilities and inten-
tions of other states and thus complement states’ threat assessments. They 
can also serve as informational or signalling mechanisms with regard to own 
interests and intentions. Hence, security institutions are arenas for communi-
cation and tables for mediation of states’ security interests and concerns. 
Furthermore, security institutions may foster development of norms and 
rules that regularise state behaviour and facilitate realisation of shared inter-
ests with regard to challenges or risks that are ‘unintentional’ or not posed by 
any particular actor(s). Haftendorn et al. (eds) (1999) assume that these (po-
tential) security dividends contribute to make participation in institutional 
arrangements attractive for states. This assumption is an important starting 
point for the current analysis of Russia’s policy. 
Insights from a broadly conceived liberal perspective have inspired my 
approach in one additional and important way. Although states are assumed 
to be purposive agents that approach decisions in a cost–beneficial or utili-
tarian manner, I sympathise with the liberal (and constructivist) arguments in 
favour of opening up the ‘state box’ and look also at internal features that 
                                                     
38  Or ‘neoliberal institutionalism’; the terms usually apply to the same group of scholars/ 
works (Baldwin 1993). 
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may affect the formulation of states interests and decisions at a given point. 
At one level, this dictates a certain sensitivity vis-à-vis various societal con-
ditions (i.e., the internal Russian ‘state of affairs’) and the (potential) effects 
on Russian decisions resulting from domestic political pressure groups. Yet 
on a more fundamental level I am also concerned with how changes and con-
tinuities in Russia’s (officially accepted) ‘identity’ constrained or disposed 
the government’s decisions. However pragmatic, this stance may arguably 
contribute to make the analysis more rich and comprehensive.39 
2.3 A model for post-Cold War security thinking 
The preceding sections show that there exists great diversity when it comes 
to conceptualisation of ‘security’ in IR theory and some fundamental differ-
ences in the way two dominating traditions have approached security issues. 
Beyond the basic concept of ‘anarchy’, realism has contributed with some 
lasting insights regarding power politics, the centrality of states, the logic of 
survival, and the dynamics of security/insecurity in world politics (Buzan 
1996:59–61). Nonetheless, a broadly conceived liberal tradition has contrib-
uted with some necessary correctives based on the observation that world 
politics is often more complex and less conflicting than what is often de-
picted by realists. As indicated above, I believe that insights from both tradi-
tions may be helpful in an analysis of Russia’s policy. 
2.3.1 Subjective security and the notion of ‘securitisation’ 
This study posits security primarily in subjectivist terms: Security is a feel-
ing or a perceived condition. Presumably, Russia’s behaviour is affected not 
by the ‘objective existence’ of risks or threats, but rather by the security 
thinking and threat perceptions that prevail among the policymaking elite in 
Moscow.40 With this in mind, I find the concept of ‘securitisation’ advocated 
by scholars such as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan a useful instrument 
(Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). In their view, security is essentially about 
the framing (by actors) of phenomena as existentially threatened with the 
aim of justifying particular actions or influencing decisions or outcomes. 
These scholars start from the idea that any public issues can be depicted on a 
scale according to its perceived urgency or priority: Issues may be non-
politicised, politicised or securitised (Buzan et al. 1998:23). These categories 
are in principle open in the sense that actors may have different opinions 
with regard to what issues should be treated in terms of security. Thus, secu-
rity manifests itself through an intersubjective discourse in which some ac-
tors – the ‘securitising actors’ – ‘speak’ security by declaring certain objects 
                                                     
39  During the 1980s and early 1990s, debate between representatives of neorealism and neo-
liberalism emerged as perhaps the defining feature of IR theory (Wæver 1996; Ruggie 
1998:4–11). Both ‘neos’ underwent development in direction of becoming IR ‘theories’ in 
a more strict, positivist (‘scientific’) sense. The two were also seen as increasingly com-
patible (‘neo-neo synthesis’), with scholars from both camps engaging in empirical stud-
ies on the consequences of anarchy, on the scope and likelihood of international coopera-
tion, and on the role of international institutions (Baldwin (ed.) 1993). Arguably, it was 
the theoretical minimalism and the largely positivist conception of science in these studies 
that sparked the ‘constructivist turn’ in IR theory in the 1990s (Checkel (1998); but see 
also Hopf (1998) and Ruggie (1998)). 
40  This is of course not to say that ‘objective’ factors are irrelevant. 
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as existentially threatened (ibid.:23–42; Wæver 1995). In other words, secu-
rity issues emerge on the public scene through ‘speech acts’ or utterances re-
garding threats and survival. Securitisation, then, can be understood as the 
(successful) moving of an issue into the third category or its elevation into a 
matter of high(est) priority. 
In essence, therefore, this approach implies focus on how actors attach 
the security label onto particular phenomena or tangibles with the aim of jus-
tifying the use of instruments that are usually considered to be beyond the 
borders of regular politics in order to influence decisions and outcomes. Yet 
there is no saying that a speech act or a ‘securitising move’ will always be 
accepted or bring about its intended effects, which essentially implies that 
the issue has been successfully securitised (Buzan et al. 1998:25–26). Also, 
an actor who wants to securitise an issue does not necessarily use the term 
‘security’, while the utterance of the word ‘security’ does not always consti-
tute a speech act (ibid.:33). Thus, security analysis within this framework 
consists in disclosing whether actors’ discourses take a form of (consciously) 
presenting referent objects in terms of survival and existential threats 
(ibid.:23–42). 
In world politics, states value and therefore securitise different referent 
objects. This is reflected in their policies and resource allocations. The state 
itself, and its survival as a political-territorial unit, is usually a top priority 
for states. Yet beyond this, states differ profoundly when it comes to defin-
ing issues in terms of survival and existential threats or as vital in a broader 
sense (i.e., a religion, ideas, a value-based order, a role, etc.). This may in-
hibit international cooperation, since it implies that states operate with dif-
ferent value scales and regard issues through different lenses. 
One assumption that is not discussed explicitly by Buzan et al. (1998), 
but which will be incorporated in the current analysis, is the notion of secu-
ritisation as a means to detract political, military or economic concessions or 
compensations. By attaching the security label onto an object, an issue or a 
development, actors may not only legitimise resource allocations and the use 
of extraordinary political or military measures. They may also increase indi-
vidual payoffs in processes of political bargaining and negotiation. A state 
which succeeds in convincing an international audience that it has particular 
security interests connected to a matter being discussed, may (potentially) 
also increase its own payoffs if decisions made in a process of bargaining 
and negotiation appear to run counter to those proclaimed security interests. 
Securitisation as a means to detract different compensations or concessions 
appears appropriate to describe situations where ‘political gravity’ and the 
assumptions of realist theory concerning material constraints work against an 
actor’s interests. 
Buzan et al. (1998) present a rather extensive framework for analysis. 
One problematic feature in their approach is their failure to define more ex-
plicitly when an issue has been successfully securitised. However, with re-
gard to my study, the adoption of official concepts and doctrines regulating 
Russian foreign, security and defence policy can arguably be regarded as the 
successful securitisation of particular speech acts or securitising moves. An 
important part of the analysis below consists in tracing the Russian discourse 
on security (i.e., threat, survival etc.) in order to see how certain issues be-
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came elevated to security issues or were defined as vital national interests. 
This implies inquiry into how and why arguments were presented (by vari-
ous securitising actors) in favour of seeing certain issues as particularly im-
portant or as existentially threatened (i.e., the survival of the state; instability 
in periphery; the protection of Russians abroad; the revival of a great power 
role; the potential rise of NATO-centrism etc.). The findings from this in-
quiry will then be used to address questions concerning implications for 
Russian–Western security cooperation. 
2.3.2 The notion of ‘international power structure’ 
Most IR scholars would accept the assumption that a broadly conceived ‘in-
ternational environment’ or ‘structure’ influences the behaviour of states in 
the sense that it keeps them from taking certain actions and disposes them 
toward taking others. Here I shall apply the concept of ‘international power 
structure’ suggested in Kjølberg and Jeppesen (2001:12–14). ‘Power’ can be 
defined as the ability of actors to influence the behaviour of other actors and 
to have other actors take oneself and one’s own interests into account in their 
behaviour (ibid.:13). Accordingly, ‘international power structure’ can be de-
fined as the actors’ image of a system’s power distribution, or their picture 
of how the possibility to affect behaviour (and outcomes) is distributed 
among actors in world politics (ibid.:8;13). As argued earlier, this power 
structure becomes visible to the actors as ‘feedback’ on their own and other 
actors’ behaviour.  
Again, this approach is derived from the assumption that states’ behav-
iour is conditioned not primarily by an objectively existing distribution of 
capabilities, but rather by their perception of power relations. This is where 
international institutions and norms enter the picture. I assume here that in-
ternational institutions and norms are the medium or the intervening sub-
stance required to transform economic resources and military capabilities 
into influence or effects on state behaviour and outcomes in world politics. I 
also assume that actors recognise this fact. States take norms and institutions 
into account as a structural constraint on their own behaviour and expect that 
other states do the same. Theoretically, the range of possible state actions is 
almost infinite. However, behaviour that breaks with a system’s existing 
formal and informal rules or standards of behaviour will usually entail sanc-
tions in terms of economic, political or military costs. Thus, institutions and 
norms are important because they affect states’ cost–benefit analyses when it 
comes to deciding on actions or behaviour. 
Accordingly, since actors in the international system are differently posi-
tioned with regard to institutional arrangements, they can also be expected to 
behave differently. In other words, variations in states’ relative connected-
ness to international institutions may have significant impact on their behav-
iour. There are actually two levels to this assertion, one of which concerns 
actors’ relative positions vis-à-vis formal institutions, the other vis-à-vis a 
system’s norms. As argued by Haftendorn et al. (1999), there is often a long-
term perspective underlying states’ commitments to formal institutions in the 
sense that these – over a longer time span – can be expected to give rise to 
norms and more informal rules of behaviour that may increase overall pre-
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dictability in a system. Accordingly, it is also fair to assume that states have 
an interest in trying to affect both the normative and institutional ‘make-up’ 
of a system. 
More precisely, since ‘power structure’ is more than distribution of capa-
bilities, I assume here that states will seek to improve their relative positions 
vis-à-vis the other power factors in a way that may serve their own interests. 
In a highly institutionalised environment, this implies that states will try to 
increase their own level of participation in decision-making processes. In 
other words, states will try to increase their own weight in terms of access to, 
participation in and relative heaviness on these formal and informal arenas. I 
also assume that states will seek to affect the functional scope and geo-
graphical domain of international institutions and norms, or the range of is-
sues and extent of values that are regulated by these intermediate factors. 
Arguably, states will seek to expand the functional scope and geographical 
domain of institutions and norms that give good prospects for one’s own 
possibility to project power and influence developments, and to limit the 
scope and domain of institutional arrangements and informal rules perceived 
to be detrimental to one’s own interests. 
By incorporating international institutions and norms into the notion of 
‘international power structure’, the current approach challenges the rather 
‘material’ structure depicted by Waltz (1979). I still regard his argument as 
relevant for many security analyses, and believe that the systemic distribu-
tion of economic resources and military capabilities is often incorporated in 
states’ perception of power relations. Also, material capabilities can in some 
cases be regarded as necessary conditions for the exercise of power. How-
ever, the term ‘international power structure’ incorporates something more 
and suggests a conception of structure that is more sensitive to some addi-
tional effects on states’ behaviour that stem from a broadly conceived ‘sys-
temic environment’, but which may still vary in importance across different 
systems. 
Again, the role of perception is an important difference between structure 
as ‘capability distribution’ and structure in terms of ‘power distribution’. 
Distribution of capabilities is a relatively concrete phenomenon. This largely 
material structure can be ‘measured’ more or less independently of actors’ 
perception or interpretation of it. The notion of ‘power structure’ will also 
have a certain basis in concrete and objectively existing phenomena. How-
ever, since the international power structure is essentially an actor’s (subjec-
tive) image of power relations that comes about through interaction with an 
external environment, there is not always a common understanding among 
actors as to what constitutes the power structure. In other words, there may 
be divergent views as to what the external environment looks like and there-
fore also with regard to what is considered legitimate or appropriate behav-
iour. This is important when we seek to understand the behaviour of actors 
that are differently situated in terms of both geography and a system’s mate-
rial and institutional composition. 
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2.3.3 The new international power structure 
The new (global) international power structure can be seen as unipolar, with 
the West making up a single dominating pole and with the US constituting 
the ‘core’ of this Western centre (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 2001:31–36). This 
depiction is based on several arguments. First, the West has an overwhelm-
ingly dominating position when it comes to (material) power resources in 
terms of military, economic and technological capabilities. Second, the Wes-
tern institutions (NATO, EU, G–8, IMF, WB) appear to be the most impor-
tant arenas and instruments for regulation of international military, political 
and economic affairs. Thus, these institutions are attractive in the sense that 
membership or formalised association with them is desirable for many out-
side actors. This leaves the West with possibilities to influence actors that 
are aspiring to these arenas. Third, the disappearance of (Soviet) commu-
nism as a competing political and economic system has made the world 
more receptive to ‘Western’ norms (free trade, democracy, human rights) 
and contributed to give these a rather dominating position in world politics. 
In other words, the informal rules of international politics are shaped by pre-
mises that largely origin in the West. In sum, therefore, these arguments may 
justify seeing the post-Cold War international power structure as unipolar.  
However, this picture is of course very simplistic. In terms of economy, 
there are obvious signs of (emerging) multipolarity. Adding to this, the 
norms of the West are of course not the only ones manifest in world politics. 
Thus, the international power structure is complex and multifaceted. With 
regard to the analysis below, I should again stress its subjective and relative 
character: What the international power structure ‘looks like’ depends to a 
great extent on where actors ‘see’ themselves and on what issue or issue area 
is being considered. Also, its expressions and significance for states’ behav-
iour may vary in different parts of the world, with regional centres or poles 
often serving as interfering factors. These are states or groups of states that 
possess a significant power potential in material, normative and/or institu-
tional terms, but whose power does not affect the global structure, and which 
are important for security relations only within geographically defined re-
gions. Thus, not only may the constitution or make-up of the international 
power structure be a disputed matter. Its importance for states’ behaviour 
may also depend on their subjective interpretation of this structure and of the 
costs implied by failing to comply with its broad ‘dictates’. 
2.3.4 Power structure, identity and security logics 
Let us return now to the conceptual model introduced in Chapter 1. This 
model can be seen as the particular expression of these reflections in a Euro-
pean context, albeit supplemented with considerations on identity align-
ments. It incorporates three dimensions assumed to be important in shaping 
the security thinking, and therefore also the security behaviour, of European 
states. The first dimension depicts Europe in terms of centres and peripher-
ies. The second denotes an East–West divide of the European continent. The 
third is constituted by a Christian–Muslim split along the southern borders of 
Europe and through the southern parts of the former Soviet Union. The logic 
behind the model is very simple: Where actors’ stand in relation to each of 
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the three dimensions is assumed to bear on their understanding of self (their 
identity) and on their perceived security interests. In other words, the model 
is assumed to capture some important features that structure actors’ security 
thinking, their threat perceptions and consequently also their security behav-
iour. Let us now take a closer look at each of the three dimensions.41  
2.3.4.1 Centre–periphery relations 
As argued in Chapter 1, the international power structure in a European con-
text can be depicted in terms of centres and peripheries. Here, the Western 
centre makes up a highly institutionalised security community based on 
shared norms and a high level of political and economic integration. The 
West can also be depicted as ‘cosmos’ or as a zone of relative peace, order, 
stability and predictability. Arguably, NATO and EU are the most important 
institutional components or the cement that binds together this Western 
community of states, which is characterised by a particular type of security 
relations: Within the Western world, states do not consider each other as ad-
versaries or potential enemies. This is an important part of their collective 
security identity. As a consequence, military power is seldom a relevant 
means to pursue state interests or solve conflicts inside the Western commu-
nity of states. 
This depiction stands in some contrast to the centre’s outlook on sur-
rounding peripheries. Seen from the centre, the periphery represents (rela-
tive) chaos and disorder. Actors in the periphery are situated outside the sta-
ble political, military and economic community of the West and are not re-
garded as part of the ordered world. These ‘outsiders’ are instead associated 
with political instability, economic failure and societal disorder. This induces 
a distinct ‘cosmos–chaos’ security logic in the West (Kjølberg and Jeppesen 
2001:16). I defined ‘security logic’ as the security thinking and the related 
security strategies that can be derived from a particular reading of the inter-
national power structure and of one’s own place in this structure. Here, seen 
from the centre, the periphery does not represent a direct military threat. On 
the contrary, it is the possible negative consequences of (broadly conceived) 
chaos and disorder in the periphery that are perceived as a potential threat to 
the relative stability in the centre.  
Accordingly, security challenges in the West will be viewed partly in 
terms of keeping the centre together and consolidating the already estab-
lished Western security community, and partly in terms of preventing possi-
ble negative influence from chaos, instability and disorder in the periphery. 
Yet this reading will also leave the centre with a limited set of alternative se-
curity strategies vis-à-vis actors in the periphery. First, the centre may try to 
integrate (parts of) the periphery by providing access to institutions and co-
operative arrangements and thereby seeking to spread the centre’s norms and 
informal rules of behaviour. A strategy of integration essentially implies re-
moval of hinders to interaction between centre and periphery. This presup-
poses a certain will in the centre to change perceptions of ‘we’ and ‘them’, 
                                                     
41  Let me remind the reader that this model is a conceptual lens or a way of mapping actors’ 
security perceptions in terms of ‘self’ and ‘other’, of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The exact pro-
jection of dividing lines for each of the three dimensions onto a geographical map is a 
matter of empirical study rather than a feature of the model itself.  
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of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, but will entail political and economic costs and 
may imply exposition to new challenges and commitment to engage in solv-
ing problems in the periphery. 
If the immediate costs of integration are perceived to be too high, the cen-
tre can instead seek to intervene or influence economic, political or societal 
developments in the periphery. This strategy presupposes (temporary) up-
holding of borders between ‘we’ and ‘them’, and aims at stabilising conditi-
ons in periphery areas in order to facilitate their possible future integration or 
to reduce the risks of negative effects (in the centre) resulting from perceived 
chaos in the periphery. This strategy will include measures of financial, poli-
tical and material support to economic reforms and domestic institution 
building in the periphery, but in the ultimate case also military intervention. 
Finally, the centre may adopt a strategy of shielding by limiting engage-
ment in common activities with periphery actors and seek to fence off per-
ceived chaos-threats by keeping these actors on a firm distance. Tightening 
of border control and denial of access to institutional arrangements can be 
relevant measures in this strategy, which is essentially aimed at building 
physical and institutional ‘walls’ around the centre. 
These strategies will seldom be pursued in their pure form. Rather, one 
may find that the centre’s policy towards the periphery is a combination of 
measures and instruments reflecting each of the three main strategies. The 
exact choice of policy will depend on cost–benefit analyses related to the 
centre’s own interests and ambitions, its material and institutional capabili-
ties, and on the perceived receptiveness in the periphery to norms and politi-
cal measures originating in the centre.42 
Similarly, actors in the periphery may pursue different strategies towards 
the Western centre, ranging from full integration to shielding. First, they 
may seek full integration by trying to appear ‘acceptable’ to the West in or-
der to become an integral part of the centre. Actors who pursue this strategy 
will have to convince the centre that the costs of integration will be limited 
or that their integration may contribute something to the Western commu-
nity. An important step towards integration can be to adopt the norms or 
standards that regulate intra- and interstate behaviour in the West.  
In terms of security, the potential gain resulting from integration may be 
twofold. First, access to markets and decision-making arenas may stimulate 
domestic economy and thereby facilitate political stability, prevent social un-
rest and increase the state’s autonomy as an actor on the international scene. 
Security challenges resulting from internal chaos may therefore be avoided 
or dealt with more effectively. However, integration with the West also en-
tails participation in institutional arrangements that make up much of the 
cement in the Western security community. Thus, in line with a liberal ar-
gument, integration may therefore serve as an appropriate answer to military 
concerns stemming from uncertainty about the intentions and interests of 
others, since the periphery actor itself becomes a constituent part of this se-
curity community. 
The costs implied by full integration and participation in institutions re-
late primarily to limitations in actors’ freedom of action. Formal institutions 
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one voice and act as one (coherent) actor.  
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often develop norms and rules that regulate behaviour concerning matters 
that are handled by these arrangements. These rules are aimed at making be-
haviour and interstate relations more predictable. Thus, since there will usu-
ally be sanctions associated with a breaking of these, a formal commitment 
to norms and standards of behaviour will often ‘bind’ the actors when these 
make decisions or choose among different courses of behaviour. 
If full integration is not an alternative, or in the absence of resources that 
might be attractive to the centre, periphery actors may seek affiliation or a 
more limited access to institutions and decision-making arenas considered 
relevant for their own interests. This strategy is an attempt to gain some 
weight in an already established institutional environment when full integra-
tion is either denied or not sought. By presenting oneself as an external re-
source, a periphery state may seek to convince the centre that it is in the lat-
ter’s own interest to consult with the periphery state on particular matters 
and to take the latter’s views and interests into account when making deci-
sions in the centre. If faced with a centre unwilling to provide full integra-
tion, control with strategic resources or policy instruments that may serve as 
means for the centre in its attempt to influence developments inside or be-
yond its immediate periphery can be convincing arguments for a periphery 
actor pursuing this strategy.  
A third way to influence policies and developments in the centre may be 
to develop particularly close ties with an actor that has full access to, or is 
perceived as an integral part of, the centre, and then to have this actor voice 
one’s own interests. This strategy of agent inside may be particularly rele-
vant in situations where some actors in the centre appear more forthcoming 
or receptive to one’s own interests. 
If the centre is reluctant to give periphery actors any type of participation 
or a formal say-so in decision-making processes, periphery actors may chose 
to adapt their policies in a way that makes them more in accordance with 
policies pursued by the centre. The aim of adaptation is to reduce the nega-
tive consequences of being an outside actor, to facilitate greater goodwill in 
the centre, and thereby to increase the prospects of closer association and a 
possible future integration with the centre.  
Finally, periphery actors may choose a strategy of shielding parallel to 
the one identified for the centre. This strategy is relevant for actors who find 
that the costs of integration, ‘quasi-membership’ and different types of adap-
tation are too high. For a periphery actor, the aim of shielding is to sustain a 
feeling of political, economic and/or cultural autonomy in a situation where 
influence from the centre is perceived as a threat. This strategy is derived 
from securitisation of ‘self’ (national identity, culture, values etc.) and of the 
freedom to pursue policies arrived at nationally and (more or less) independ-
ently from the centre’s influence. This will often imply a policy of isolation 
and some degree of dissonance between the centre and the periphery actor, 
since the latter essentially seeks to fence off any influence from the centre. 
As indicated earlier, Russia can be read both as Europe’s periphery and 
as a centre of her own. This is an essential point with regard to my analysis. 
It is namely an important hypothesis here that a conception (in Russia) of 
Russia as a centre may trigger a cosmos–chaos logic as basis for Russia’s 
policy vis-à-vis her own periphery. In other words, if Russia regards herself 
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as a separate centre, her security concerns can be expected to concentrate on 
internal consolidation, projection of (relative) stability into the periphery, 
and prevention of ‘chaos spill-over’ from the periphery into the Russian cen-
tre. However, the success of strategies adopted in Russia will to a great ex-
tent be contingent to how the other actors in the system interpret the interna-
tional power structure and Russia’s place in it and to external receptiveness 
with regard to Russian views and security interests. And, as I shall elaborate 
below, a depiction of Russia as centre may induce a completely different se-
curity logic based on a reading of relations with the West in terms of a zero-
sum game of power and influence.  
In any case, actors in the periphery have to take into account that power, 
in terms of both material capabilities and structural power associated with 
control over norms and formal institutional arrangements, is largely concen-
trated in the Western centre. This means that periphery actors face a ‘force 
of gravity’ that will affect international outcomes relevant for their national 
interests more or less independently of policies chosen by these actors them-
selves. This ‘objective’ force can be seen as the effect on outcomes in world 
politics determined by the behaviour of the Western centre alone. Thus, if 
the West is determined to intervene or influence developments in the periph-
ery more or less independently of policies pursued by periphery actors, then 
the costs of shielding may become very high for these actors. This needs to 
be recognised and incorporated in the cost–benefit analyses of actors in the 
periphery, and may dispose them for a more integrative or adaptive policy 
vis-à-vis the centre.  
2.3.4.2 Overlay or residual Cold War antagonism 
In world politics, states and other actors may change behaviour and percep-
tions of ‘self’ and ‘other’. However, such changes will usually come about 
only gradually, because patterns of thinking and behaviour are often institu-
tionalised. Here I assume that identities and threat perceptions associated 
with the former bipolar international structure may still be present in the 
minds of policymakers in both Russia and the West. In other words, the 
East–West divide, which is largely an identity dimension associated with 
Cold War antagonist views, mutual suspicion and a zero-sum game of (mili-
tary) power balancing, may contribute to structure the mind-sets and policy 
options for actors in the European region.  
This reflects a security logic that differs fundamentally from the cosmos–
chaos logic introduced above. I argued that a depiction (in Russia) of Russia 
as a centre of her own might trigger a logic of chaos as basis for Russia’s 
policy vis-à-vis her own periphery. However, if Russia regards herself as a 
centre of her own, this may also induce a zero-sum thinking and a balancing 
logic vis-à-vis the West. In other words, if Russia looks upon herself as a 
separate pole in the international power structure, one may expect the adop-
tion of security strategies that are (at least partly) incompatible with those of 
the Western centre. A principal task in the analysis is to trace how and to 
what extent this East–West dimension and the security logic of power bal-
ancing has affected Russia’s policy regarding formalised security coopera-
tion with the West. 
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2.3.4.3 Identity in terms of ‘Christian civilisation’ 
The third dimension in the model is based on perceived differences in cul-
ture, norms and values between the Christian and Muslim worlds respec-
tively. The Christian and Muslim worlds are often described as two different 
ideological camps, civilisations or cultural communities. Accordingly, actors 
can be identified as ‘we’ and ‘them’ in terms of perceived differences in the 
culture, norms and values that dominate each of the two camps. In the analy-
sis, I seek to trace the extent to which Russia’s identity debate and security 
thinking have related to this dimension, and how this has influenced Mos-
cow’s approach to security cooperation with the West. This implies address-
ing the following questions: To what extent is Russia associated with the 
perceived uniqueness of a Christian civilisation as opposed to an Islamic sys-
tem of norms and values? To what extent has this Russian identity been con-
nected to ‘security’, ‘threat’ and a perceived need for measures of protection 
against influence from the culture, norms and values of the Islamic world? 
And finally, how has this influenced Russia’s approach to the construction of 
Europe’s security architecture?43 
2.4 Hypotheses on Russia’s behaviour and cooperative out-
comes 
As stated above, the model assumes that actors’ identities, threat perceptions, 
and understanding of security interests can largely be derived from the inter-
play between these three dimensions. I should add that geographical prox-
imity to one or both of the Christian–Muslim and East–West ‘borderlines’ is 
likely to increase the relative importance of these dimensions for an actor’s 
security thinking. Accordingly, Russia’s role as an actor on the European 
stage may be a more urgent concern for states in CEE than for Portugal. 
Similarly, Russia may have a more immediate awareness regarding the 
Christian–Muslim split than do the Scandinavian countries. Thus, actors’ se-
curity thinking will depend not only on where they stand in relation to the 
centre–periphery dimension, but also on their geographical distance to the 
East–West and Christian–Muslim dimensions respectively. This is what pro-
duces divergent security policies for actors who are differently situated on 
the European continent.  
2.4.1 Shared identity and shared interests foster security cooperation 
In general, one would expect that the potential for security cooperation be-
tween Russia and the West is great when they have a shared (security) iden-
tity and shared (security) interests. This implies situations where they largely 
agree on where the security label is appropriate and when their threat percep-
tions relate to the same phenomena and developments. This should foster 
                                                     
43  One may of course argue that there is no firm ontological basis for speaking about Chris-
tian and Muslim ‘worlds’ or ‘civilisations’. The point here is that in an analysis of actors’ 
behaviour, questions concerning the (‘objective’ or ‘real’) existence of different civilisa-
tions are subordinate to actors’ perception or to the question of what actors think exists. 
The model is based on the assumption that actors located to the North and South of the 
line see themselves as belonging to a Christian and Muslim sphere respectively, and that 
they associate each other with perceived differences in norms, values and culture. 
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development and use of institutional instruments to address security issues of 
common Russian–Western concern.  
Accordingly, a shared securitisation of norms and values associated with 
the notion of a distinct ‘Christian’ civilisation and a depiction of Russia and 
the West on the same side of the Christian–Muslim divide should provide 
the two with a basis for security cooperation. To the extent that Russia looks 
upon the West as a power centre and Russia as a periphery in this (largely 
value-based) Christian civilisation, one might expect a Russian policy aimed 
at integration with the West. In its turn, the response of the West to a Rus-
sian policy of integration, which rests on a cost–benefit analysis in the West, 
could in turn have an effect on Russia’s own policy in the next round. 
2.4.2 Cosmos and chaos: Shared concern with stability in the periphery 
The cosmos–chaos logic derived from the centre–periphery dimension sug-
gests that Russia and the West should have a shared interest in facilitating 
stability in Europe’s peripheries. To the extent that Russia regards herself 
more as a part of the Western periphery than as a centre of her own, this the-
sis seems reasonable. However, to the extent that Russia regards herself as a 
separate centre, a certain level of Russian–Western security cooperation 
might still be expected on conditions of 1) a shared Russian–Western under-
standing of security in terms of consolidation of the two centres and of the 
relationship between them and 2) a shared concern with facilitating stability 
in areas that are periphery to both. In both these cases, one might expect 
Russia to pursue a policy aimed at developing a security framework per-
ceived capable of providing security for both Russia and the West and in 
their shared peripheries.  
2.4.3 Russia as centre: The logic of military and institutional balancing 
The security logic derived from the model’s East–West dimension suggests 
that an opposing force may sometimes be at work. Here, Russia’s relation-
ship with the West is regarded in competitive or even confrontational terms, 
seeing politics between them as a zero-sum game of power and influence be-
tween two independent centres. In other words, to the extent that Russia re-
gards herself as a centre of her own, she may take on an interest in balancing 
the power and influence of the Western centre. Under these conditions, there 
may also emerge conflicting interests and competition between the two cen-
tres with regard to power and influence in areas that are periphery to both.  
There are actually two levels to this security logic of power, which re-
flects the assumption that the international power structure is constituted by 
both material and institutional factors. A confrontational worldview may not 
only entail a perceived need to balance the military power of the other centre 
by building up one’s own capabilities or entering into alliances. To the ex-
tent that the two centres share an understanding that they are not military 
enemies and that military power is not a relevant means for resolving con-
flicts of interests between the two, they will still seek to balance each other’s 
institutional powers, and to enhance one’s own possibility to project non-
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military power and influence developments by means of institutional ar-
rangements. 
Thus, one should expect that increased salience in Russia and/or the West 
of a perceived confrontational East–West divide and the existence of a zero-
sum power game would inhibit the potential for Russian–Western security 
cooperation. To the extent that Russia regards herself as a competing centre 
to the West, and beyond potential measures of military power balancing, one 
would expect Moscow to seek a build-up and/or strengthening of institu-
tional security arrangements perceived favourable to Russia and believed to 
potentially undermine the power and influence of the West, not least beyond 
the latter’s ‘core’ areas. This essentially implies the adoption in Russia of a 
shielding strategy vis-à-vis the West. Accordingly, Russia should be expec-
ted to seek to limit the functional scope and geographical domain of Western 
or Western-dominated security institutions; to increase the relative weight 
of, and Russia’s own weight in, ‘cross-system’ cooperative security ar-
rangements dealing with issues in their common periphery; and to establish a 
firm institutional basis for influencing her own periphery. These are all de-
velopments that might contribute to a relative gain in institutional powers as 
seen from Moscow, and hence potentially increase Russia’s weight with re-
gard to (future) influence on developments in Europe. 
As with the security logic of chaos, geography is relevant in the sense 
that concern with power and possibilities to influence is usually regarded as 
most expedient in areas that are close to one’s own borders. Yet this may 
change with variations in the ambitions that the centre has on other systemic 
levels. To the extent that Russia claims to be a global power, concern with 
institutional powers and influence on external developments may have pol-
icy implications beyond neighbouring areas, and thus entail attempts to in-
fluence developments also further away from the Russian centre. 
The security logic of power, which obviously draws on some basic realist 
ideas, will expectedly also induce a reading of international institutions as 
policy instruments and arenas more than as independent actors. In a realist-
driven agenda, institutions are assumed to have limited value in their own 
right and only marginal ‘independent’ effect on state behaviour. They are in-
stead regarded as policy instruments for states’ power projection and legiti-
misation of behaviour. Thus, to the extent that Russia regards herself as a 
centre of her own, European security institutions are presumably regarded 
(by Moscow) in terms of states’ motivations and the question of how Russia 
and other European states can use – and are believed to use – these as arenas 
and instruments for power projection and legitimisation of their (realist-
driven) behaviour.  
2.4.4 Contingency of external perceptions and strategies for actions and 
outcomes 
I should again stress that Russia’s expected behaviour, as well as its effects 
on institutional outcomes and overall political developments, is conditional 
to security perceptions and strategies adopted in the West and by other actors 
in the European region. Not only does the overall potential for Russian–
Western security cooperation depend on a certain level of shared Russian–
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Western interests. Russia’s influence on the shape of institutionalised secu-
rity arrangements will to a considerable degree depend on how the interna-
tional power structure and Russia’s position in it are interpreted by other ac-
tors. Accordingly, if we accept the assumptions that institutions may provide 
states with security dividends and (at least partly) reflect outcomes of politi-
cal negotiations, Russia may agree to the establishment of security arrange-
ments perceived less favourable to Russia in light of the latter’s proclaimed 
interests, but still better than having no security arena at all. The outcomes of 
these negotiation processes may in turn affect Russia’s security perceptions 
and behaviour in the next round. 
The assumed interdependence of actors’ security perceptions and policies 
is relevant in order to understand how security cooperation is facilitated or 
inhibited. For instance, cooperation between Russia and the West may be in-
hibited when the two perceive each other to be operating according to com-
pletely different security logics. One actor may claim to be operating accord-
ing to the logic of chaos, yet be perceived by the other to be acting on the 
dictates of power politics. To the extent that the latter regards actions by the 
former as threatening to its interests, this will inhibit security cooperation. In 
an opposite case, the potential for Russian–Western cooperation is much 
greater when the two regard peripheries through a non-confrontational lens 
and interpret the other’s actions to be dictated by the logic of chaos. How-
ever, security cooperation may also emerge between two actors that are 
driven by different security logics. For instance, a periphery state may seek 
integration with a centre in order to enjoy the fruits of stability (i.e., it oper-
ates according to the logic of chaos), but obtain cooperation with a centre 
operating on the dictates of power balancing. Perceptions, therefore, of oth-
ers and of their motivations, are important when we seek to explain both 
states’ actions and outcomes in terms of cooperative security arrangements. 
The two security logics of chaos and power should be regarded as ana-
lytically distinct from the different strategies of integration/non-integration 
discussed above. These latter strategies concern only centre–periphery rela-
tions, whereas the two security logics are derived from the centre–periphery 
and East–West dimensions respectively. As discussed above, the two secu-
rity logics and the interplay between them create opportunities for both co-
operation and conflict, for both partnership and discord. In fact, they essen-
tially reflect the realist and liberal worldviews briefly introduced above. Ac-
cordingly, they also entail different interpretations of how political influence 
in world politics is best attained (Wolfers 1962). The power logic basically 
reflects the view that influence is best attained through coercion or through 
projection of (ultimately: military) power. By contrast, the chaos logic de-
rived from the centre–periphery dimension dictates influence through coop-
eration and by means of affecting the environment in which states interact. 
The analysis below is concerned with the interplay between the two secu-
rity logics and the Christian–Muslim dimension as driving forces behind 
Russia’s foreign policy in the 1990s. I basically discuss the relative impact 
of these three dimensions on Russia’s policy and ultimately also on Russian-
Western security cooperation or institutional outcomes in a European con-
text. As I try to show in the analysis, the constructivist notion of ‘securitisa-
tion’ and the related concept of ‘security logic’, both of which accentuate the 
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important role of actors (i.e., states, policymakers a.o.) in defining security 
threats and in adopting worldviews as basis for foreign policy, may be help-
ful in revealing how cooperation is facilitated and inhibited, and conse-
quently also under what conditions ‘expectations’ about state behaviour and 
international outcomes from the liberal and realist worldviews find empirical 
support. Thus, the chapters below in a sense constitute a ‘test’ of the model 
applied to a case where realists and liberals could forward their different 
claims and interpretations. 

3.0 The formative years 1991–93 
This chapter discusses Russia’s approach to security cooperation with the 
West from 1991 to 1993. The central question is: In light of the domestic de-
bate on national identity and foreign policy that emerged in Russia from 
1991, how can we understand Russia’s approach to NATO and CSCE as re-
maining components in the post-Cold War European security architecture? I 
address this question in several steps. Section 3.1 provides a brief introduc-
tion to historical trajectories of ‘Europe’, ’the West’ and ‘Eurasia’ as guiding 
concepts for Russia’s identity and foreign policy, and analyses their re-
emergence as central features of the post-Soviet identity/foreign policy de-
bate in the early 1990s. Section 3.2 examines early relations with NATO, 
central to which were revised perceptions of the Western alliance in the Rus-
sian policymaking elite. This section also discusses why Russia joined 
NACC and came to use this body to handle matters of military security that 
pertained to post-Soviet territories and to areas of former Soviet influence. 
Section 3.3 examines relations with CSCE, and centres on the role and func-
tional scope envisioned by Russia for this security body inside the post-
Soviet space. The last section (3.4) provides some concluding remarks.  
My central argument is that while Russia was initially (1991–92) driven 
by a cosmos–chaos logic that was based on accentuation of Russia’s shared 
identity and shared interests with the West and which prescribed Russia’s 
westward integration and adaptation to the Western security structures, she 
increasingly came to regard relations with the West through the prism of a 
zero-sum power game. By 1993, consensus had emerged in Russia around 
the need for a more balanced foreign policy and to restore Russia’s (alleg-
edly) ‘natural’ role as an independent centre of power. The security logic de-
rived from this new reading of Russia’s identity and of relations with the 
West dictated a more instrumental view of security institutions as means to 
pursue and protect particular Russian national interests. As a consequence, 
Russia came to favour the construction of a European security architecture 
that would facilitate the revival of a hegemonic role for Russia in the post-
Soviet space, while at the same time providing her with a great power role in 
Europe and possibilities to influence overall political developments in the 
West.  
Accordingly, while Russia was initially not in opposition to an enhanced 
role for NACC and (a reformed) NATO in the emerging European security 
architecture, with security functions potentially pertaining even to post-
Soviet territories or areas of former Soviet influence, the security logic from 
1992–93 dictated Russian obstruction to a prominent role for these bodies 
and a more instrumental use of CSCE in defence of particular Russian na-
tional interest in the post-Soviet space and in Europe at large. 
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3.1 West, East or South? In search of a foreign policy balance 
For more than 500 years, the cardinal problem in defining Europe has cen-
tred on the inclusion or exclusion of Russia. Davies (1997:7–26) found that 
whatever cultural and religious fault lines he drew on the European conti-
nent, Russia ended up as a bad fit and always to the east of these dividing 
lines. The conceptual problem of defining Europe with or without Russia ar-
guably stems from a historical relationship of mutual alienation. Seen from 
the West, Russia has often been depicted as a learner on the European pe-
riphery. Yet her orthodoxy, autocracy, economic backwardness and per-
ceived Asian-barbaric features have continuously served as premises for ex-
cluding Russia and for treating Russia as external to Europe proper. On the 
other side, the Russians themselves have never been sure whether they 
wanted to be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Europe (ibid.; Neumann 1996). Seen from Rus-
sia, Europe and a broader West have been subject to everything from 
admiration, criticism, antagonist views and enemy perceptions. Thus, in 
conceptual and factual history, there has been a tendency in both Russia and 
Europe/the West towards defining each other at least partly in terms of mu-
tual alienation and (political–cultural–ideological–military) opposition to the 
other. 
This historical legacy notwithstanding, trajectories from the Cold War pe-
riod are presumably particularly relevant for analyses of Russian identity de-
bate in the early 1990s. During the Cold War, the West became the most im-
portant ‘other’ for Russia in terms of constituting the military enemy of the 
SU (Neumann 1997:159–162). Despite fundamental changes during the 
Gorbachev years, there is reason to assume that at the outset of the 1990s, 
residuals from Cold War security thinking and enemy perceptions were still 
present in the minds of both ordinary Russians and a broadly conceived Rus-
sian elite, and were perhaps also institutionalised in the new, post-Soviet 
Russian state structures.44 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union regarded itself, and was largely 
recognised by the international community, as a ‘superpower’. This word in-
vokes greatness and respect, but also privileges and special responsibilities. 
It signifies a superior status in relation to (most) others, and entails connota-
tions of (more or less) legitimate areas of interest and influence. Although 
post-Soviet Russia inherited a permanent seat in the UNSC, the break-up of 
the Soviet Union put in question the basis for Russia’s continued great 
power status in world affairs. This issue became central to Russia’s debate 
on identity and foreign policy during the 1990s. 
                                                     
44  Although New Political Thinking (NPT) and changes in Soviet foreign and security pol-
icy under Gorbachev’s rule (1985–91) are beyond the scope of this study, they obviously 
served as background for debate on Russia’s identity and foreign policy from 1991 on-
wards. Some important developments during the Gorbachev years were: Democratisation 
of foreign policy; revision of the West as an inherently militaristic, aggressive and impe-
rialistic enemy; calls for demilitarisation and denuclearisation of world politics; and a 
shift from ‘parity/superiority’ and ‘offensive defence’ to ‘reasonable sufficiency’ and ‘de-
fensive defence’ as guiding principles for military policy. For detailed accounts, see 
Checkel (1993), Krasin (ed.) (1998), Wettig (1991), Simon et al. (1992), Herman (1996) 
and Gorbachev’s Perestroika (1987). 
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3.1.1 National identity and foreign policy: Westernisers vs. Eurasianists 
Early identity debate in post-Soviet Russia can be characterised as a struggle 
between two opposing camps: Westernisers and Eurasianists.45 As semantics 
indicate, each group departs from a distinct outlook on the geographical rela-
tionship between Russia and the surrounding world. Westernisers regard 
Russia through a prism of westward inclination or as integral to a geographi-
cal space of which the West is also a constituent part. This arguably ex-
presses the historical view that Russia is essentially a European country 
(Baranovsky 2000a). Eurasianists, on the other side, stress Russia’s unique-
ness as the link between the European and the Asian continents. Her location 
and vastness in territory give the country a distinctly Eurasian identity 
(Trenin 2001). 
Still, if we go beyond spatial metaphors, there exist fundamental differ-
ences between Westernisers and Eurasianists with regard to conception of 
Russia’s cultural, ideological and geopolitical identity. These in turn entail 
diverging interpretations of Russia’s national interests. Consequently, the 
two camps also adhere to different prescriptions concerning main orienta-
tions in the country’s foreign and security policy.  
3.1.1.1 Westernism 
In general terms, Westernisers identify Russia with democracy, modernity 
and Western culture (Chafetz 1996:672–673; Baranovsky 2000a:444). In 
their view, the break-up of the Soviet Union implies the separation of ‘Rus-
sia’ from connotations of (Tsarist/Soviet) authoritarianism, militarism, impe-
rialism and Marxism. Since post-Soviet Russia is argued to be a (liberal) 
democracy, she is also inclined towards the norms and values of the civi-
lised, Western world. Principles of market economy, rule of law, individual 
freedoms and human rights are regarded as appropriate designs or ‘models’ 
for Russia. Westernisers also recognise a component of shared Russian–
Western/Russian–European identity based on affiliation with the Christian 
civilisation (Baranovsky 2000a:444). Thus, properties of ideational, cultural 
and civilisational kinship with Europe and a broader West lie at the core of 
Russia’s identity as conceived by Westernisers (Chafetz 1996; Baranovsky 
2000a).  
Most Westernisers adhere to liberal readings of world politics (Arbatov 
1993; Kassianova 2001). Arbatov (1993:9) argues that people in the ‘pro-
Western group’ tend to downplay or neglect both geopolitical and strategic 
considerations in their assessments of international relations. Instead, they 
give greater prominence to foreign economic relations and stress arguments 
of interdependence and the need for international cooperation. In terms of 
security, the ideological basis of Westernism incorporates components from 
New Political Thinking, which served as guideline for Soviet foreign policy 
in the late 1980s (Kassianova 2001:824; Sergounin 2001:2–4). Central to 
this body of thought were the two concepts of ‘indivisible security’ and a 
                                                     
45  Stankevich (1994:25) argues that this dichotomisation captures debates in Russia on iden-
tity and foreign policy all the way back to Peter the Great. Nevertheless, it obviously can-
not account for the full diversity of Russian views on these matters. See Arbatov (1993), 
Chafetz (1996), Sergounin (2001) and Kassianova (2001) for more detailed accounts. 
Some authors also prefer alternative labels (‘Romantic nationalists’; ‘Atlanticism’) for the 
two main categories applied here (Neumann (1996); Flikke (1998)).  
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‘Common European Home’, which were largely adopted by the post-Soviet 
Russian leadership. Arguably, the elevation of these concepts into policy-
guiding ideas had two important consequences for the conceptualisation of 
security relations with the West from 1991. First, the notion of a ‘common 
home’ depicted Russia firmly as a member of the European ‘family’, or as 
integral to a perceived European community of states. Second, by accentuat-
ing the interdependency of actors’ security, the concept of ‘indivisible secu-
rity’ signalled a certain move away from the notion of ‘national security’ and 
the belief that states can obtain security independently from other actors.  
Taken together, therefore, the worldview and conception of Russia’s 
identity advocated by Westernisers, which were intimately linked to a liberal 
reading of world politics, largely removed every reason to suspect the West 
of having hostile motives vis-à-vis Russia and to interpret the West as Rus-
sia’s a priori adversary or enemy. On the contrary, assumptions of interde-
pendence and shared interests and accentuation of Russia’s ‘sameness’ with 
Europe and the West led Westernisers to prescribe a foreign policy directed 
at developing particularly close ties with the prosperous and economically 
strong West, and to pursue Russia’s speedy political and economic integra-
tion into the Western-dominated world community of democratic states. 
3.1.1.2 Eurasianism 
Eurasianists, by contrast, emphasise Russia’s uniqueness in both geographi-
cal and cultural–civilisational terms. By ‘Eurasia’ one may understand the 
idea of ‘great Russia’, regarding ‘Russia’ as synonymous with the ‘tsardom 
of Muscovy, the empire, the Soviet Union’ (Trenin 2001:12).46 In spatial 
terms, this implies seeing Russia as stretching beyond the borders of the 
post-Soviet Russian Federation. In other words, areas that are currently lo-
cated outside Russia are perceived to be in some sense integral to the Rus-
sian state or to the state’s orbit of (legitimate) interests. In cultural and civili-
sational terms, the notion of ‘great Russia’ is ambiguous, and has produced 
some rather peculiar philosophical ideas and stances with regard to foreign 
policy. Yet key shared postulates have been that in civilisational terms, Rus-
sia cannot be regarded as a part of Europe, and that Russia has a particular 
responsibility or mission in history (Sergounin 2001:5).47 Thus, Eurasianism 
essentially expresses the view that Russia constitutes something greater 
                                                     
46  An alternative view would be to see ‘Eurasia’ as the (spatial) sum of Europe and Asia.  
47  With regard to the notion of ‘great Russia’, some have postulated Russia as the ‘real’ 
bearer of Christendom, seeing Moscow as a ‘third Rome’ and Orthodoxy as morally supe-
rior to perceived Roman (Western) ‘heresies’ (Neumann 1996:6–8). Accordingly, Rus-
sia’s moral responsibility in world politics consists in protecting the link between ‘true’ 
Christendom and the Russian lands. A related idea has been asserted by disciples of 
Slavophilism, which re-emerged in Russian identity debate in the early 1990s and which 
can be seen as a separate version of Eurasianism (Sergounin 2000:221). Slavophiles 
largely equate ‘grand Russia’ with ‘all Slavs and their lands’, and regard this link between 
territory and supra-ethnicity (‘Slavs’) as a distinct civilisation between East and West. 
Policy prescriptions derived from this school have suggested that Russia should pursue 
her own revival as empire by means of a Slav Union (Sergounin 2000:221–222; Trenin 
2001:51–52). A third group of Eurasianists have depicted Russia as the heart of a Eura-
sian ‘organism’ constituted by a ‘symbiosis of nature, spirit and land’, and as the ‘centre’ 
in a largely self-contained and self-sustained ‘universe’ or ‘microcosm’ (Trenin 2001:39–
40; 44–46; Baranovsky 2000a:444). In its Tsarist and Soviet manifestations, Russia’s 
guiding principle was to unify Eurasia as a ‘sacred space’ and to protect this cultural-
civilisational ‘whole’ from (negative) external influence. Some calls for restoration of the 
Soviet Union have been seen as an expression of this idea (Trenin 2001:66–67). 
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and/or larger than an ordinary (European) nation-state, and that this justifies 
the pursuit of particular objectives in Russia’s foreign policy. 
Sergounin (2001:5) asserts that Eurasianism can be characterised as ‘an 
exotic mixture of geopolitics and realism’. This phrase signals Eurasianists’ 
concern with the link between geography, power and (national) security. In 
traditional Russian/Soviet security thinking, a geopolitical worldview has 
been reflected in concepts like ‘hostile encirclement’ and a perceived need 
for external ‘buffer zones’ around the ‘Russian heartland’. Today, these con-
cepts again structure much security discourse among Eurasianists (Trenin 
2001:56–66). In line with the realist tradition, adherents of this worldview 
accentuate the world’s conflicting character. They question the basis for 
shared Russian–Western interests in world politics and the allegedly naïve 
assessment of the West as inherently ‘good’ or ‘friendly’ (Sergounin 
2001:5–7). Accordingly, they are sceptical concerning excessive westward 
orientation in Russia’s foreign policy. With reference to Russia’s geopoliti-
cal heritage, Eurasianists have argued in favour of a relative downscaling of 
relations with the West, and that priority should be given to consolidation of 
economic, political and security ties with the former Soviet states. 
3.1.2 1991–92: Securitising ‘democratic Russia’ through a Western link 
From late 1991 to mid-1992, President Yeltsin and his foreign policy team 
pursued a course dominated by Westernist ideas (Arbatov 1993:9–10; Ser-
gounin 2001:2–5). The proclaimed goal of the Russian government was po-
litical and economic integration with the West. Foreign policy was directed 
at establishing relations with the international financial institutions (IMF, 
WB) and the Western political-economic community (GATT, G–7, OECD, 
EC/EU). These priorities reflected a perceived need to distance Russia from 
her totalitarian past, and to facilitate Russia’s ‘return to Europe’, after having 
been pushed to the sidelines of international developments during the Soviet 
period (Sergounin 2001:2; Malcolm 1994:164–165). 
Questions concerning security were largely regarded through the same 
lens of westward integration. At the time, the Russian–Western agenda in-
corporated both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues in terms of strategic 
(START) and conventional (CFE) arms control and a CSCE-sponsored dia-
logue on human rights and individual security. Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
frequently proclaimed the idea that Russia is part of a shared European secu-
rity space, and emphasised the need to see interdependence as a starting 
point for addressing European security issues (Malcolm 1994:164–165). He 
and other Russian officials held out that the West represented the (potential) 
solution to security threats emerging inside the old Soviet empire (ibid.:165). 
Accordingly, Russia’s security was largely regarded in terms of security for 
Europe as a whole.48 
In an early 1992 article titled ‘Russia: A chance for survival’, Kozyrev 
(1992a) presented another security argument in favour of a westward policy 
                                                     
48  Although Kozyrev and other Westernisers adopted some central ideas and concepts from 
NPT, they were also critical to some of its contents. For instance, NPT had a more 
‘global’ and ‘harmonic’ outlook on the world than what was advocated by Kozyrev and 
early post-Soviet liberals (Malcolm 1994:157–163; Sergounin 2001:2–5). 
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orientation. This article constitutes a discussion of Russian policy choices in 
the wake of the failed August 1991 coup and the break-up of the Soviet Un-
ion. Kozyrev argued that the fate of Russia as democracy was dependent on 
successful economic reforms, and that the latter could be facilitated only 
through integration with the West. In fact, as the title indicates, he asserted 
that Russia would simply not survive unless the government succeeded in 
implementing fundamental reforms: ‘We can no longer live without meas-
ures carried out by the government to introduce a free-market economy, pri-
vatisation and liberalisation of the entire economy’ (Kozyrev 1992a:10; my 
italics). As he saw it, these reforms depended on political and economic sup-
port from the West, which dictated an overall westward orientation in Rus-
sia’s foreign policy.  
This article can therefore be regarded as a securitising move, or as an at-
tempt to legitimise the government’s policy by asserting that westward inte-
gration is a matter of Russia’s survival. It was basically ‘Go West or go un-
der’. Note, however, that it is not the Russian Federation as a political-
territorial unit that is threatened; it is Russia as a democratic state. In other 
words, Kozyrev sought to securitise Russia’s democratic regime, and re-
garded the survival of democracy as conditional to Russia’s successful inte-
gration into the Western political community and a Western-dominated 
world economy. He even combined this argument with explicit references to 
Russia’s great power identity. However, he regarded Russia’s democratic 
and ‘normal’ nature as the basis on which foreign policy should be devel-
oped (ibid.:15). Hence, this argument apparently reflects the security logic of 
chaos, which prescribed Russia’s integration with the West as the potential 
solution to internal problems of transition and reforms. 
Since Kozyrev’s article was published in Foreign Affairs, there is reason 
to believe that his speech act was addressed primarily to a Western (or inter-
national) audience with a view to political and financial support for democ-
ratic transition and economic reforms, which might prevent the return of an 
authoritarian regime in Russia.49 Yet the same argument was later reiterated 
in newspaper articles presumably addressed to a broad domestic audience 
(Kozyrev 1992b;1992c). Here he warned against the threat from emerging 
national-patriotic forces inside Russia.50 This threat amounted to a potential 
undermining of Russia’s democratic nature and the adoption of concepts 
with neo-imperial flavour, which Kozyrev believed might lead Russia into 
isolation from the civilised international community. With regard to foreign 
policy, Kozyrev saw a Russian interest in sidelining with the international 
community and warned against the prescriptions advocated by national-
patriotic forces in Russia: ‘Internal democracy cannot go hand in hand with 
                                                     
49  The perceived link between internal ‘chaos’ and the potential return of an ‘old’ regime in 
Russia was being considered in both Russia and the West. Omang (2001) found that Rus-
sia during this period possessed a certain level of ‘passive chaos power’ vis-à-vis the 
West in the sense that concern with negative consequences of military chaos, economic 
collapse or social unrest in Russia made the West more receptive to Russian views and af-
fected Western policies, particularly with regard to financial aid and non-proliferation of 
nuclear arms.  
50  At the time, ‘nationalists’, ‘national-patriots’, ‘neo-communists’ and ‘national-commu-
nists’, but also non-conventional terms like ‘red-browns’ and ‘hurrah-patriots’, were used 
largely as synonyms to demarcate the (main) domestic opposition against the govern-
ment’s policy (Arbatov 1993:13). 
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national–communist methods in foreign policy ’ (ibid.).51 The liberal world-
view adopted by leading figures in the government couldn’t have been ex-
pressed more clearly. Hence, by seeking to securitise the link between ‘Rus-
sia’ and ‘democracy’, Kozyrev sought both domestic and international sup-
port for the government’s policy of westward integration. 
3.1.3 1992–93: A Eurasianist call for adjustment 
Kozyrev’s articles indicate that foreign policy had now become subject to 
domestic political debate. Throughout 1992, President Yeltsin and the mak-
ers of Russia’s foreign policy were increasingly attacked from various seg-
ments of the Russian elite for what many perceived as excessive Westernism 
in the government’s policy. The criticism was twofold. First, attacks were 
directed against what was largely perceived as a ‘policy of yes’ and ‘diplo-
macy of smiles’ vis-à-vis the West (Arbatov 1993:17). These attacks in-
volved accusations that the government was selling out Russian interests and 
conceding to easily to Western stances on important international issues (i.e., 
arms control, UN sanction policies on Iraq and Yugoslavia a.o.).  
A second line of criticism was directed against the allegedly dispropor-
tionate attention given to the West as opposed to the East when it came to 
foreign policy priorities. In a frequently quoted article, state counsellor Ser-
gei Stankevich called for adjusting policy more in direction of Russia’s East-
ern interests and paying more attention to developments in the post-Soviet 
space (Stankevich 1992). Two geopolitical considerations lay at the core of 
his prescriptions. First, Stankevich argued that the distance between Russia 
and the heart of Europe ‘objectively’ dictated a relative downscaling of rela-
tions with these states compared to states in the CIS area. Second, he also 
believed that the Islamic world was increasingly gaining foothold in the 
post-Soviet space, and that this might have a destabilising effect on the CIS 
area, since many states in this area were politically and economically weak. 
In fact, he saw an ‘arch of crisis’ forming to the south of Russia, and be-
lieved that chaos and disorder were already beginning to diffuse into the 
Russian mainland (ibid.). This dictated a relative increase in Russia’s atten-
tion towards developments in the post-Soviet space.52 
Stankevich largely equated Russia’s security with stability in the CIS 
area. His argument was explicitly framed in an ‘Atlanticism vs. Eurasianism’ 
context, and can be read as an attempt to develop the latter as basis for Rus-
                                                     
51  The quoted article (Kozyrev 1992b) was a reply to proposals forwarded in the Russian 
parliament in favour of a more assertive Russian stance in defence of Serbia in the inter-
national community’s handling of Balkan issues. These proposals were largely derived 
from the Eurasianist idea that Russia and Serbia are connected by a ‘Slav brotherhood’ 
that dictates particular Russian interest in the Balkans. Kozyrev (ibid.) denounced any ba-
sis for an unconditionally pro-Serbian Russian policy or a more confrontational stance 
vis-à-vis the West on these matters. 
52  Stankevich’s article was printed in Nezavisimaya Gazeta under the title ‘Derzhava v pois-
kakh sebya’. Interestingly, it also appeared in The National Interest (1992 (Summer), pp. 
47–51) under the title ‘Russia in Search of Itself’. The contents of the two are identical. 
Given the ambiguous meaning of the word ‘derzhava’ (‘power’ or ‘great power’; the word 
arguably has an implicit connotation of ‘great strength’ to it, signalling something more 
than ‘ordinary’ power), the two titles open for an interpretation of the texts as statements 
belonging to two different discourses on Russia; a domestic one and a Western/ interna-
tional one. One may only speculate whether the author has consciously sought to adapt 
the titles to two different audiences. 
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sia’s policy. The unease with which he regarded the gradual advance to-
wards Russia of the Islamic world and the related accentuation of chaos-
threats and (the potential for) instability along Russia’s southern borders led 
him to prescribe a more balanced foreign policy. A correction of the govern-
ment’s pro-Western bias could come about only through a strengthening of 
ties with states in the CIS area, and was needed in order to facilitate stability 
in the post-Soviet space, which he saw as Russia’s ‘mission’ at the current 
stage of history.53  
The argument in favour of a more balanced foreign policy was under-
pinned by yet another concern: The fate of Russians ex patria. With the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, approximately 30 million ethnic Russians 
found themselves living outside the borders of the Russian Federation (Arba-
tov 1993:27). As a consequence of nation-building projects in the former 
Soviet republics, these Russians were exposed to what they perceived as dis-
crimination and suppression of basic civil rights (Kolstoe 1995).54 Stanke-
vich had obviously detected this development. Accordingly, the well-being 
of ‘ours’ abroad, who had allegedly been neglected in the Kremlin and by 
the makers of foreign policy, was now to be regarded as an important Rus-
sian national interest. 55 
Stankevich’s depiction of Russia and of Russia’s national interests can be 
interpreted as a speech act, or as the inscription to ‘Russia’ of a special re-
sponsibility for stability in the entire post-Soviet space. As he saw it, Rus-
sia’s security interests consisted not primarily in deterring the potential 
threat from military aggression. Rather, they lay in preventing perceived 
chaos and instability in Russia’s (southern) periphery from developing and 
spreading into ‘home territory’, but also in projecting relative internal stabil-
ity into Russia’s immediate environment. To act as a moderating force in the 
former SU was believed to reduce the conflict potential within Russia’s own 
periphery. It would also enable Russia to keep ‘them’ and ‘their influence’ – 
the approaching Islamic world – from advancing too close to Russia’s bor-
ders.56  
3.1.4 Towards consensus: Adjusting the foreign policy balance 
Criticism of the government’s foreign policy was conditioned by several in-
terrelated factors. One important facilitating circumstance was the growing 
feeling of domestic political and economic crisis (Arbatov 1993:15). Yet 
perhaps equally important were the government’s failure to identify more 
explicitly Russian national interests and main priorities and its pursuit of a 
                                                     
53  Which was also vested in Russia’s larger ‘historic’ mission: To ‘balance East and West, 
North and South’, and to be an ‘upholder of dialogue’ and ‘a conciliating force’ in a world 
of conflicting interests (Stankevich 1992).  
54  It is not always clear exactly who these Russian expatriates are. Conventionally, however, 
the label applies to both ethnic Russians and Russian citizens living outside the Russian 
Federation (Kolstoe 1995). 
55  Kozyrev (1992c; 1992d; 1992e) on several occasions denounced allegations made by 
Stankevich and other Eurasianists that the government ignored or paid too little attention 
to the CIS area and the fate of Russians. 
56  Although he did not discuss the latter point in detail, Stankevich’s article (1992) was es-
sential in bringing about a new foreign policy language on Russia’s relations with the 
post-Soviet space/Near Abroad (Matz 2001). Arguments concerning the (potential) ‘Is-
lamic threat’ were elaborated by other Eurasianists and by specialists on Asia and the Is-
lamic world (ibid.; Malcolm 1994:167).  
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pro-Western policy without any sound institutional and popular support 
(ibid.:19–23). These ‘deficiencies’ were regarded as inadmissible in light of 
what many Russians were starting to perceive as Western reluctance to en-
gage with Russia on new terms (Arbatov 1993:23; Malcolm 1994:166–172). 
In a fundamental sense, many Russians felt that Russia was not welcomed 
with (the expected) enthusiasm as a natural part of Europe and the West. 
This fostered intense criticism of the government’s pro-Western and alleg-
edly concessive policy, since it entailed a certain potential for Russia’s hu-
miliation in world politics. 
Criticism contributed to a certain shift in the country’s foreign policy dur-
ing the fall of 1992 (Arbatov 1993:18–24; Malcolm 1994:166–172). In brief, 
this shift implied a reorientation away from the West towards greater focus 
on ‘the Near Abroad’ (ibid.). Yet criticism also entailed a more intense de-
bate on the need for a new doctrinal basis for the state’s foreign and security 
policy.57 Arguably, debate over these issues during the subsequent months 
can be read as a national exercise of self-demarcation, with various actors in 
a broadly conceived political elite advocating arguments about Russia’s 
identity and foreign policy that can again be structured in two main camps: 
Westernists and Eurasianists (RFE/RL 1993; Crow 1993; Malcolm 
1994:166–172).58  
In the spring of 1993, the government adopted a foreign policy concept 
(FPC’93) that provided some officially sanctioned ideas about Russia’s iden-
tity and some key directions for the state’s foreign policy.59 The document is 
strikingly dualistic with regard to Russia’s identity. On the one hand, it ac-
centuates Russia’s democratic nature and conveys a feeling of sameness be-
tween Russia and other normal, democratic and civilised states. On the other 
hand the text contains passages that point more to Russia’s uniqueness and 
to vague ideas about a special Russian role and status in world affairs. For 
instance, Russia is referred to as a ‘great power’ with a ‘unique geopolitical 
position’ (FPC’93). Without elaboration, the document also purports the ex-
istence of certain ‘specifics’ in Russia’s historical, geopolitical and eco-
nomic interests, and depicts Russia as a bearer of ‘inherited rights and re-
sponsibilities’ in world politics. References to ‘interests’ and a ‘special role’ 
for Russia in ‘countries of traditional Russian influence’ (i.e., the FRSU and 
to some extent CEE) are equally intriguing. 
Arguably, connotations like ‘great power’ cannot pertain to all states. 
FPC’93 purports that it is an appropriate label for Russia. Yet beyond some 
explicit references to Russia’s permanent seat in the UNSC, the basis for 
Russia’s great power status is not elaborated. Likewise, the perceived 
uniqueness of Russia’s heritage, interests and geopolitical position signals a 
belief in the existence of a particular role for Russia in world politics. Still, 
                                                     
57  Kozyrev (1992d) had earlier rejected the idea that Russia needed a foreign policy concept: 
‘There can be no plan (shkema). There are only reactions to specific situations, and in 
these [reactions] Russia’s national interests are exposed.’ 
58  Again, the dichotomisation cannot account for all views. For instance, some ‘red-browns’ 
or ‘national-communists’ spoke out in favour of resurrecting the Russian empire and Rus-
sia’s role as a (Soviet-style) superpower, which obviously goes beyond the ambition of 
more moderate Eurasianists (Arbatov 1993:13–14). 
59  See ‘Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993), hereafter referred to 
as FPC’93. 
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the contents of this role are not specified. Consequently, the text left the 
makers and practitioners of foreign policy with great room for interpretation.  
The adopted foreign policy concept has a consensus character (Crow 
1993). It incorporates some central ideas from both Westernism and Eura-
sianism, and balances between the CIS area and the West as the two main 
foreign policy orientations.60 Although some differences in views remained, 
many liberals and former critics of Kozyrev welcomed its adoption (RFE/RL 
1993). President Yeltsin, who rarely engaged in public debates on foreign 
policy, made the following remark prior to its formal approval: ‘Russia’s in-
dependent foreign policy started with the West. It started with the United 
States, and we feel that this was justified. We had to lay the main foundation 
(…) on the basis of which it would be easier, afterward, to build relations 
with any country, be it from the West or East, Europe or Asia’ (Yeltsin 
quoted in Neumann 1996:182). Apparently, this expresses a view shared by 
many liberals in 1993 and an emerging mood of consensus in Moscow 
around main orientations in Russia’s foreign policy.61 
Debate on Russia’s identity and foreign policy was never about choosing 
either a Eurasianist or a Westernist course; it was a question of how to adjust 
the balance between the Western and Eastern priorities (Sergounin 2001: 
7).62 With regard to the analysis below, the proclaimed ambition of having 
the former SU and (to some extent) CEE recognised as Russian spheres of 
influence is one of the most interesting features in the FPC’93. The docu-
ment comes close to proclaiming a hegemonic role for Russia in the CIS 
area. The new policy consensus reflected a belief in Russia’s self-evident 
right and moral duty to act as a defender of Russian minority populations in 
the FRSU (Kolstoe 1995:287). Yet the tonality of the FPC’93, its unques-
tioned conception of Russia as a great power, and the vague content of some 
Eurasianist ideas included in the text, are rather intriguing. I assert that the 
dualism contained in the FPC’93 implied official sanctioning of competing 
worldviews that entailed two different security logics as the basis for Rus-
sia’s policy. I will argue later that Moscow’s use of these ambiguous con-
cepts, and the failure to fill them with clear content in interaction with the 
                                                     
60  FPC’93 incorporates some central ideas advocated by the Council for Foreign and De-
fence Policy (SVOP), a loose network of government officials, academics and people 
from the military establishment. In August 1992, this network presented a document that 
suggested some main priorities for Russia’s foreign policy (‘Strategiya dlya Rossii’). The 
SVOP strategy basically argued that Russia should develop close relations with the West 
and pursue an ‘enlightened post-imperialist integrationist course’ vis-à-vis the former So-
viet republics. The argument was elaborated by Karaganov and Vladislavlev (1992), who 
state that: ‘You cannot run from yourself’, signalling thereby that Russia cannot run from 
the special responsibility conferred on her by history with regard to the post-Soviet space, 
which is so intimately tied to Russia through history, culture, economic interdependence 
a.o. 
61  Opinion polls undertaken inside the foreign policymaking elite during this period show 
that there was a marginal overweight of sympathisers to Westernist ideas (52%) compared 
to Eurasianist (45%) (Crow 1994:6).  
62  Although Kozyrev continued to defend the government’s focus on relations with the 
West, he too adopted some concepts and ideas that had been advocated primarily by Eura-
sianists: The notion of Russia’s ‘special responsibility’ for peacekeeping in the post-
Soviet space (1993a); the conception of the former SU as a sphere of ‘legitimate Russian 
interests’ (1993b); and the fear of having a ‘security vacuum in the CIS filled by others’ 
(1993d). Yet he was apparently more watchful than many Eurasianists about possible 
negative reactions from the West if these concepts received a neo-imperial flavour. He 
was also very cautious with regard to the potential for negative reactions from the Islamic 
world and from the large minority of Muslims in Russia if Moscow were to take on con-
ceivably ‘anti-Muslim’ stances in international affairs (Balkans, CIS) (Kozyrev 1993c). 
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West, to some extent constrained the potential success of Russia’s policy 
with regard to the construction of a post-Cold War security architecture in 
Europe. 
3.2 Relations with NATO 1991–93 
During the 1990s, NATO changed fundamentally in character and purpose.63 
These changes came about only gradually and not without hesitation among 
the actors involved. However, an important step towards transformation was 
taken already at the Rome summit in November 1991 when the alliance ap-
proved a new strategic concept that called for NATO to become a more po-
litical alliance with security missions beyond the basic task of territorial de-
fence of its member states.64 A second step was the establishment of NACC 
in late 1991, which became NATO’s ‘outreach program’ to states in the for-
mer Eastern bloc (Kugler 1996), and which established a forum for consulta-
tions on a wide range of military and political issues. Thus, in the immediate 
wake of Soviet dissolution and the 1989–91 geopolitical shift in Europe, 
Russia faced questions regarding how to conceive of the former military en-
emy, and also whether and how to formalise security relations with NATO.  
3.2.1 Revised perceptions of a former enemy 
During the first couple of years, the Russian government had a largely posi-
tive view of NATO (Sergounin 2001:3–4). The Western alliance was not 
perceived as an aggressive organisation with offensive motives vis-à-vis 
Russia. Although many started to question NATO’s raison d’être after the 
formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in early 1991, Russia’s foreign policy 
officials did not insist on a corresponding Western dissolution of NATO. On 
the contrary, utterances and decisions that might have invoked suspicion in 
the West of a remaining confrontational worldview appear to have been 
carefully avoided by Moscow officials. In liberal Russian circles, the transat-
lantic alliance was in fact frequently recognised as a guarantor of stability in 
Europe, and as an important instrument for improving East–West relations.  
At the outset (1991–92), the question of NATO enlargement was not high 
on the international political agenda. To the extent that an enlargement sce-
nario was discussed, Russian officials refrained from opposing it (Sergounin 
2001:3). President Yeltsin and high-ranking figures in the government even 
embarked upon the idea that Russia herself might one day become a NATO 
member, although this was regarded as conditional to fundamental changes 
in the character and purpose of the alliance. 
Despite a generally non-confrontational attitude, Russia’s government 
remained somewhat sceptical with regard to an extensive role for NATO in 
European affairs. NATO’s composition was based on exclusive membership. 
This contradicted the idea of indivisible security, which was central to the 
                                                     
63  Arguably, NATO has gone from being an (‘exclusive’) military alliance to become a 
(more ‘inclusive’) security management institution, or from ‘collective defence’ (focus on 
territorial defence) to ‘collective security’ (concern with task beyond territorial defence) 
(Wallander and Keohane 1999; Yost (1998). 
64  The text is available on NATO’s home page:  
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm (2002-08-14). 
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security thinking of Russian liberals. In a 1992 interview with Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, Kozyrev (1992d) also ruled out an extension of the alliance’s func-
tional scope to incorporate peacekeeping missions out of area, a question 
that had emerged in light of Balkan developments. As he saw it, any role for 
NATO in this regard needed sanctioning by the UNSC. Thus, although 
NATO was not regarded as an enemy, Russia was wary of an extensive role 
for the Western alliance unless it was transformed in terms of both character 
and purpose. 
3.2.2 NACC and the expansion of NATO-sponsored activities 
Nonetheless, when NATO invited Russia to join NACC as a framework for 
politico-military consultations and cooperation, there was apparently little 
hesitation in the policymaking elite in Moscow. Russia joined NACC in 
March 1992 (NATO Handbook 2001:40), and participated actively in its ac-
tivities during the first couple of years. The agenda was extensive, but fo-
cused primarily on problems in CEE and in the FRSU. In fact, Adomeit 
(1994:50–51) found that NACC became an important arena for managing 
complex intra-CIS security issues. During 1991–92, Russia found it increas-
ingly difficult to deal with some controversial issues in the post-Soviet 
space. One cluster of problems related to the dissolution of the Soviet Army 
(the division of forces and military equipment; the status of military units 
and infrastructure; the elimination and redistribution of nuclear weapons, 
etc.). A second group of problems concerned emerging Russian efforts at 
crisis prevention and management of conflicts on post-Soviet territories. 
Some CIS member states were openly wary of Russian great power ambi-
tions and attempts by Moscow to reassert a dominant role in the region.  
The question of CFE ratification and the division of ‘Soviet quotas’, 
which involved a number of ‘non-Soviet’ Eastern European countries, added 
substantially to the first group of problems.65 However, despite the fact that 
NACC did not have the authority to decide on these matters, it facilitated 
their partial resolution (Adomeit 1994:51). Russia used NACC as an arena 
for achieving agreements with the CIS states and former Warsaw Pact mem-
bers on implementation of CFE provisions and a number of military issues 
that were essentially intra-CIS or intra-East in character. In effect, therefore, 
by agreeing to deal with these matters inside a NATO-affiliated body, Mos-
cow contributed to expand the functional scope and geographical domain of 
NATO itself. The fact that Russia did not oppose the access of NATO coun-
tries to discussions on ‘internal’ post-Soviet/post-Warsaw Pact affairs is 
equally intriguing.66 
                                                     
65  In the framework of the CSCE summit in Paris in November 1990, the 22 members of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact had signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE). The CFE treaty established limitations for particular types of military 
equipment and their geographical concentration on the continent. The quotas for each of 
the two sides were to be internally distributed by the alliances themselves. The dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact (February–July 1991) complicated questions of ratification and im-
plementation of the treaty.  
66  NACC was less successful in contributing to solving issues of conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space. However, Russia’s initial position was rather 
forthcoming with regard to a (potential) future role for NATO also in these matters, al-
though this had to be sanctioned by the UNSC (Adomeit 1994:52). 
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3.2.3 Joining NACC: A step westward? 
If Russia was in opposition to a prominent role for NATO in the post-Cold 
War security architecture, at least in any ‘old’ and ‘exclusive’ variant, how 
can we explain the decision to join NACC and the use of this forum to deal 
with intra-CIS/intra-East issues? In his address to the first NACC meeting of 
foreign ministers in March 1992, Kozyrev said: ‘We consider the North At-
lantic Cooperation Council to be another mechanism to help us join the in-
ternational community’ (Kozyrev quoted in Adomeit 1994:50). This state-
ment fits nicely with the proclaimed goal of westward integration, although 
it indicates a Russian look beyond the limited Western world. Apart from 
(potential) security dividends resulting from politico-military consultations 
and interest mediation, NACC was only one in a number of bodies that con-
firmed Russia’s ‘return’ to world politics as a reliable partner and as a nor-
mal, democratic and civilised state. 
However, officials in Moscow obviously regarded relations with NATO 
and NACC through a prism of military security and institutional payoffs. In 
itself, the geopolitical shift and a fear of political isolation was essentially a 
question of Russia’s strategic security situation. The goal of westward inte-
gration was vested in a view of Russia as part of a larger security space 
shared with the West. Within this space, NATO remained an important insti-
tution. This facilitated a perceived need for some formal link to this body. 
Kozyrev (1992a:13) stressed ‘openness in the military-strategic sphere’ as an 
important function of NACC, and regarded it in the perspective of creating 
favourable external security conditions for implementation of internal Rus-
sian reforms. This apparently reflects Kozyrev’s personal belief in the as-
sumed benefits of cooperation and international security institutions formu-
lated by authors in the liberal tradition (Checkel 1993). 
These sections suggest that the East–West dimension was close to absent 
in the security thinking of the Russian government during this period (1991–
92), or at least that it was of little importance with regard to policy. Argua-
bly, a confrontational view of the West and perceptions of NATO as an ag-
gressive military alliance would have triggered a power logic and dictated 
strong Russian opposition to any expansion of the geographical domain and 
functional scope of NATO and NATO-associated structures. There is little 
evidence to support such a thesis. On the contrary, Kozyrev and other liberal 
figures were concerned with having Russia recognised as a normal, civilised 
and European state, and were driven by the security logic of chaos, which 
dictated Russia’s integration into the Western security structures. At the 
time, Russian interests to a great extent corresponded to the interests of the 
West. The two shared an interest in consolidating their improved political 
relations and in facilitating dialogue and development of mutual confidence 
in the politico-military sphere. They also had a shared interest in settling a 
number of problems concerning arms control and military security, many of 
which pertained to their common periphery (i.e., CEE, the Caucasus, Central 
Asia). Thus, disposed by the largely non-confrontational view of NATO and 
the West that dominated the Russian policymaking elite, the benefits of join-
ing NACC were believed to greatly exceed the expected costs of non-
participation. 
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3.2.4 NACC and the absence of a ‘Russian’ institution  
To be sure, Cold War images of NATO and the West remained strong within 
certain segments of the Russian society. This was particularly evident in the 
Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces, but was expressed also by Eura-
sianists and others in opposition to the government’s pro-Western course 
(Allison 1996; Pravda 1996). If these views had any influence on policy, one 
could expect the adoption of Russian countermeasures and attempts to bal-
ance NATO’s role by establishing ‘Russian’ institutions.  
However, after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, Moscow was 
left without a strong institutional basis for influencing political and military 
developments in CEE. By 1992, Russia was already detecting a certain 
westward drift and an interest in several CEE states to formalise relations 
with NATO. Thus, Russia was left with no immediate prospects for estab-
lishing a new ‘Russian’ institution that could potentially counterbalance 
NATO in this part of Europe. And as I shall discuss in more detail later, the 
slowly emerging CIS structure never became a well-functioning institution 
or an effective policy tool for Russia. Under these conditions, the Russian 
government in a sense ‘conceded’ to seeing NACC take on the role of host-
ing consultations on hardcore security issues that were essentially ‘internal’ 
to the (former) East. Given the fact that the Russian military establishment 
actively used NACC as a policy instrument, it is probably fair to assume that 
Russia’s decision to join this framework was also affected by the urgent 
need to address military questions creating political tensions with some CEE 
states and former Soviet republics. Russia had enough problems at home, 
and needed to create favourable external conditions for their resolutions. 
NACC might potentially serve as one contributing factor in this regard. 
Hence, to the extent that Cold War overlay was present in the minds of 
policymakers, it bore little effect on Russia’s decisions. The 1989–91 geopo-
litical shift was obviously a constraining factor with regard to establishing a 
new ‘Russian’ institution. Besides, Russia and the West had a shared interest 
in consolidating the gains of mutual rapprochement and in facilitating the 
resolution of difficult military issues. At the time, NACC stood out as a suit-
able table to deal with these matters. And since NATO was also no longer an 
enemy, the benefits of cooperation exceeded the expected costs as perceived 
by the liberal-minded foreign policy leadership. 
3.3 Relations with CSCE 1991–93 
The Soviet Union was the initiator and a key contributor to the process that 
led to the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This document was the 
outcome of an East–West dialogue on a wide range of political, economic 
and security issues, and started a process of gradual rapprochement between 
the two opposing blocs in Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, CSCE had 
evolved into a framework for regular political consultations and was increas-
ingly becoming an institutionalised component of the European security ar-
chitecture. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia soon came to fa-
vour an extensive role for CSCE in European political and security affairs. 
Nevertheless, some ambiguities surfaced already from 1992 with regard to 
the exact content of this role as envisioned by the new Russian leadership. 
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The following sections trace Russian decisions with regard to the weight, 
geographical domain and functional scope of CSCE, and seek to analyse the 
rationale behind these decisions.67 
3.3.1 CSCE – advantages and disadvantages seen from Russia 
The CSCE process is essentially a liberal project in the sense that it reflects a 
comprehensive approach to security; is inclusive in terms of membership; 
has a norm-building character; and applies a consensus rule of decision-
making. These features made CSCE attractive to the new Russian leadership 
(Baranovsky 2000b:153–154). Seen from Russia, CSCE had the additional 
advantage of being an inexpensive policy instrument, which was important 
in light of financial constraints on Russian policy (ibid.:154). In contrast to 
NATO, EC/EU, WEU and other Western institutions, Russia was also full 
participant to CSCE. This was an arena where Russia could voice her inter-
ests and concerns vis-à-vis other European states, with the consensus rule 
giving Moscow a right to veto decisions perceived to be detrimental to Rus-
sian interests. 
To be sure, the disadvantages of CSCE are reflected in these same values: 
No decision without consensus; too extensive an agenda; universal member-
ship fosters disagreement on CSCE role, functions and priorities; and scarce 
resources make it a weak instrument to formulate policy and monitor imple-
mentation of decisions. Still, CSCE was generally spoken of in favourable 
terms in Moscow and was regarded as a preferred framework for political 
consultations and security cooperation in Europe. 
3.3.2 Bringing Central Asia into Europe 
There is some truth to allegations made by several critics that the govern-
ment’s Western orientation in 1991–92 was accompanied by a certain ne-
glect of relations with the former Soviet republics (Zagorski 1994; Sten-
seth1999). This neglect was arguably caused by a belief in the dictates of 
(economic) interdependence in the post-Soviet space (Zagorski 1994:266–
267). Moscow simply took for granted that the CIS states would eventually 
gravitate back to Russia. Yet a facilitating factor may also have been scarcity 
in the government’s foreign policy resources, which were largely concen-
trated on developing relations with the West (Lough 1993a; 1993b).68 
With the break-up of the USSR, the states of Central Asia might easily 
have fallen outside CSCE, which is an explicitly European institution.69 
                                                     
67  Key CSCE/OSCE documents and an overview of developments from 1975 are available 
on the organisation’s home page: www.osce.org (2002-06-25). At the CSCE Budapest 
summit in December 1994, CSCE became OSCE, which reflected a higher degree of 
institutionalisation of this security body from January 1995. 
68  Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev (1992), who was in charge of relations with the CIS area in the 
Russian Foreign Ministry, said in an interview that only about ten persons in the ministry 
were engaged in CIS matters. 
69  Arguably, the Caucasian states are ‘more European’ than the five republics of Central 
Asia. Also, the fact that the former were entangled in the CFE process may have pre-
sented a stronger rationale for their continued inclusion in CSCE. Although some argu-
ments in the following paragraphs may be relevant also with regard to the Caucasian re-
gion, I limit the discussion here to the question of CSCE membership for states in Central 
Asia. 
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There is reason to assume that path dependency and the value of continuity 
in political relations was an important factor contributing to their recognition 
as CSCE members. However, when faced with some sceptical voices in the 
West concerning the enormous geographical distance between Europe and 
Central Asia, the Russian government made certain diplomatic efforts in late 
1991/early 1992 to help the Soviet–Asian republics remain members to 
CSCE. Thus, when the question came up: Why did Russia actively seek to 
‘pull’ these states into the CSCE processes, thus contributing to maintaining 
a geographical domain that covered North America, Europe and the former 
SU?70 
The zero-sum logic suggests that Russia was trying to draw friendly 
states or perceived allies into an already established institution in order to 
increase Russia’s own weight by means of a post-Soviet bloc inside CSCE. 
If the new states were themselves interested in becoming members, and if 
Moscow was pursuing a policy of ‘wait-and-see; they-will-come-back-to-
us’, Russian facilitation of their CSCE membership might in fact create a 
certain political goodwill in these states and accelerate their ‘return’ in terms 
of reintegration in the post-Soviet space.  
However, this explanation is hardly tenable. Given CSCE decision-
making procedures, where the principle of unanimity lies at the core, why 
would Russia need ‘allies’ to back her own stances? Russia enjoyed equal 
status with the participating states in the conference, and could veto any de-
cision perceived to be detrimental to her own interests. To be sure, a ‘N–1’ 
mechanism was introduced in the fall of 1991 that made it possible to send 
CSCE missions to investigate human rights situations without the consent of 
the ‘–1’ party in question (Flynn and Farrell 1999:519). However, the 
mechanism was a complex one and applied only to this very limited area of 
the CSCE human dimension. Thus, there is little reason to believe that Mos-
cow considered this mechanism to be a potential ‘threat’ that might outweigh 
the exclusion of Central Asia. 
Besides, Moscow was already beginning to feel a certain wariness in sev-
eral CIS states concerning what these perceived as signs of Russian neo-
imperial ambitions (Zagorski 1994). As indicated earlier, scepticism in the 
former WP states and in some former Soviet republics concerning Russia’s 
policy was particularly evident with regard to questions of military security. 
Some Central Asian states openly sought to fence off Russia and to counter 
political initiatives originating in Moscow, fearing that these might under-
mine their own sovereignty (Stenseth 1999). Thus, leaders in Russia must 
have known that a decision to help these states into CSCE did not necessar-
ily imply that Moscow was providing a seat at the table for ‘friends’ or ‘al-
lies’ of Russia. 
Adding to this, Russian diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing sceptics 
not only in the West, but also at overcoming reluctance in some CIS states 
themselves towards joining CSCE (Kozyrev 1995a:176–177). The Russian 
decision may therefore have been conditioned by an emerging fear in Mos-
cow of losing altogether Russia’s institutional basis for influencing devel-
                                                     
70  With the exception of Georgia (March 1992) and the Baltic states (September 1991), all 
the former Soviet republics were recognised as members to CSCE in January 1992 
(OSZE-Jahrbuch 1999).  
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opments in the CIS area. If it was becoming increasingly clear to the Russian 
government that it would not be able to preserve a union-like structure with a 
leading role for itself, it may have regarded CSCE as a policy instrument that 
might prevent certain ‘Russophobic’ or ‘hostile’ CIS states from drifting out 
of Russia’s sphere of influence altogether. Given the uncertainties in late 
1991/early 1992 about future developments, one cannot exclude that a per-
ceived need for some sort of ‘guarantied’ institutional leverage on Central 
Asia was part of the picture underlying Moscow’s decision. 
Yet as Zagorski (1994:66–67) argued, there was a strong belief in Mos-
cow at the time that the dictates of (economic) interdependence would even-
tually facilitate a certain level of integration on the basis of CIS. This obvi-
ously weakens the argument above. I suggest instead that Russia wanted to 
make sure that the states of Central Asia were tied to a world of democratic 
and ‘civilised’ states, and thus prevent them from becoming potential sub-
jects to Islamic fundamentalism. In a discussion of Russia’s foreign policy 
that took place within the framework of SVOP in early 1993, Kozyrev said 
that the government in 1991 found it to be in Russia’s security interest to fa-
cilitate attachment of Central Asia (and the Caucasus) to ‘everything that the 
European political culture carries in it’ (Kozyrev in RFE/RL 1993:16). In his 
words, Russia was to be surrounded ‘not by ‘asianness’ (aziatchina)’, but 
rather by a ‘CSCE space of high principles, democratic norms and marked 
standards’ (ibid.:15–16). For the sake of Russia’s security, therefore, all the 
CIS states needed to become members of CSCE. 
There are actually two dimensions to Kozyrev’s argument, both of which 
point to an explicit security dividend for Russia. Seen from Moscow, Central 
Asia is located on the border between the Christian and Muslim worlds. 
Emerging societal tensions inside several CIS states made the liberal gov-
ernment in Russia wary that this region was particularly exposed to the 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which was regarded as the very counter-
force of democracy, basic freedoms and human rights. The attachment of 
Central Asia to CSCE would imply formal adoption by these states of de-
mocratic norms and values, and thus prevent these states from embarking 
upon identities and policies that made them alien to Russia and the Western 
civilisation. Thus, his argument contains strong sentiments of pessimism 
with regard to the potential for conflict derived from value-based or civilisa-
tional differences.71 
The second dimension is intimately linked to the first, but does not entail 
the same accentuation of perceived differences in values or civilisation. 
Rather, it reflects Russia’s concern with facilitating order and stability in the 
CIS area as favourable conditions for Russia’s transition and reforms and for 
peoples lives in the post-Soviet space. Kozyrev had great personal belief in 
the benefits of democracy as a condition for societal development and inter-
national peace, but also in the potential contribution to international security 
                                                     
71  Early Russian discourse on relations with the ‘Near Abroad’ often implied references to a 
vague link between hyper-nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism as (potential) threats 
to Russia (Matz 2001). Kozyrev was always careful not to define ‘Islam’ in itself as a 
source of danger to Russia’s security. This reflects his fear of invoking negative reactions 
in the Muslim world and among Russia’s large Muslim minority (Kozyrev 1993c). 
Rather, the security argument that facilitated Russia’s decision to help the Central Asian 
states into CSCE was derived from the potential threats from ‘Islamic fundamentalism or 
other extremist forces’ (Kozyrev in RFE/RL 1993:15).  
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stemming from institutional cooperation (Checkel 1992:20–21; Kozyrev 
1992a:12–13). Accordingly, the attachment of Central Asia to CSCE was re-
garded as a means to foster stable democratic regimes, human rights and 
economic development in this sub-region, which would in turn make these 
states less vulnerable to various expressions of political extremism.  
Thus, the decision in Moscow to advocate the inclusion of Central Asia 
into CSCE was dictated by the security logic of chaos and by Russia’s secu-
ritisation of the link between these states and the values of a (liberal) West-
ern, European or Christian civilisation. Concern with potential chaos in the 
periphery lay at the core of Russia’s rationale, but was strengthened by a 
scenario of Islamic fundamentalism gaining territory and advancing toward 
Russia and a broader civilised order. Arguably, initial reluctance in the West 
towards having the Central Asian states entangled in the CSCE process re-
flects the geographical distance to these threats of chaos and Islamic funda-
mentalism. Yet the West also had an interest in facilitating the spread of 
CSCE norms and values in the European region. Accordingly, since the costs 
of inclusion were low, it didn’t take a lot of bargaining to concede to the 
Russian view.  
Russia’s decision obviously served the liberal-minded government well 
in creating a favourable image of Russia in the West. It not only expressed 
Moscow’s recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the FRSU. It 
also signalled a commitment to CSCE principles and norms and a willing-
ness to serve as a projector of shared Russian–Western values along Russia’s 
southern and eastern perimeters. Here, the two sides had a shared interest. 
Yet the incorporation of Central Asia into CSCE also contributed to binding 
these states to a security body of which Russia was a member. Thus, it eased 
in one sense the complex task of handling Russia’s external relations in a pe-
riod of disintegration and domestic transition. It also compensated for the in-
stitutional vacuum some people in Russia saw emerging in Central Asia, and 
was believed to (potentially) hamper attempts by these states or external ac-
tors to establish alternative security arrangements in this sub-region. 
3.3.3 CSCE and its role in the post-Soviet space 
With the end of the Cold War and a belief in both Russia and the West that 
the danger of global war was significantly reduced, issues of conflict preven-
tion, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement became cen-
tral to the international agenda. This development was conditioned not least 
by the emergence of a number of violent conflicts in the former SU. Some of 
these were internal conflicts vested in ethnic and/or religious disputes. Yet 
they often had international implications through claims made by various 
groups for political autonomy, national sovereignty, revision of borders, and, 
in some cases, integration/reintegration with other states. In addition, in-
creasing attention to human rights entailed questions concerning how far 
principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention really went as norms 
in world politics.  
CSCE soon became entangled in these matters. During the early 1990s, 
the parties to CSCE sought to strengthen the human dimension and policy 
instruments pertaining to ‘soft’ aspects of security. They also committed 
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themselves to developing CSCE capabilities for conflict prevention and cri-
sis management. These measures aimed at making the conference an effec-
tive tool for peaceful settlement of disputes. The promotion of democracy 
and human rights was important in this regard.72 
In July 1992, CSCE was recognised as a regional agency as defined in 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter authorised to carry out peacekeeping opera-
tions. In light of the Russian government’s proclaimed understanding of in-
ternational security, one might expect that Russia would favour strong in-
volvement by the conference in post-Cold War peacekeeping. Yet develop-
ments from 1992 brought to the surface a Russian ambivalence concerning 
the role of CSCE in these matters. They also disclosed different views be-
tween Russia and the West as to how these conflicts might be approached 
and resolved.73 
3.3.3.1 Early Russian involvement: Pro-active prevention of military chaos? 
During a period from 1992 to 1994, Russia became involved in peacekeep-
ing operations in Tajikistan, Transdniestria/Moldova, Georgia/South Ossetia, 
Georgia/Abkhasia, and Nagorno–Karabakh.74 It has been argued that Rus-
sia’s military involvement in these conflicts came about at least partly as a 
response by the Russian Defence Ministry to an emerging threat of losing 
control with the Armed Forces, and that the Foreign Ministry was in some 
cases taken by surprise (Baev 1998; Allison 1994).75 As events on the 
ground evolved, the generals in Moscow feared that armed groupings might 
become ‘nationalised’ by the conflicting parties (Baev 1998:28). Although 
liberals in the government were concerned that an interventionist approach 
to intra-CIS conflicts might damage the policy of westward rapprochement, 
combat orders from the Defence Ministry were often treated in the Foreign 
Ministry with ‘benign neglect’ and even supported by ‘semi-official Go-
Aheads’ (Baev 1996:151). 
There is also some evidence that a strong, nationalist-minded military 
lobby pushed for involvement in these conflicts in defence of Russian expa-
triates (Allison 1994:22–25; Lough 1993b:23–24). From early 1992, per-
ceived suppression of the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian minori-
ties in the FRSU emerged as central to Russia’s debate on foreign policy. 
                                                     
72  In the early 1990s, CSCE introduced so-called human rights ‘missions’ and developed 
instruments for consultation, early warning, and arbitration in emerging conflicts (so-
called ‘preventive diplomacy’). The adoption of a ‘Code of Conduct for Politico-Military 
Aspects of Security’ and the transformation of CSCE into OSCE with a higher level of in-
stitutionalisation and several new bodies, were also important. For details, see the ‘Char-
ter of Paris for a New Europe’ (1990) and ‘Budapest document 1994: Towards a genuine 
partnership in a New Era’ (1994) (both texts available on www.osce.org). See also Flynn 
and Farrell (1999). 
73  The conflict in Chechnya (1994–96) will not be dealt with in this study. One may argue 
that this is essentially a secessionist conflict comparable with the ones that form the basis 
of my discussion. Yet despite deployment of an OSCE Assistance Group in early 1995 
(with a rather limited mandate), the international community has largely recognised this to 
be an internal Russian affair. See Pursiainen (1998:205–343) for a detailed analysis.  
74  I make no distinction here between ‘mirotvorcheskie operatsii’ (i.e., ‘peace-making opera-
tions’ or ‘operations to create peace’) and ‘operatsii po podderzhaniyo mira’ (i.e., ‘peace-
upholding operations’ or ‘operations to maintain peace’). These two terms are often used 
as synonyms in Russian academic and political debate, and arguably with certain confu-
sion with regard to their appropriate application and content. 
75  Baev (1998) is concerned with secessionist conflicts, and does not discuss the case of Ta-
jikistan.  
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Thus, under the pretext of defending the interests of ‘ours’ abroad, Russian 
commanders claimed a legitimate right to intervene in intra-CIS conflicts. 
From a military point of view, this would also serve the additional strategic 
interest many generals saw in continued presence of Russian troops in the 
region.76 
Arguably, both these explanations can be derived from the centre–
periphery dimension of our model. Concern with military disintegration and 
armed chaos reflects Russia’s obvious security interest in having conflicts on 
post-Soviet territory settled before these escalated and began to spread into 
Russia herself. Yet the invocation of particular interests with regard to de-
fence of ethnic Russians in the CIS area has an additional flavour to it that 
reflects a conception of Russia in more Eurasianist terms. The evidence 
above suggests that Russia’s initial involvement came about as ad hoc re-
sponses by the Russian military to challenges of perceived chaos and disin-
tegration, and that neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Kremlin were the 
primary driving forces. There was apparently a more urgent feeling amongst 
the military that Russia needed to act. This reflects their immediate contact 
with emerging challenges on the battlefield, but also a certain dominance 
within the Russian military leadership of a (realist-driven) security logic of 
power vis-à-vis the West, which dictated pro-active Russian involvement 
and strategic presence in the CIS area. And since a pro-active policy by the 
Defence Ministry in a time of flux might potentially facilitate conflict resolu-
tions on terms perceived favourable to Russia and Russian expatriates, it was 
largely left to the generals to deal with these matters. Hence, military re-
sponses were undertaken as needs arose and by means of Russian troops al-
ready present in the conflict areas.77  
3.3.3.2 Ambiguities in Russian peacekeeping activities 
Analyses of Russia’s conduct in these operations have documented a certain 
discrepancy between Russia’s military involvement and internationally rec-
ognised standards for peacekeeping. This concerns particularly the principles 
of impartiality of peacekeepers and non-imposition of external solutions 
(Flikke (ed.) 1996).78 For instance, in a case study of Russia’s role in Tajiki-
stan, Lena Jonson (1996) found that Moscow’s bias in favour of the regime 
in Dushanbe greatly inhibited Russian peacekeeping efforts. Similarly, 
Fuller (1994) goes quite far in suggesting that the Russian Defence Ministry, 
with at least tacit support from the Russian government, conducted ‘media-
tion’ in Nagorno–Karabakh in early 1994 that clearly favoured the Armenian 
side. This ‘mediation’ was conducted parallel to a CSCE-sponsored negotia-
tion process agreed to by both sides and (at least officially) supported by 
                                                     
76  In the 1993 military doctrine, the fate of Russians abroad is regarded as ‘a potential source 
of external military danger’ to the Russian Federation. See ‘Osnovnye polozheniya voen-
noy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993). 
77  In the case of Georgia/Abkhasia, Baev (1998) found that Russia’s involvement was not so 
much the result of a pro-active policy by the Russian Defence Ministry. Instead, he sug-
gests that as the conflict started, Russian forces stationed in Abkhasia suddenly ‘found 
themselves on that side of the battlefield’ (ibid.:23). 
78  The observed readiness amongst Russian authorities to use considerable military force 
even in ‘peacekeeping operations’ is a separate case (Allison 1994). This issue has raised 
some concern in both Western and Russian liberal circles that Russia does not adhere to 
internationally accepted norms and particularly to the jus in bello principle of avoiding 
unnecessary or excessive use of military force. This issue will not be dealt with here. 
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Russia, a process to which the Azerbaijani authorities were clearly more 
sympathetic.  
These findings are intriguing because they indicate that Russia may have 
been pursuing additional interests than the goal of peace and stability in the 
post-Soviet area. In the case of Tajikistan, Jonson (1996:85) concludes that 
Moscow had ‘given priority to strengthen its presence and influence rather 
than finding a lasting solution to the conflict’. Likewise, Fuller (1994:13) in-
terprets Defence Minister Grachev’s 1994 ‘diplomacy’ in Nagorno–
Karabakh as an attempt by Moscow to ‘assume a monopoly on peacekeeping 
operations in the former Soviet sphere of influence’. Russia also intervened 
and expanded her conflict management activities in the post-Soviet space 
‘with little regard of the UN and pan-European organisations’, and with 
mandates being ‘invariably questionable’ (Baev 1998:30). In face of critical 
voices, Moscow presented the operations as CIS-led rather than Russian-led 
(Allison 1994:11). Still, this development raised questions concerning inter-
national authorisation and the role envisioned by Russia for CSCE and the 
West in these matters.  
3.3.3.3 Western involvement: The question of authorising Russian-led opera-
tions 
It should be noted that in the early 1990s, many Western leaders had no clear 
vision of how to deal with post-Cold War peacekeeping and conflict man-
agement in Europe. In June 1992 NATO declared its willingness to support 
the UN and CSCE in peacekeeping activities on a case-to-case basis (Laugen 
1999:26). Over the subsequent three years, the Western alliance became 
deeply involved in the war in Bosnia, which constituted the first operational 
phase of NATO’s out-of-area policy. However, there was no talk of having 
NATO become militarily involved in operations on post-Soviet territories, 
which would be unacceptable also to the Russian military and the Russian 
political opposition. In fact, it appears that non-engagement in CIS affairs 
was the prevailing Western approach during the first couple of years 
(Baranovsky 1994; Baev 1998). Accordingly, reactions in the West to Rus-
sia’s peacekeeping activities varied from ‘mild disapproval to tacit encour-
agement’ (Baev 1998:30). This arguably reflected the absence of vital West-
ern interest and reluctance to engage in matters far from the Western centre, 
but also acceptance that Russia could be left with the task of pursuing a 
shared Russian–Western interest in suppressing signs of chaos and instability 
in their common periphery (CIS). 
However, the question of Western involvement and international authori-
sation of Russia’s military operations lurked in the background. At an early 
stage, Russia apparently favoured an extensive role for NACC in this regard 
(Allison 1994:37–41). Some Russian experts saw NACC as a particularly 
suitable body for implementing UN-mandated operations in the post-Soviet 
space. NACC not only encompassed the main powers and the states threat-
ened by instability. One might also count on using NATO infrastructure if 
decisions were taken to launch peacekeeping operations. In this scenario, 
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NACC might develop into a joint Russian–Western instrument for dealing 
with conflict management and peacekeeping even in the Soviet space.79 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev was no stranger to this idea. However, it ap-
pears that he regarded a role for NACC in peacekeeping operations on for-
mer Soviet territory as conditional to a development of this body into a struc-
ture independent from NATO (Allison 1994:39–40; Mihalka 1994:36–38). 
He also made it clear that any role for NACC in these matters would have to 
be linked to CSCE. At first, these two bodies were seen as in some sense 
overlapping structures, in which NACC would deal with military issues, and 
CSCE with political and other matters. However, in early 1993 Kozyrev 
suggested that a vertical line of responsibility be established from the UN 
and CSCE to NACC in questions of peacekeeping in the CSCE area. At the 
same time, President Yeltsin called for international organisations to grant 
Russia ‘special powers’ as guarantor of peace and stability in CIS area. By 
early 1994, Kozyrev’s model had developed into a proposed framework in 
which CSCE would assume the task of ‘coordinating’ peacekeeping efforts 
by the various regional institutions (Allison 1994:39–40). Now, NATO, 
NACC and CIS were depicted as belonging to an identical organisational 
level in a security framework that had CSCE at its centre.80  
Parallel to these developments, the Russian government sought to in-
crease the status of CIS by suggesting that it should receive observer status 
in the UN and that it should be formally recognised as a regional structure 
with responsibility for peacekeeping as defined in the UN Charter (Allison 
1994:34–35). Russian military authorities also sought to develop a joint CIS 
military framework including collective peacekeeping forces and an inte-
grated command structure to deal with intra-CIS conflicts (ibid.:11–16). Yet 
many CIS states were either unwilling and/or unable to provide personnel, 
equipment and funding for this structure. Scepticism towards Russia’s inten-
tions also facilitated orientation to the West and preference for a CSCE 
framework for peacekeeping. Accordingly, these Russian efforts largely 
failed. 
This evidence suggests that Russia now promoted an institutional frame-
work that would give CSCE an extensive role in the European security archi-
tecture as a whole, but only a limited role with regard to peacekeeping and 
conflict management in the CIS area. Arguably, this development can be de-
rived from the security logic of a zero-sum power game, which was increas-
ingly influencing the formulation of Russia’s policy vis-à-vis the West. As 
the political elite in Moscow came to regard Russia as an alternative centre 
with legitimate rights and a special responsibility for stability in the post-
Soviet space, Russia became concerned with developing an exclusive institu-
tional basis for Russian influence and power projection. And although there 
was apparently an emerging feeling in Moscow that one needed international 
sanctioning of Russian peacekeeping activities in the CIS area, there were 
                                                     
79  Among others, Russian academic Dmitri Trenin put forward this argument. See Allison 
(1994:40). 
80  See Allison (1994) and Crow (1993) for detailed accounts of Russian diplomatic initia-
tives and proposals on these matters. Allison (1994:48–49) found that Russia from late 
1993 to the summer of 1994 developed a more assertive policy by moving away from an 
initial willingness to see Russian-led operations being monitored by CSCE representa-
tives, and came to regard as less expedient the formal sanctioning (by CSCE) of her op-
erations. 
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limits as to how expedient this was regarded. The foreign policy concept 
adopted in March 1993 called explicitly for activation of ‘primarily bilateral 
forms of Russian mediation and peacemaking’ and for international sanc-
tioning only ‘if necessary’ and ‘as the need arises’ (FPC’93). Thus, the docu-
ment contains a clear message to the West: This is our area, and we’ll let 
you know if your services are needed.81 
Obviously, an emerging scenario of NATO enlargement underlay devel-
opments in Russian–Western relations from mid-1993 (Kugler 1996:62–63). 
To some extent, manifest reluctance in the West towards an extensive role 
for CSCE in the emerging European security architecture facilitated the 1993 
shift in Russia in direction of seeing CIS as Moscow’s preferred instrument 
for authorising and mandating peacekeeping operations. Still, there is little 
(if any) evidence that Russia’s policy on these matters was dictated by fear 
of an emerging hostile West or an aggressive NATO alliance, which would 
dictate balancing in terms of military build-up and alliance formation. 
Rather, what we see is the reflection of a Russian great power legacy or a de-
piction of Russia as an alternative centre to the West which sparked a need 
for institutional balancing and for limiting Western influence on develop-
ments in Russia’s own periphery or ‘backyard’. Arguably, this was particu-
larly important in face of emerging internal and external constraints on Rus-
sia’s economic capabilities and military power. 
3.3.3.4 CSCE and the promotion of democracy and human rights 
If CSCE were to be a ‘cornerstone’ in Europe as a whole, but have only a 
limited role with regard to peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space, what ex-
actly was the functional scope of CSCE in the CIS area as envisioned by 
Moscow? During 1993 and early 1994 arrangements were made for CSCE 
observers to be deployed in South Ossetia, Transdniestria, Abkhasia and Na-
gorno–Karabakh (Allison 1994; Baev 1998).82 However, in most cases, 
these decisions came about only after ‘much quarrelling’ (Baev 1998:30). 
Also, Russian concessions were in many cases given only in terms of inspec-
tion powers in the human rights field. Arguably, this reflects Russian unwill-
ingness to see any substantial role for CSCE in ‘hardcore’ security issues in 
the CIS area, and points towards seeing ‘third basket issues’, or the promo-
tion of democracy and human rights, as Moscow’s envisioned role for CSCE 
in this region.  
Several CEE and CIS states were inclined to seeing an extensive role for 
CSCE also in areas of former Soviet influence. Allison (1994:48–49) found 
that these states prevented the adoption in 1993 of a CSCE framework for 
conflict monitoring proposed by Russia that the Western states were close to 
accepting, and which would imply de facto legitimisation of Russian activi-
ties in the CIS area, but only limited CSCE presence through observers. 
However, during 1993, on the basis of observed developments in the CIS 
area, worries grew also in the West that Russia was pursuing not so much 
                                                     
81  There are strong indications that Russian calls for international support to peacekeeping 
operations in the CIS area may have been motivated primarily by financial considerations, 
with Russia seeking a sharing of burdens more than legitimisation of her own conduct 
(Kozyrev 1993a; Kozyrev 1995a:117–118; Raphael et al. 1993:40). 
82  In the case of Nagorno–Karabakh, agreement on having the CSCE ‘Minsk group’ act as 
mediator in the conflict was reached already in 1992. 
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peace and resolution of conflicts, but rather the revival of a Russian sphere 
of influence (Crow 1993).83 This concern fostered a growing Western inter-
est in developing instruments that might facilitate monitoring of Russia’s 
military conduct and make it possible for CSCE to play a greater role. 
Again, these developments can be derived from our model. Promotion of 
democracy and human rights in the CIS area had been securitised in Russia 
in 1991–92 as conditions for stability in the post-Soviet space. From 1992–
93, the security logic of power dictated a shielding strategy in terms of Rus-
sian policy measures aimed at balancing or fencing off Western influence in 
the CIS area, while at the same time preserving a certain Russian weight in 
the handling of European security affairs to Russia’s west. The promotion of 
a prominent role for CSCE in Europe at large served the latter interest, while 
the adoption of CIS as Russia’s preferred instrument for conflict manage-
ment in the post-Soviet space served the former.84 Nevertheless, as pressure 
grew from the West and from states in Russia’s periphery to provide CSCE 
with a functional scope in the CIS area, Russia conceded to letting CSCE 
play a rather limited role through observers and mandates pertaining primar-
ily to ‘soft’ issues. Consequently, the perceived costs of these concessions 
must have been lower than the potential costs of being regarded by others as 
a neo-imperial state.85 
On its side, the West was reluctant towards becoming heavily involved in 
the CIS area, and was increasingly regarding NATO as its preferred security 
instrument. However, Russia and the West had a shared interest in promot-
ing democracy, human rights and basic freedoms as conditions for peace in 
their common peripheries. Both regarded CSCE as a suitable instrument in 
this regard. Yet their motivations vis-à-vis CSCE differed somewhat from 
1993. To the West, CSCE might serve the additional purpose of monitoring 
Russia’s peacekeeping conduct on former Soviet territory. Seen from Russia, 
CSCE provided an institutional arena where the rights of Russians in the 
FRSU could be raised and defended (Zagorski 1997:525). Accordingly, al-
though the functional scope and the perceived appropriate role of CSCE be-
came subject to Russian–Western controversies later in the 1990s, there was 
a shared interest in preserving this body as one component in the emerging 
European security architecture. 
                                                     
83  In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 Kozyrev explicitly dis-
missed the idea that Russia would concede to seeing third parties undermine Russia’s 
‘special responsibility’ as peacekeeper in the CIS area (Crow 1993:4). On another occa-
sion he linked this argument explicitly to geopolitics and the need to protect Russian ‘po-
sitions that took centuries to conquer’ (Kozyrev quoted in Crow 1993:4).  
84  In the 1993 foreign policy concept, CSCE is depicted as a ‘central channel’ for Russia’s 
involvement in European affairs, and as an instrument to ‘bring the CIS area up to a Euro-
pean level’ in matters of human rights and basic freedoms (FPC’93). The document also 
advocates institutionalisation and transformation of CSCE into ‘a fundamental element’ in 
a new international architecture (ibid.).  
85  Any involvement by CSCE in these matters would be (at least partly) on terms dictated by 
Moscow. Also, given the limitations set to CSCE involvement, the presence of interna-
tional observers might actually give some legitimacy to Russia’s unilateralist or allegedly 
CIS-sanctioned peacekeeping efforts (Baev 1998). 
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3.4 Some conclusions 1991–93: The rise of an alternative 
centre 
This chapter suggests that some ambiguities developed in Russia’s approach 
to the construction of a post-Cold War European security architecture al-
ready in the formative years of Russia’s post-Soviet existence. Whereas the 
policymaking elite was initially not in opposition to an extensive role for (a 
reformed) NATO, Russia soon came to favour CSCE as her preferred 
framework for dealing with security issues in Europe at large. However, in-
side the post-Soviet space, Moscow from 1992–93 in effect contributed to 
limit the functional scope of CSCE to ‘soft’ issues by insisting on treating 
peacekeeping and conflict management as an exclusive Russian responsibil-
ity, if necessary with institutional backing from the rather hollow CIS struc-
ture. Thus, there emerged a strong discrepancy between what Russia said 
and what she did with regard to the role of CSCE in European security af-
fairs. There was no consistency in the functional scope and geographical 
domain of CSCE as envisioned by Moscow. 
These ambiguities are intimately linked to the debate on national identity 
and foreign policy, which produced two different security logics as basis for 
Russia’s policy. At the outset of the period, the Russian government largely 
depicted Russia as a normal and democratic state situated on Europe’s pe-
riphery. The dominating view among policymakers entailed a conception of 
Europe as a shared security space, and accentuated Russia’s shared identity 
and shared interest with the West. The security logic derived from this read-
ing of Russia and of Russia’s place in the international system dictated 
westward integration and adaptation to Western security arrangements 
(NATO, NACC). During this period, there were few conflicting interests be-
tween Russia and the West. The inclusion of Central Asia into CSCE and the 
use of CSCE as means to promote democracy and human rights reflect 
shared Russian–Western interests in facilitating peace in their common pe-
riphery, with Russia herself being integral to the Western periphery. Shared 
concern with (potential) ‘chaos’ and disorder and the (potential) advance of 
Islamic fundamentalism was also part of this picture. 
However, the government’s largely pro-Western policy soon became sub-
ject to domestic debate. By 1993 consensus had emerged in Russia on the 
need to resurrect Russia’s great power identity and to have the post-Soviet 
space recognised as an area of legitimate Russian interests and influence. As 
has been argued by one scholar, the adoption of the concept of ‘Near 
Abroad’ meant that the former Soviet republics ended up being ‘neither un-
der the remit of foreign, nor domestic affairs, but somewhere between’ 
(Wæver 1997:73). Thus, the adoption of a Russian Monroe Doctrine vis-à-
vis the post-Soviet area essentially implied a projection of Russia’s external 
borders to go beyond those of Russia proper and to incorporate a space that 
was now made up of several independent republics. This is of course not to 
say that Russia claimed that these states are, or should become, parts of Rus-
sia de jure. Rather, the new outlook in Moscow reflected strong geopolitical 
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sentiments and implied unilateral demarcation of the CIS area as a zone of 
(‘legitimate’) Russian influence and responsibility.86 
Accordingly, Russia increasingly came to regard relations with the West 
through the prism of a zero-sum power game. The security logic derived 
from this new reading of Russia and of Russia’s place in the international 
power structure dictated a more instrumental use of institutions as a means to 
pursue and protect particular Russian national interests.87 Russia now came 
to favour the construction of a European security architecture that would fa-
cilitate the revival of a hegemonic role for Russia in the post-Soviet space, 
while at the same time providing her with possibilities to influence overall 
political developments in the West. This implied advocacy of a prominent 
role for CSCE in Europe at large and obstruction to an extensive role for an 
exclusive NATO and for other NATO-affiliated structures. The new security 
logic also provided a rationale for fencing off Western influence in the CIS 
area by pursuing ‘unilateral’ (or bilateral) peacekeeping efforts and by seek-
ing to create a separate institutional basis for dealing with CIS security mat-
ters on Russia’s own terms.  
The apparent ambiguities in Russia’s policy were to some extent condi-
tioned by reluctance in the West towards becoming heavily engaged in the 
CIS area. There were some geographical limits as to how far the logic of 
chaos could dictate the security policy of the Western centre. However, Rus-
sia’s ‘success’ was constrained by the policies of some states in Russia’s pe-
riphery that were concerned that Moscow was pursuing the revival of an 
empire, but also by a Western unwillingness to provide CSCE or an inde-
pendent NACC with a prominent role in the emerging architecture. Thus, 
when plans for NATO enlargement surfaced from 1993, Russia and the West 
came to pursue incompatible strategies. This is the theme of the next chapter. 
                                                     
86  The term ‘Monroe Doctrine’ was apparently first applied by then Presidential Advisor 
Andranik Migranyan and Supreme Soviet member Yevgeny Ambartsumov (Matz 
2001:168–169).  
87  I.e., Russia’s policy was vested in a conception of Russia as a ‘great power’ and in the 
notion of ‘national interests’ from the very start (see Kozyrev 1992a for an example). It is 
the government’s reading of Russia’s greatness, and the (alleged) content of these na-
tional interests, that changed in 1992–93 and brought about policy changes. This argu-
ment goes counter to the belief of some authors that the notion of ‘national interests’ be-
came the basis for Russia’s foreign policy only from 1992–93 (see Williams and Neu-
mann (2000) for an example). 
4.0 Tracing the humiliation of a trou-
bled great power 
This chapter analyses developments in Russia’s policy from 1993 to 2000. 
Section 4.1 discusses the period from 1993 to 1996 and analyses Russian at-
tempts to counter NATO-centrism as an emerging constraint on Russia’s 
foreign policy. As plans for NATO enlargement took shape and as the West-
ern alliance took on a more active role out of area, Russia saw herself being 
pushed to the margins of Europe and became increasingly concerned with 
sustaining a level of Russian influence and avoiding Russia’s isolation alto-
gether from the handling of European politico-military and security affairs. 
This was reflected in a largely unsuccessful diplomatic campaign in 1994 to 
increase the relative weight of OSCE vis-à-vis NATO, but also in the estab-
lishment of the Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia and in Russia’s 
(rather reluctant) agreement to participate in NATO’s PfP program. 
Section 4.2 discusses the period from 1996 to 2000. Moscow regarded 
developments in direction of NATO-centrism with growing dislike. Opposi-
tion to a US-dominated world order in which NATO was regarded as Wash-
ington’s primary policy tool gave rise to the notion of ‘multipolarity’ as a 
guiding concept for Russia’s foreign policy. Policy measures adopted during 
this period can largely be ascribed to the security logic of power and to a 
reading of relations with the West in terms of balancing the institutional 
weight of the other. In fact, scenarios of NATO enlargement and operations 
out of area presented Russia with a particular security threat related to rela-
tive decline in institutional powers, which was inadmissible in light of Mos-
cow’s conception of Russia as a great power. In other words, since the poli-
cymaking elite saw Russia as a great power almost per se, relative losses in 
institutional powers were essentially regarded as security threats to Russia 
(Fyodorov 2001; Wallander 2001). 
However, developments put on display a substantial gap between Rus-
sia’s foreign policy ambitions and her ability to influence developments in a 
way perceived favourable to Russian interests. Events in Kosovo and the 
failure to prevent NATO enlargement were telling in this regard. Yet as I 
show in section 4.3, Russia also lacked other feasible policy options that 
might provide her with greater influence on external developments and on 
the shape of the emerging European security architecture. I also argue that 
Russian diplomacy during the late 1990s came to advertise Russia’s weak-
nesses, and that this brought Russia into some humiliating situations in terms 
of institutional ‘defeats’ and ‘concessions’ vis-à-vis the West. 
4.1 1993–96: Responding to emerging NATO-centrism 
As discussed in earlier sections, the question of NATO enlargement was not 
high on the international agenda during 1991–92. However, during 1993 a 
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certain momentum was created in the West in favour of enlargement (Kugler 
1996:60–61). Within a few months, both the US and the German govern-
ment signalled a preference in this direction. This shift came about not least 
as a result of intense lobbying by leaders from several CEE states, perhaps 
most forcefully by the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic (ibid.; 
Bluth 1998:333). With reference to developments in Russia, Lech Walesa 
and Vaclav Havel expressed concern that the potential return of a national-
ist–communist regime in Moscow might pose a direct military threat to the 
CEE states. Both had detected growing popular support to the Russian oppo-
sition and particularly to outspoken ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
who advocated a Russian foreign policy reminiscent of the country’s impe-
rial past. Accordingly, it was argued that the West should not deny CEE 
states their legitimate claim to security in the wake of newly gained inde-
pendence from Soviet influence.88  
Formal affirmation that the alliance was open to new members came at a 
NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994 (NATO Handbook 2001:61). At 
that meeting, NATO also launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. 
Invitations were forwarded to all NACC and CSCE states to engage in de-
fence-related cooperation with the alliance on the basis of individual agree-
ments. As with NACC, PfP did not incorporate collective defence assur-
ances. From NATO’s perspective, PfP had the advantage of facilitating de-
fence cooperation with a great number of states in the European region, 
while at the same time providing for particularly close ties with a more lim-
ited number. Thus, the program was largely designed to prepare potential 
members for future admission to the alliance (Kugler 1996:61).89 
Although several factors inhibited early endorsement of NATO enlarge-
ment, the perhaps most important constraint had been worries in the West 
regarding negative reactions in Russia (Kugler 1996:60–62).90 However, this 
concern was to a great extent eased in August 1993. During two official vis-
its to Poland and the Czech Republic, President Yeltsin was asked about 
Russia’s attitude towards potential NATO membership for these states. Al-
though he was clearly not enthusiastic about the idea, the Russian president 
proclaimed the right of all sovereign states to choose their own political ori-
entations and alliances, and that aspirations in these states to join NATO did 
not run contrary to Russia’s interests. Many in the West interpreted this as 
evidence that Moscow would not object to NATO enlargement. Thus, by al-
leviating one of the strongest arguments against it, Yeltsin may have con-
                                                     
88  Although it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse in-depth policies pursued by 
states in CEE, it appears that the two security logics of ‘chaos’ and ‘power balancing’ can 
be relevant also here. A depiction by CEE states of ‘self’ as ‘periphery’ dictated integra-
tion or adaptation to the Western structures in order to facilitate resolution of mounting 
problems of domestic transition and economic reforms. However, in terms of (military) 
security, relative proximity to (a potentially dangerous or imperial) Russia also presented 
many of these states with an incentive to ‘change side’ or step into the Western camp in a 
perceived Russian–Western game of power. In other words, they were close to a per-
ceived East–West divide and wanted to cement a firm foot in the West. 
89  In December 1994, NATO launched a comprehensive ‘Study on enlargement’, where the 
question of whether to admit new members was largely reduced to questions of how and 
why (NATO Handbook 2001:61–62). 
90  Many Western leaders were also concerned that enlargement would weaken the alliance’s 
security guaranties and that potential new members would be unable to meet NATO stan-
dards (Kugler 1996:60; Kjølberg 1999:44).  
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tributed to the shift in favour of enlarging the Western alliance (ibid.; Zagor-
ski 1997:532).91 
4.1.1 NATO enlargement and Russia’s fear of institutional isolation 
The elevation of NATO enlargement to the top of the international agenda to 
some extent caught Moscow ‘off guard’ (Kugler 1996:62). As the Russian 
government detected a Western shift in favour of enlargement, the ‘official’ 
reading of NATO apparently underwent a change from seeing it as a stabilis-
ing force in Europe to regard it increasingly in negative terms. Although 
many liberals were somewhat indifferent to the issue, they questioned the 
rationale for enlarging the alliance. In light of growing popular support to the 
nationalist–communist opposition, many were also worried that enlargement 
might stimulate anti-Western, anti-US and anti-NATO forces inside Russia. 
The December 1993 parliamentary elections provided some evidence that 
this concern was warranted (Pravda 1996).92 Sentiments of Cold War enemy 
perceptions were already widespread in the military establishment and parts 
of the policymaking elite (Allison 1996; Sundal 1998). Allison (1996:251–
258) also found that the Russian Defence Ministry became increasingly in-
volved in the formulation of foreign policy during 1993–94, and that its in-
fluence on decisions involving key security issues grew as a consequence of 
its support to President Yeltsin in the October 1993 confrontation with the 
parliament. Thus, there is reason to argue that a more negative view of 
NATO and scepticism vis-à-vis Western enlargement motives gained foot-
hold both in Russia’s public opinion and in the policymaking elite during 
this period. 
Accordingly, emerging signs of NATO-centrism, central to which was 
the question of expanded membership, became the main factor shaping Rus-
sia’s policy from 1993–94 (Baranovsky 2000b; Zagorski 1997).93 Both 
President Yeltsin and Kozyrev expressed concern that NATO enlargement 
would create ‘new dividing lines’ and bring about ‘Cold Peace’ in Europe 
(Kozyrev 1995b; Kugler 1996:64). These worries were accompanied by fre-
quent and loud complaints from Russian diplomats regarding negative impli-
cations for Russia and for European security. As discussed earlier, late 1993 
                                                     
91 There are some indications that Yeltsin’s statements had not been coordinated with the 
Foreign Ministry and the Russian military establishment in advance. Russian diplomats 
were quick to denounce interpretation of his statements as Moscow’s go-ahead to NATO 
enlargement. Also, in letters to influential Western leaders in the fall of 1993, Yeltsin ex-
pressed a more negative attitude to the enlargement scenario. Given the circumstances 
pertaining to official state visits, it is difficult to imagine that the Russian president could 
have avoided a scandal if he had answered differently on these direct questions. Neverthe-
less, as one Russian scholar has observed, Yeltsin’s statements in effect ‘reopened’ a de-
bate on NATO enlargement that had for some time not been on the international agenda 
and indirectly contributed to an impetus in its favour (Zagorski 1997:532). 
92  In the elections, LDPR (headed by ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky) received 23% 
of the popular vote. When taken together, the three main parties constituting a broadly 
conceived ‘patriotic’ or ‘national-communist’ opposition (LDPR, KPRF and the Agrari-
ans) received close to 45%. Pravda (1996:182) found that these ‘centrist’ and ‘Pragmatic 
Nationalist’ preferences, which entailed more negative views of the West, gained weight 
on foreign policy from mid-1993, but particularly after the parliamentary elections in De-
cember 1993. 
93  Baranovsky (2000b:148) found that opposition to NATO enlargement reflected a ‘con-
sensus’ that ‘for the first time in modern Russian history’ united the entire political spec-
trum in Russia.  
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and early 1994 saw intense Russian diplomatic efforts aimed at enhancing 
the status of CSCE by having NATO become subordinate to this body, or, 
alternatively, by having CSCE ‘coordinate’ the activities of NATO and other 
regional structures. Russia also suggested that a regional security council be 
established on the design of the UNSC (von Plate 1998:56–57). This body 
would enjoy the exclusive power to sanction use of force to promote Euro-
pean security. Thus, it appears that Moscow was now advocating a pro-
CSCE design that would limit the overall ‘weight’ of NATO in handling 
European security affairs (Baranovsky 2000b; Zagorski 1997).  
How do we explain this development? I suggest that intense Russian op-
position to NATO enlargement from 1993–94, and, more generally, to 
NATO-centrism in the emerging European security architecture, can again 
be derived from a reading of Russia as an alternative centre and from the as-
sociated security logic of power balancing vis-à-vis the West. However, it is 
primarily the perceived existence of a zero-sum game of institutional powers 
that shaped Russia’s policy. The officially accepted view of Russia as a great 
power dictated a need for institutional powers that might facilitate Russian 
influence on European political and politico-military affairs. As seen from 
Russia, NATO enlargement would tie new members states to the West and 
inhibit Russian influence on their behaviour and on political developments in 
CEE. Thus, the geographical zone of Russian influence would shrink, which 
was inadmissible in light of the newly adopted outlook on Russia great 
power identity. In fact, any development in direction of NATO-centrism in 
the new European security architecture would imply a relative decline in the 
weight of CSCE and therefore also in Russia’s institutional powers vis-à-vis 
the West. Accordingly, Russia had an interest in upgrading the role of CSCE 
in an attempt to ‘balance’ and potentially ‘outweigh’ NATO’s role. 
I argued in Chapter 3 that Russia and the West in 1991–92 shared many 
security concerns and had few conflicting interests regarding how to handle 
security challenges in the CEE region. However, developments in Russia 
and in Russia’s foreign policy made the West more receptive to calls by CEE 
states for security guaranties. This is reflected in the 1993 US shift in favour 
of NATO enlargement, which was crucial in shaping subsequent develop-
ments (Kugler 1996). Feffer (1999) found that Washington’s pro-
enlargement decision reflected a change in the Clinton administration’s con-
ception of CEE as a neutral zone in Europe. He asserts that NATO enlarge-
ment was driven by a US policy of ‘soft containment’ or ‘containment lite’ 
vis-à-vis Russia, central to which was the perceived need to fence off Rus-
sian political influence in CEE (ibid.). At the same time, the Russian politi-
cal elite was convening around a foreign policy concept that defined Eastern 
Europe as an area where Russia had legitimate interests (FPC’93). The 
document also expressed explicit concern with perceived attempts to ‘push 
Russia out’ of this part of Europe (ibid.). Thus, there was evidently a feeling 
in Moscow that Russia and the West now had conflicting interests with re-
gard to the institutional handling of CEE as a periphery to both Russia and 
the West. Accordingly, Russia came to regard developments in terms of po-
tential losses in a zero-sum game of power, central to which was the issue of 
NATO enlargement. 
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At first sight it is not so clear to what extent this Russian security logic 
reflects residuals also from Cold War antagonism and a fear of aggressive 
military motives vis-à-vis Russia. In other words: Did worries concerning 
NATO enlargement reflect a fear in Russia that this might represent an exis-
tential threat to Russia? As discussed in Chapter 3, disappointment with 
Western policies were to some extent instrumental in bringing about the 
1992–93 shift in Russia’s foreign policy. Signs of ‘containment’ in US pol-
icy provided the Russian elite with some grounds for concern. Large seg-
ments of the military elite still adhered to a confrontational view of NATO 
(Allison 1996:251–258). Accordingly, many regarded NATO in terms of 
military capabilities and interpreted NATO enlargement as a (potentially ag-
gressive) move directed against Russia. This security thinking apparently re-
flects a ‘worst case scenario’ and concern with the potential for relative de-
cline in Russia’s military power vis-à-vis the West. 
Nevertheless, I believe that Russia’s policy should be interpreted more in 
terms of relative decline in institutional powers and in the (perceived) possi-
bility to influence overall political developments in the heart of Europe. The 
military doctrine adopted in 1993 explicitly asserts that the threat of large-
scale war had been significantly reduced, a view shared by many in the 
West.94 Arguably, this increased the relative importance of institutions as 
means for regulating interstate relations. In this perspective, Russia’s opposi-
tion to NATO enlargement from 1993–94 can be assigned to an emerging 
feeling in Moscow that NATO was de facto becoming the most important 
security institution in Europe. NATO enlargement confronted Russia with 
the threat of isolation in the sense that she might become more or less ex-
cluded from the handling of important European politico-military affairs. 
Russia was not a member to the Western alliance and would not become one 
anytime soon. These worries of institutional isolation were reinforced by the 
absence of a formal association to NATO that was perceived to correspond 
to Russia’s great power status. Thus, a development in direction of NATO-
centrism was inadmissible because it was believed to imply a relative reduc-
tion in Russia’s possibility to influence developments in Europe.95 
Note that these concerns are vested not in a confrontational worldview or 
the security logic of a zero-sum game of military power. Rather, they reflect 
the notion of a shared Russian–Western security space inside which threats 
and challenges largely can be derived from ‘the logic of chaos’, but where 
institutional balancing is part of the picture. Here, there is no saying by Mos-
cow that Russia and the West will always be of one opinion and without ex-
ceptions have shared interests regarding how to deal with current and future 
security issues. Rather, it reflects the view that European states needed a 
common arena for mutual exchange of views and mediation of their security 
interests. Implicit in this argument is Moscow’s assumption that Russia and 
the West have some shared interests based on (at least partly) complemen-
                                                     
94  See ‘Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993). 
95  The influential Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP) in May 1994 pointed to 
this as a potential security threat to Russia. If the West sought to construct a NATO-
centred security system in Europe, this would imply ‘military-political isolation of Rus-
sia’ and allegedly ‘reduce Russia’s possibilities to influence the external environment’ 
(vneshnyy mir) and to defend her interests in world affairs. See ‘Strategiya dlya Rossii 
(2)’ (1994). 
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tary threat perceptions. The Russian elite had inscribed Russia with great 
power status and consequently also a legitimate role as player on the Euro-
pean scene. Yet as NATO enlargement rose to the top of the Western secu-
rity agenda, Moscow faced being left on the sideline when all the other 
members of the European family negotiated common approaches to post-
Cold War security challenges in Europe at large. 
To be sure, the idea that NATO was an aggressive alliance posing a direct 
military threat against Russia remained latent in some parts of the Russian 
society and the policymaking elite. NATO enlargement was clearly a dire 
scenario to the military establishment: The ‘enemy’ was gaining military 
strength and adding new territory to its geographical domain (Allison 1996). 
The military leadership was also concerned that NATO enlargement would 
displace the Russian–Western force balance and undermine the emerging 
arms control regime in Europe (Zagorski 1997).96 Given the state of affairs 
in the Russian military, such a scenario was perceived to be in Russia’s dis-
favour. The Armed Forces were already struggling with a chronic lack of fi-
nances, structural reforms and adaptation to a new security environment (Al-
lison 1997; Baev 1996). The disastrous war in Chechnya (1994–96), which 
displayed the inability of the Russian forces to deal even with a (relatively) 
small conflict, only added to these challenges. Thus, there is reason to as-
sume that concern with relative losses in military capabilities was part of 
Russia’s analysis of NATO enlargement and its consequences. 
Nevertheless, it appears that opposition to NATO enlargement was dic-
tated more by political and institutional considerations and a fear of becom-
ing isolated or marginalised in the emerging European security structure. 
Most parts of the policymaking elite did not consider NATO enlargement as 
a direct military threat to Russia (Zagorski 1997:532). Critics of enlargement 
plans also failed to suggest any rationale for US/Western aggressive motives 
vis-à-vis Russia. A 1994 Foreign Ministry planning document argued instead 
that enlargement of NATO would create a security system in Europe that 
‘would embrace most of CEE, but not Russia’ (Bluth 1998:334). This was 
believed to impede Russia’s participation in the handling of security affairs 
in Europe, but also threaten Russia’s strategic interest in developing partner-
ship relations with the West (ibid.). Thus, although the Russian security 
logic dictated power balancing vis-à-vis the West, opposition to NATO 
enlargement reflects first and foremost concern with a potential relative de-
cline in institutional powers and a fear of being left without arenas where 
Russia could voice her security interests and concerns.  
4.1.2 Junior partner for peace?  
An interpretation along these lines may also account not only for loud Rus-
sian opposition to a prominent role for NATO in general, but also for some 
intriguing shifts and ambiguities in Russia’s policy during the subsequent 
                                                     
96  The military doctrine adopted in 1993 expresses deep concern about the potential deterio-
ration of Russia’s military-strategic position. And although NATO enlargement is not 
mentioned explicitly in these sections, it is difficult to imagine that references to ‘some 
states and coalitions of states’ and to a potential ‘stationing’ and ‘build-up’ of armed 
groupings closer to Russia’s border do not involve the Western alliance. See ‘Osnovnye 
polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993). 
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years. For instance, when NATO launched PfP in January 1994, both Presi-
dent Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev signalled Russia’s willingness to 
join the program (Zagorski 1997:534). The new framework proposed by 
NATO envisioned individual security agreements with (potentially) all states 
in the European region. Thus, PfP did not imply a strengthening of NATO’s 
role per se. Seen from Russia, an individual partnership agreement with 
NATO might in fact contribute to a realisation of shared interests and pro-
duce mutual benefits for Russia and the West in the security sphere 
(Kozyrev 1994:61). 
However, it appears that Moscow initially regarded PfP as a substitute to 
NATO enlargement (Zagorski 1997:534; Kugler 1996:62). As it became 
clear to the Russian government that the program was designed to prepare 
potential NATO members for future accession, two factors contributed to 
Russia’s hesitation with regard to joining PfP. First, the program did little to 
alleviate a feeling in Moscow that Russia was being pushed to the rim of the 
European heartland as a consequence of NATO’s enlargement plans (Mi-
halka 1994). Yet perhaps equally important was the fact that PfP treated 
Russia as equal in status to all the other states in Europe that were not mem-
bers of NATO. Although the program envisioned individual partnership 
agreements, it contained no formal recognition of Russia’s role as a great 
power. PfP essentially put Russia in the same category as Lithuania and 
Georgia. Accordingly, participation in the program hardly conformed to 
Moscow’s view of Russia as a great power or to the role envisioned for Rus-
sia in European affairs.97 
Nevertheless, Russia joined PfP in June 1994. Kjølberg (1999:46) sug-
gested that this decision came about through something of a package deal 
with the West. Within few days, Russia signed the PfP program with NATO, 
a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU, and received 
access to the G–7 forum. The latter point, and the fact that NATO formally 
acknowledged Russia as a ‘major European power’, may certainly have 
eased Moscow’s reservations.98 Signals from Washington that CSCE would 
be given a greater role were perhaps also part of Moscow’s analysis (Kugler 
1996:63). However, the development of an individual partnership program 
(IPP) was to a great extent hampered by unwillingness in the Russian mili-
tary to engage in close cooperation with NATO. Also, the backing to PfP 
from the political elite remained ambiguous (Kugler 1996:63-66; Bluth 
1998:332).99 
Thus, Russia’s attitude to PfP can be derived from a reading of Russia as 
a great power and from the related security logic of institutional power bal-
                                                     
97  In an elaboration on Russia’s attitude to the PfP program, Kozyrev (1994:61) explicitly 
argued that Russia’s ‘status and significance as world power’ needed to be recognised by 
the West. 
98  In a Ministerial Communiqué from the 22 June 1994 meeting between NATO foreign 
ministers and Russia’s Foreign Minister Kozyrev, NATO’s recognition of Russia’s status 
and role as a great power is reflected in several passages. For instance, the document 
states that NATO and Russia have agreed to develop an individual PfP program ‘corre-
sponding to Russia’s size, importance and capabilities’. Russia’s potential contributions 
are also viewed in light of ‘its weight and responsibility as a major European, internatio-
nal and nuclear power’. See www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940622a.html (2002-04-
29). 
99  Sourness in Russian–Western relations resulting from Russia’s military campaign in 
Chechnya from December 1994 may also have hampered implementation of Russia’s in-
dividual partnership program (IPP). 
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ancing vis-à-vis the West. Seen from Russia, NATO enlargement was per-
ceived to strengthen the Western alliance, whether this was regarded as an 
aggressive military ‘enemy’ or as a security institution that was not directed 
against Russia. Yet if PfP was not an alternative to enlargement but rather a 
step on the way to preparing particular states for future accession to the alli-
ance, the partnership program had the potential of undermining the signifi-
cance of two other security institutions: NACC and CSCE (Zagorski 
1997:533). In other words, PfP might contribute to limiting the weight and 
functional scope of collective security arrangements to which Russia was 
herself a member, and which represented consensus arenas where Moscow’s 
voice would be heard. This, together with the absence in PfP of a special 
status for Russia, may largely explain Moscow’s hesitation with regard to 
joining the program, and also a general unwillingness in the political and 
military elite to substantiate Russia’s individual partnership program.  
However, PfP presented Russia with a formal link to NATO in a situation 
where US policy showed emerging signs of ‘soft containment’. By 1994, the 
Western alliance was de facto recognised as the central security institution 
by both the West and the CEE states aspiring for NATO membership. To 
Russia, PfP was in one sense a potential answer to the threat of isolation 
(Mihalka 1994). In terms of political orientation, PfP supplemented NACC 
and was perceived to contribute to the overall goal of developing good rela-
tions with the West. In terms of security, PfP also went beyond NACC. 
Moscow would now have an individual arena for cooperation and interest 
mediation with the West on important security issues, which might poten-
tially evolve into a strategic relationship. PfP could potentially be used to in-
fluence decisions and developments in the West. Thus, when faced with an 
emerging threat of isolation from decision-making processes on European 
security altogether, PfP was in the end seen by Moscow as a lesser evil or as 
a viable, but far from ideal, solution. 
4.1.3 Being ignored: NATO’s move out of area 
Parallel to plans for enlargement, NATO became more involved in out-of-
area operations. The Balkans largely staged this development. In the case of 
Bosnia–Herzegovina, Laugen (1999) found that NATO from 1992 to 1995 
went from being ‘UN assistant’ to ‘independent enforcer’. A decision to 
support UN peacekeeping activities on a case-to-case basis was taken in 
1992. This initiated early involvement in the war in Bosnia–Herzegovina. 
Yet in December 1995 NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced 
forces under UN command. A new commitment was undertaken with the 
late 1996 decision to prolong NATO’s involvement through a Stabilisation 
Force (SFOR). Thus, NATO gradually adopted a new role as projector of 
peace and stability outside the territory of its own member states (ibid.).100 
                                                     
100  Iraq was arguably the second geographic area where NATO’s out-of-area policy 
evolved. Laugen (1999:10) suggests that NATO largely ‘stumbled’ into this new role, 
with policy developing ‘almost by accident’. This is at best only partly true. However, 
Laugen’s depiction of a stumbling alliance seems to capture one important factor: 
NATO’s out-of-area commitments were largely event-driven, and came about as answers 
to challenges that erupted from beyond NATO’s own territory and control, and which 
were perceived to demand urgent responses in order to prevent them from escalating into 
regional war or foster instability in adjacent areas. 
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In one sense, both Russia and the West regarded the Balkans through a 
lens of potential ‘chaos’ and a fear of having ethnic conflicts escalate into 
large-scale war. However, developments on the ground soon displayed di-
verging views regarding how to achieve peace and stability in this sub-
region. In 1995, Moscow protested against the transfer of authority to IFOR, 
which in effect cut UN civilian authorities from the chain of command 
(Laugen 1999:59). Some Russian–Western controversies also surfaced with 
regard to interpretation of UN mandates and concerning the legitimacy and 
effects of NATO decisions. And although NATO operated under mandates 
sanctioned by the UNSC, Russia regarded developments with some concern.  
Apparently, Russian outcries reflected unease with seeing NATO take on 
a more independent approach to security matters without consulting Moscow 
and with Russian concerns largely being neglected by the West (Sherr 1995; 
Parrish 1995). It is arguably in this perspective that we should interpret the 
Russian initiative to establish a Contact Group for the FRY in 1994, which 
led to closer Russian diplomatic involvement as mediator in the Bosnian 
conflict.101 This body, which has an ad hoc character, compensated in some 
sense for the lack of institutional arrangements where Russia could voice her 
interests and influence decisions regarding the Balkans. This Russian initia-
tive can be interpreted as an attempt to create a separate body inside a 
largely Western-dominated security architecture that would provide Russia 
with certain say-so in a functionally and geographically limited set of secu-
rity issues. The West was not ready to have CSCE play a major role and 
hence commit to a formal Russian veto on these important matters. Yet 
given Moscow’s ties to Belgrade, Russia might represent an external re-
source to the West in attempts to resolve Yugoslavia conflicts. Thus, the es-
tablishment of the Contact Group reflects recognition by major Western 
states that that it might be in their own interest to engage and cooperate with 
Russia in the handling of important European issues, and, in particular, Bal-
kan issues. 
Thus, although the question of enlargement was the most important issue 
during this period, NATO’s emerging activities out of area represented a 
second strain on Russian–Western relations. Seen from Russia, there was a 
close link between the FRY, NATO’s enlargement plans, and the restoration 
of ‘blocs’ in Europe, where Russia increasingly felt that she was being mar-
ginalised with regard to influence the course of events (Sherr 1995; Parrish 
1995). These developments presented Russian leaders with a set of funda-
mental security questions: Why does the West ignore our expressed interests 
and concerns? How far is NATO willing to go in its out-of-area activities, 
not only in terms of geography, but also in the degree of ‘unilateralist’ deci-
sion-making? Are there any ‘hidden’ motives behind NATO’s new policy? 
Arguably, the rise of these questions to the Russian agenda reflects a feeling 
in Russia of being looked upon as a marginal player and as an outsider to the 
European security community, where the voice and interests of all states 
were taken into account prior to important decision.102 
                                                     
101  The Contact Group was established in April 1994 on a Russian proposal (Yesson 
2001:202). Its original members were the US, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, and 
with EU holding observer status. 
102  The perhaps most humiliating event signifying Russia’s increasingly marginal role 
as player in the Balkan conflict was NATO’s intense bombardments of the Bosnian Serbs 
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However, there is little evidence that NATO’s emerging role out of area 
was perceived as a potential military threat to Russia. Rather, Russia’s be-
haviour reflected concern with institutional influence, a concern that came to 
affect Russia’s policy more and more during this period. In the West, 
NATO’s military operations in the Balkans were largely dictated by the se-
curity logic of ‘chaos’ and a perceived need to project stability into the 
Western periphery. However, CEE and the Balkans in particular were in-
creasingly regarded by Moscow through the lens of a Russian–Western zero-
sum game of power and influence. Accordingly, the alliance’s move out of 
area was interpreted as just another step by the West in the direction of hav-
ing NATO become the central security institution in Europe (Baranovsky 
2000b). This was inadmissible to a Russia that was increasingly aware that 
NATO-centrism would imply a relative decline in Russia’s institutional 
powers vis-à-vis the West and hence reduced possibilities to influence de-
velopments in a way perceived to be favourable to Russia’s national inter-
ests.103  
4.2 1996–2000: Weakness at display 
The sections above suggest that Russia from 1993 onwards began to recog-
nise that there was a certain gravity in the West and CEE towards having 
NATO become the preferred security arena in Europe. Russia’s policy was 
interpreted as (more or less successful) attempts to counter and adapt to this 
development. However, closely related to the Russian fear of institutional 
isolation or marginalisation was a concern that Russia was de facto being 
neglected as a great power, and hence that Russia’s influence on decision-
making processes might easily fall short of her ‘natural’ or ‘appropriate’ 
weight. In other words, Moscow was beginning to detect a certain disso-
nance between the role Russia ascribed to herself and the role other states in 
the region, including the West, were willing to recognise or provide her with.  
4.2.1 Identity revisited: Russia and the notion of ‘multipolarity’ 
I argued in Chapter 3 that a degree of domestic consensus was arrived at in 
1993 regarding Russia’s identity and some implications for foreign policy. 
Central to this consensus was the conception of Russia as a great power with 
legitimate interests and a right to influence developments in areas of former 
Soviet influence and a special responsibility for stability in the post-Soviet 
space. However, debate on these matters continued and was affected by both 
external and internal Russian developments. 
                                                                                                                            
in Sarajevo in late August 1995, when Moscow was notified only after the strikes had al-
ready begun (Parrish 1995:30). 
103  The failure to prevent emerging NATO-centrism and the largely unsuccessful Russian 
diplomacy in the Balkans brought about intense domestic criticism against President 
Yeltsin, the government and particularly Foreign Minister Kozyrev. In fact, they were 
instrumental in bringing about Kozyrev’s resignation and Primakov’s takeover as foreign 
minister in January 1996 (Mlechin 2001:564–568). 
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In December 1997, Russia adopted a national security concept (NSC’97) 
that depicts two opposing trends in world politics.104 On the one hand, it de-
tects a (still emerging) multipolar world order in which Russia makes up one 
of the leading centres. On the other hand, it identifies emerging signs of uni-
polarity and a strive by certain forces to create an international power struc-
ture based on unilateral decisions and on extensive use of military force in 
dealing with key international questions.  
However, the depiction of Russia as a leading centre is rather intriguing 
in light of the extent to which the document elaborates on Russia’s financial, 
economic and socio-economic problems, which are painted explicitly in 
terms of security: ‘An analysis of threats to Russia’s national security shows 
that the bulk of these, today and in the foreseeable future, are non-military 
and primarily of internal character’ (NSC’97). The concept devotes re-
markably much space to elaborate on the ‘crisis traits’ (krizisnye yavleniya) 
in the Russian society and acknowledges Russia’s technological backward-
ness and dependency on the West. Also, economic decline and decrease in 
Russia’s military, scientific, technological and demographic potential are as-
sumed to be the cause behind Russia’s ‘significantly reduced influence’ in 
world affairs, which is recognised as a fact (ibid.). This contributes to give 
the document a rather contradictory character. Arguably, the presentation of 
‘what is’ does not fit very nicely with the notion of ‘what should be’. 
NSC’97 also conveys a strong feeling of business unaccomplished.105 
The adopted security concept is intimately linked to the name of Prima-
kov and to the notion of ‘multipolarity’, which became the guiding concept 
for Russia’s foreign policy in the late 1990s. Fyodorov (2001) argues that 
NSC’97 put an equation mark between security and Russian influence un-
derstood as the upholding and strengthening of Russia’s great power role in 
world politics. As he puts it: ‘Russia’s security is primarily her influence on 
the world arena; reduced influence weakens her security’ (ibid.:40). Thus, 
more than being a question of Russia’s survival as a political-territorial unit, 
Moscow came to regard security in terms of the strategic goal of regaining 
and upholding a certain level of Russian influence in world politics. In other 
words, Russia’s role as a great power had essentially been securitised.  
Since Russia’s military and economic capabilities were seen to be in 
dramatic decline, this made it ever more important for Russia to gain access 
to institutional arrangements and decision-making arenas and to avoid insti-
tutional isolation or marginalisation. In fact, these issues became questions 
of Russia’s security defined as possibilities to influence international devel-
opments and the environment in which international outcomes are deter-
mined. If Russia were to play a major role in European and world affairs, she 
needed access to arenas where Moscow’s voice could be heard and where 
Russia’s national (security) interests could be mediated with those of other 
dominant actors. Despite Moscow’s permanent seat in the UNSC, Russia 
had only limited institutional basis for influence in world politics. Thus, the 
notion of Russia’s greatness was largely an empty phrase.  
                                                     
104  ‘Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1997). A draft concept 
published prior to the 1996 presidential elections conveys many of the same views; see 
‘Politika natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (1996–2000)’. 
105  I.e., ‘great power’ is variably something Russia ‘is’ and ‘will become’ (NSC’97).  
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Accordingly, Western reluctance with regard to integrating Russia into 
central European/Euro–Atlantic institutions and to give OSCE a prominent 
place in the emerging European security architecture in reality deprived Rus-
sia of the possibility to find coherence between her great power identity, the 
‘objective’ state of affairs or the factors that (might) constitute the material 
and institutional basis of this identity, and other actors’ view of Russia and 
of Russia’s role. As I shall elaborate below, recurrent Russian complaints in 
the late 1990s regarding signs of unipolarity and perceived US and/or West-
ern solo runs on important security issues can be interpreted in this perspec-
tive and in terms of a related gap between Russia’s foreign policy capabili-
ties and ambitions. I will also argue that the failure among Russian policy-
makers to keep ‘what is’ analytically apart from ‘what could be’, or even 
‘what should be’, may explain intriguing ambiguities and shifts in Russia’s 
policy during this period. 
4.2.2 Bedrock or rocking bed? Founding an uneasy partnership 
As it turned out, Russia’s individual partnership program (IPP) with NATO 
proved unsatisfactory to both Russia and the West. During 1996 and 1997, 
Russia and NATO engaged in negotiations on a new body for consultations 
on security issues.106 Although NATO’s plans for enlargement were taking 
shape and continued to sour Russian–Western relations, the scope and speed 
of enlargement, and its implications for Russia, remained issues unresolved. 
Accordingly, negotiations focused primarily on the type of compensations 
Russia would be given along with NATO’s enlargement, with Moscow seek-
ing a maximum level of ‘damage limitation’ (Bluth 1998:338). 
The West did not want to stimulate negative Russian perceptions of 
NATO. Yet developments in the Balkans had convinced the alliance that it 
needed to be able to act independently of Russia when situations so de-
manded. Moscow, in its turn, wanted veto or at least a say-so with regard to 
important NATO decisions and guaranties that enlargement would not imply 
negative military consequences for Russia. In particular, Russia demanded 
constraints on NATO deployment of nuclear as well as conventional capa-
bilities and on development of military infrastructure on the territory of new 
member states (Bluth 1998:337–339). Moscow also called for a review of 
CFE provisions in order to compensate for changes in Russia’s security 
situation (ibid.:337). 
The outcome of these negotiations was the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Re-
lations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federa-
tion’ adopted in Paris on 27 May 1997.107 This document laid down the 
principles according to which the parties would engage in mutual consulta-
tions on matters of common interest in order to strengthen mutual trust and 
cooperation with the overall aim of contributing to security and stability in 
the Euro–Atlantic area. For this purpose, a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 
                                                     
106  The idea that Russia and NATO might develop a ‘special relationship’ with consultations 
outside PfP was discussed already in the spring of 1994, and may actually have been in-
strumental in bringing about Russia’s June 1994 decision to join PfP (Zagorski 
1997:534). 
107  The text of the Founding Act is available on: www.nato.int/pfp/nato-rus.html (2002-04-
30). 
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was established. Here, NATO and Russia would meet regularly on various 
levels for mutual consultations, and, ‘where appropriate’, make joint deci-
sions and take joint action. The alliance acceded to a central Russian demand 
by formally restating the so-called ‘three ‘no’s’: that the alliance has ‘no in-
tention, no plan and no reason’ to deploy nuclear weapons or establish nu-
clear storage sites on the territory of new NATO member states. It also 
agreed to adapt the CFE treaty in light of changes in the European security 
environment. Beyond this, NATO did not commit to any constraints on mat-
ters of internal military planning and force posture. 
The Russian obsession with non-deployment of NATO military capabili-
ties and infrastructure in the new member states reflects a zero-sum reading 
of Russian–Western relations and may have been dictated by a need to ease 
remaining concerns in the Russian military derived from the security logic of 
East–West military antagonism. This was particularly important at a time 
when the armed forces were experiencing some serious difficulties with re-
gard to internal finances and structural reforms (Baev 1996). On several oc-
casions, the Russian government had threatened to respond to NATO 
enlargement by withdrawing from various arms control agreements, to de-
ploy nuclear weapons westwards, and to form new military alliances (Old-
berg 1999a:14; Bluth 1998:336). Yet the credibility of these threats, and the 
feasibility of Russian alternative security strategies, had to be questioned by 
the West. As a consequence of the poor performance of the Russian military 
in Chechnya, there was a growing feeling in the elite that one couldn’t es-
cape the need for structural reforms and a downscaling of the armed forces. 
And let alone the absence among central policymakers of a perceived need 
to balance the military might of the West, Russia simply couldn’t afford it – 
taking into account also that ‘the West’ was extending its geographical 
boundaries. Hence, the poor state of the Russian economy and armed forces, 
which was increasingly being recognised in official and quasi-official policy 
documents, undermined any threats by Moscow to adopt costly military 
measures in response to NATO enlargement. 
Accordingly, the fact that Russia signed the Founding Act can be as-
signed to a perception of this as a potential answer to the threat of institu-
tional isolation. In one sense, the alternative was in a sense self-imposed iso-
lation. PJC presented Russia with an exclusive security arena where Russia 
could voice her interests and concerns and consult with NATO countries on 
a wide range of security issues.108 The new arrangement also reflected a spe-
cial status vis-à-vis NATO and apparently eased Russia’s fear of being ne-
glected as a major European power. Still, the Founding Act and PJC did not 
remove altogether the concern in Russia that she might be kept out of impor-
tant decision-making processes. The West had decided on NATO enlarge-
ment and a more active role out of area despite Russia’s strong objections. 
Also, the Founding Act contained no legally binding guaranties that NATO 
would consult with Russia on security issues perceived to affect Russia’s in-
terests. Accordingly, there remained some concern in Russia that she might 
                                                     
108  The Founding Act lists 19 areas for (possible) consultation and cooperation. This in-
cludes conflict prevention, crisis management, arms control, non-proliferation, informa-
tion concerning security strategies and military doctrines, conversion of military indus-
try, terrorism, civil emergency and other issues.  
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still be deprived of influence on important political decisions and on overall 
security developments in Europe. 
During 1998 and early 1999, NATO and Russia met regularly in the PJC 
format to discuss security issues from areas listed in the Founding Act.109 
The new body arguably had a certain potential for increasing Russia’s 
‘weight’ and for mediating Russian–Western interests and differences in 
views concerning how to handle security matters of common concern. How-
ever, it appears that neither the West nor Russia had the political will to real-
ise this potential, and consequently put little effort into making PJC a con-
structive arena for security cooperation and consultations. In many cases, the 
West was ready to listen to the Russian views only after NATO decisions 
had (already) been taken. This rendered the PJC format rather meaningless 
from a Russian point of view (Wallander 2002).110 On the other side, Rus-
sian politicians and diplomats signalled little interest in listening to NATO’s 
arguments and often adopted an excessively confrontational language vis-à-
vis the West in defence of proclaimed Russian interests. Hence, consulta-
tions in PJC had a pro forma character and often amounted to having the two 
sides state and restate views and arguments already well known. This im-
pression stems not least from the handling of events in 1999.  
4.2.3 The ‘watershed events’ of 1999? Kosovo and a first round of enlar-
gement 
On 24 March 1999, NATO started an intensive air campaign against the 
FRY.111 This act caused strong reactions in Russia. On 23 March, Prime 
Minister Primakov cancelled his trip to the US in mid-air to protest against 
the expected air strikes. When NATO’s campaign commenced the next day, 
Russia immediately cut off all military contacts with the alliance except 
those affecting interoperability on the ground in Bosnia–Herzegovina (God-
zimirski forthcoming). Moscow also suspended participation in PfP activi-
ties, froze bilateral military cooperation programs with NATO countries, and 
refused to participate in NATO military exercises. President Yeltsin also re-
called Russia’s military envoy to NATO.112  
These immediate measures were accompanied by threats of additional 
military and political responses and by almost unanimous Russian condem-
nation of NATO’s air strikes as an ‘act of aggression’ against a sovereign 
state.113 As a member of the UNSC, Russia had supported international ef-
                                                     
109  Press releases from the PJC meetings are available on NATO’s home page: 
www.nato.int (2002-05-06). These give a brief account of what NATO and Russia dis-
cussed at each PJC meeting from 1998 to date.  
110  NAC meetings were usually held immediately prior to meetings in the PJC format. 
Hence, NATO countries had a chance to mediate views among themselves and speak 
with a unified voice when Russia entered the room.  
111  See Laugen (1999:94–96) for an outline of events leading up to NATO’s decision to 
launch this operation. 
112  For a comprehensive overview and analysis of Russian reactions to NATO’s air cam-
paign in the FRY, see Godzimirski (forthcoming). The subsequent paragraphs draw ex-
tensively on his work. See also RFE/RL Newsline reports from late March to June 1999: 
www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/ (2002-05-03). 
113  Defence Minister Sergeyev and other officials hinted that Russia might be forced to de-
ploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and Kaliningrad and supply Belgrade with air 
defence and other military equipment. Russian responses were also linked to the fate of 
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forts to end the conflict by peaceful means. During the last couple of weeks 
prior to 24 March, Moscow regarded NATO’s preparations for war with 
great concern. Russian officials had warned strongly against any use of force 
that was not sanctioned by the UNSC. Thus, NATO’s decision to act militar-
ily therefore reflected an outright disregard of Russia’s voice. 
Seen from Russia, the air campaign violated the letter and spirit of the 
Founding Act and was perceived to undermine the newly established 
NATO–Russian partnership.114 However, at the core of Russia’s criticism 
against NATO’s war in Kosovo lies concern with what Moscow perceives as 
violation of the UN Charter and of the exclusive right of the UNSC to sanc-
tion use of military force in world politics. NATO’s air strikes were arguably 
not sanctioned by the UNSC.115 Accordingly, Russian leaders pointed to the 
danger of precedence and argued that NATO threatened to jeopardise the 
whole framework of international law (Godzimirski forthcoming). Russian 
officials also expressed scepticism regarding the notion of ‘humanitarian in-
terventionism’ as the motive behind the military operation. Foreign Minister 
Ivanov interpreted it rather as an expression of the alliance’s ‘aggressive’ na-
ture (Ivanov 2001:23). In line with the multipolarity thesis, he saw NATO as 
a US policy instrument serving Washington’s strategic goal of world he-
gemony. The air campaign against the FRY was just another step in a policy 
aimed at constructing a unipolar world in which the US would act as world 
police in disregard of international law (ibid.).116 
Russian criticism of NATO and the US was stimulated even further when 
NATO held its summit in Washington in April 1999. Here, Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic were officially adopted as new members to the alli-
ance, with NATO leaders declaring that these three ‘will not be the last’ 
(NATO Handbook 2001:22). In Washington, NATO also adopted a new 
strategic concept. Ever since the last concept was adopted in 1991, the alli-
ance had sought to legitimise a new role for itself in world politics. Seen 
from Russia, vagueness in formulations concerning the possible use of 
NATO military capabilities outside the territory of its member states caused 
great concern. In light of the ongoing air campaign in the FRY, the political 
elite in Russia largely interpreted the new concept as legitimising NATO’s 
emerging out-of-area policy, which undermined the UNSC and consequently 
also Moscow’s voice.117 
                                                                                                                            
arms control agreements (START II, CFE). See again RFE/RL Newsline reports from 
late March and early April 1999 for details: www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/ (2002-05-03). 
114  The Founding Act states that NATO and Russia will ‘refrain from the use of threat or use 
of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence’. 
115  The legality of NATO’s air campaign in the FRY remains a controversial issue. Here it 
suffices to say that Russia, together with several other states and large parts of the popu-
lation also in many NATO countries, disputed the view that use of force had been suffi-
ciently sanctioned by the UNSC. 
116  The intensification of US/UK air strikes against Iraq in December 1998 had already fos-
tered strong reactions in Russia. Although this was not a NATO operation as such, it 
contributed to shaping the Russian view of NATO as a US policy instrument aimed at 
world hegemony. See RFE/RL Newsline reports from late December 1998 for the Rus-
sian reactions: www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/12/ (20002-05-03).  
117  Symbolic to Moscow’s opposition to these developments, Russia declined an invitation 
to NATO’s summit in Washington. With the exception also of Belarus, all the other 
EAPC member states were present here. 
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Arguably, the Russian–Western controversy over Kosovo and the re-
sumption of loud Russian criticism of NATO enlargement can again be as-
signed to the interplay between the two security logics of ‘chaos’ and 
‘power’ respectively. The West apparently regarded Kosovo (primarily) 
through the lens regional stability and a felt need to prevent the potential es-
calation and spread of chaos (inter-ethnic war, poverty, refugees, etc.). As 
the humanitarian situation in Kosovo was seen to be worsening, this security 
logic dictated projection, if necessary even by force, of a ‘liberal order’ (de-
mocracy, human and minority rights etc.) perceived to be favourable with 
regard to facilitating stable societal conditions and regional peace. 
It appears that the elite in Russia read these developments more accord-
ing to the security logic of power, yet in two very different ways. Some out-
cries in Russia exposed concern regarding the West’s ‘real’ intentions and 
the possibility that Russia or post-Soviet territories might become subject to 
NATO’s out-of-area activities. These concerns focused largely on NATO’s 
military capabilities, but were closely linked to perceptions of NATO as a 
potentially aggressive alliance. In other words, NATO might be out to chal-
lenge Russia’s very existence. Arguably, these threat perceptions are ‘legiti-
mate’ in the sense that they reflect a ‘worst case scenario’ derived from a re-
alist-driven agenda, central to which were the military capacities of the West 
and the (potential) threat to Russia’s survival. 
Others regarded Kosovo more through the lens of Russian–Western insti-
tutional powers and a perceived relative decline in Russian influence. Rus-
sia’s interests in the Balkans have deep historic roots. This facilitates a gen-
eral unease with regard to having other actors influence developments in this 
sub-region independently from Russia. In the case of Kosovo, a majority of 
Russians were more sympathetic to the Serb cause (Godzimirski forthcom-
ing). This arguably reflects the Eurasianist notion of a ‘Slav brotherhood’ 
touched upon in Chapter 3. Accordingly, NATO’s air campaign caused mas-
sive public protests and street rallies all over Russia. In this particular read-
ing, Moscow was now being deprived of its legitimate right to protect ‘ours’ 
and have a say-so with regard to future developments in South-Eastern 
Europe.  
However, perhaps more importantly, Russia’s interest in Balkan issues 
derived naturally also from the great power role Moscow ascribed to Russia 
with increasing strength from 1993 onwards. If the notion of Russia’s great 
power status were to have any meaning at all, Russia needed to influence 
developments and decisions also inside the now expanding West. Arguably, 
Kosovo put on display the limitations to Russia’s influence on the European 
course of events. Adding to this, if the West took a more unilateral approach 
to resolve security challenges in the Balkans under the flag of humanitarian 
interventionism, Moscow had no guarantee that the post-Soviet space might 
itself not become subject to the same exercise at one point. If this were to 
happen, it might not only undermine Russia’s role as a great power in 
Europe proper, but also threaten her influence on developments deep inside 
Russia’s own periphery. 
Note, however, that this concern is vested not so much in fear of NATO’s 
capabilities and their potential threat to Russia’s existence. Rather, NATO’s 
self-assumed role as security provider out of area threatened to undermine 
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the established security system in Europe and contribute to a relative decline 
in Russia’s institutional powers. In other words, the alliance’s disregard of 
the UNSC threatened Russia’s role as a great power, and might contribute to 
render future developments in the Euro–Atlantic region excessively subject 
to the interests and preferences of the West. Thus, more than reflecting a 
perceived existential threat, these Russian concerns express worries that 
Russia was deprived of her appropriate institutional ‘weight’ and her possi-
bility to influence European decision-making processes and developments in 
a way perceived favourable to Russia’s interests. 
As indicated in section 4.2.1, the notion of ‘multipolarity’ became the 
guiding concept for Russia’s foreign policy from the mid-1990s. At the core 
of this concept lies a Russian feeling of antipathy towards unipolarity or ob-
served developments in the direction of having the US constitute the domi-
nating centre in world affairs (Primakov 2001; Ivanov 2001).118 This dislike 
regarding US dominance is reflected in Russia’s concern that NATO was 
emerging as the most important European security institution. NATO in-
creasingly came to be regarded as a US policy instrument aimed at world 
hegemony. As seen from Moscow, this US policy would undermine the role 
of the UNSC, which was Russia’s most important institutional tool in world 
politics. Here, Russia has a permanent seat to voice Russian interests and to 
veto decisions perceived to be detrimental to these interests. Accordingly, 
US dominance, NATO enlargement and a more active role for the Western 
alliance out of area were perceived to work in direct opposition Russia’s in-
terests. In fact, they threatened Russia’s security in the sense that they un-
dermined Russia’s self-ascribed role as an independent centre of influence, a 
role that had largely been securitised in the NSC’97. 
This worldview dictated a Russian policy aimed at multipolarity and the 
revival of a leading role for Russia in world politics. In an outline of main 
priorities in Russia’s foreign policy in the late 1990s, Foreign Minister 
Ivanov writes: ‘Our choice in favour of a multipolar world order is condi-
tioned primarily by national interests. At the current stage of Russia’s devel-
opment, this is the most favourable system with regard to facilitating a wor-
thy (dostoynyy) place in the world community’ (Ivanov 2001:26). Arguably, 
in a highly institutionalised environment, participation in institutional ar-
rangements and decision-making processes can be seen almost as a defining 
feature of influential powers. Thus, the official reading in Moscow of Russia 
as a great power dictated a need for access to the main European security 
arenas. As seen from Moscow, signs of NATO-centrism absent any prospect 
that Russia might become fully integrated in the Western alliance were per-
ceived to be detrimental to Russia’s security interests. As Primakov 
(2001:239) puts it: ‘NATO-centrism (…) pushes Russia into a zone of isola-
tion from decisions concerning common world problems’. Again, therefore, 
the fact that the Russian elite elevated the officially acknowledged concep-
tion of Russia as a great power to something of a guide for the state’s foreign 
                                                     
118  Yevgeny Primakov served as foreign minister from January 1996 and as prime minister 
from September 1998 to May 1999. His successor in the office of foreign minister, Igor 
Ivanov, served as 1st deputy foreign minister under Kozyrev, then under Primakov. Rus-
sia’s foreign policy apparently changed little with Ivanov’s takeover as head of the For-
eign Ministry in September 1998, with the concept of ‘multipolarity’ remaining an im-
portant guiding principle (Mlechin 2001). 
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policy in effect ‘forced’ Moscow to oppose an enhanced role for NATO. It is 
arguably in this perspective we should interpret Russia’s intense opposition 
to NATO’s military operation in Kosovo and the first round of enlargement 
in 1999.  
Notably, this interpretation is vested not in a Russian perception of 
NATO as a potential military threat or a reading of relations with the West in 
terms of military capabilities. Rather, it reflects Moscow’s strategic interests 
in securing a certain level of influence on the course of events in Europe. An 
enhanced role for NATO was believed to entail a relative loss in Russia’s 
institutional powers, which made Russia’s formal veto in the UNSC ever 
more important. Cultivation under Primakov’s leadership of bilateral ties 
with some European states, in particular with France and Germany, can ar-
guably be interpreted in this same perspective of Russian concern vis-à-vis 
perceived US domination in global affairs and NATO-centrism in the Euro-
pean region. Large parts of the public opinion and political elite in these 
states remained sceptical to NATO enlargement and to the alliance’s new 
role out of area. Accordingly, as seen from Moscow, they were potentially 
more receptive to Russian views and interests and might serve as agents in-
side with regard to influencing future developments and decisions in the 
West. Thus, multipolarity, which entailed a competitive more than confron-
tational view of the US, dictated Russian development of good relations with 
potential friends inside NATO circles, and strengthened the rationale for 
‘splitting’ the Western centre across the Atlantic divide. 
To be sure, many in the political and military elite said that they regarded 
NATO enlargement as a direct military threat against Russia (Oldberg 
1999a:17). Large segments of the Russian society also remained sceptical to 
the West and continued to regard NATO as a potential enemy.119 Yet to the 
extent that NATO enlargement was perceived to pose a direct military threat, 
these worries must have been eased in the eyes of policymakers with formu-
lations in the Founding Act that committed NATO not to adopt certain mili-
tary measures. Already in 1996 Defence Minister Rodionov, whose room for 
manoeuvring was perhaps more limited than that of leaders in the Kremlin 
and in the Foreign Ministry, had stated that enlargement of the Western alli-
ance was no threat to Russia (Oldberg 1999a:22). Also, as Bluth (1998:333) 
rightly observes, an interpretation of NATO enlargement as an existential 
threat to Russia presupposed that the West was regarded as an enemy or an 
adversary with potential aggressive motives vis-à-vis Russia. There were 
few indications that the policymaking elite looked upon the West in this 
way. Accordingly, the proclaimed fears of becoming subject to NATO mili-
tary attack and recurrent threats to respond to NATO enlargement by mili-
tary countermeasures were simply not credible.  
The dominating view in the Russian policymaking elite apparently cen-
tred on discontent with having Russia’s interests and voiced concerns being 
                                                     
119  In an analysis of perceptions of ‘the West’ in Russia from 1991 to 1997, Kobrinskaya 
(1997:117) found that the Russian public opinion to a great extent held on to Cold War 
perceptions of the West, and that outlooks on the West changed to a ‘significantly less 
degree’ among ordinary Russians than inside a broadly conceived elite. Hence, she ar-
gues that the public opinion largely served as a ‘conservative corrective’ to elite views 
(ibid.). Her argument is based on public opinion polls and on textual analysis of various 
media. 
4.0 Tracing the humiliation of a troubled great power 
nupi may 03 
85 
ignored in the West. It also appears that the political leadership over time 
conceded to accept emerging NATO-centrism as an ‘objective fact’ serving 
as a constraint on Russia’s influence. As Foreign Minister Primakov said to 
his Polish colleague in a 1998 meeting: ‘You have to understand that we are 
not glad about the enlargement of NATO. We know it will happen. Just 
don’t ask us to be happy about it’ (quoted in Williams and Neumann 
2000:359). This arguably signals dislike more than existential fear, and was 
a strong indication that the issue was in reality not regarded as a question of 
Russia’s survival. These considerations were surely part of cost–benefit ana-
lyses in the Western capitals prior to the decision to go forward with NATO 
enlargement and ‘unsanctioned’ out-of-area commitments in spite of strong 
Russian objections. 
How then do we explain frequent Russian invocations regarding NATO’s 
‘aggressive character’, a term that was applied even by Russia’s Foreign 
Minister Ivanov? Beyond a genuine concern that the UN-centred world order 
might be in danger, I believe that the answer can be sought at least partly in 
terms of pleasing a domestic demand that Russia should not yield too easily 
to the West.120 Yet it was also a way of signalling to the West the Russian 
discontent with having Russia’s interests and concerns being ignored. Since 
the West was essentially not perceived to be an enemy, and since Russia was 
regarded in Moscow as a great power, emerging NATO-centrism made it 
ever more important to gain institutional concessions and possibility to in-
fluence decision-making processes. Thus, by securitising Russia’s role as a 
great power or an influential player in world affairs, Moscow sought to elicit 
institutional arrangements that might serve as some sort of guaranty that 
Russia would have a voice and that Russian interests would not be ignored in 
the emerging NATO-centred order.  
4.3 Alternative options: The ‘dead ends’ of Russia’s foreign 
policy 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 centred on Moscow’s struggle to come to terms with 
emerging NATO-centrism as an ‘objective’ constraint on Russia’s foreign 
policy in the heart of Europe. However, already from 1993, and not exclu-
sively as a response to emerging NATO-centrism, Russia pursued other pol-
icy directions and adopted some measures that aimed at strengthening Rus-
sia’s power position in her own immediate periphery and beyond. This sec-
tion analyses Russian policy moves and initiatives in this regard, which were 
all constrained by factors beyond Russia’s own control and influence, and 
which contributed to create a gap between Russia’s foreign policy capabili-
ties and ambitions. I also address the question of whether Russia’s obsession 
with being recognized by others as a great power had a constraining effect in 
itself on the potential success of Russia’s own policy.  
                                                     
120  The way in which Russian leaders exploited (domestically) the occupation by Russian 
forces of the airport in Prishtina (Kosovo) in June 1999 – however brief and symbolic – 
points in this direction. 
Morten Jeppesen 
nupi may 03 
86 
4.3.1 The failure of CIS, the weakness of OSCE and Russia’s ‘no allies’ 
situation 
I hypothesised in Chapter 2 that to the extent that Russia regards herself as 
an alternative centre to the West, one would expect Russia to seek a build-up 
and/or strengthening of institutional arrangements perceived as favourable to 
Russia and believed to potentially undermine or balance the power and in-
fluence of the West. Intense Russian diplomatic efforts in 1994 to increase 
the weight of CSCE/OSCE vis-à-vis NATO can be interpreted in this per-
spective, as can the (largely unsuccessful) Russian diplomacy in 1994–95 to 
prevent NATO’s role in the Balkans from becoming too independent from 
the UN and the UNSC (Parrish 1995; Sherr 1995).  
Still, with regard to OSCE, most Russian initiatives appeared to be moti-
vated by the intention to undermine the role of NATO. This largely discred-
ited any pro-OSCE designs in the eyes of the West (Baranovsky and Arbatov 
1999:62). Also, OSCE had no value in itself for Russia. It served strictly in-
strumental purposes in Russian foreign policy (von Plate 1998). In fact, it 
appears that Russia to some extent lost interest in OSCE when Moscow did 
not succeed in convincing the West that this institution should be given a 
more prominent place in the emerging architecture (ibid.; Zagorski 1997). 
This largely corresponds to expectations derived from our model: As Russia 
increasingly came to look upon herself as a separate centre entangled in a 
zero-sum game with the West, she also took on a more instrumental ap-
proach to institutions and regarded OSCE more through the lens of securing 
a level of Russian participation in European affairs and as a policy tool in the 
pursuit of particular Russian interest. Indicative to this approach was the use 
of OSCE in defence of Russian minorities and their civic rights in the FRSU, 
perhaps most intensely in Latvia and Estonia. Russian obstruction to a sub-
stantive role for OSCE in matters of peacekeeping and conflict management 
in the post-Soviet space arguably reflects the same tendency.121  
The latter assertion points to a separate issue: Although Russia’s concerns 
regarding signs of emerging NATO-centrism centred on her possibility to 
influence developments in Europe proper, there are some indications that 
Moscow adopted policy measures aimed at fencing off or balancing Western 
influence also in the post-Soviet space. Attempts to strengthen CIS as an in-
stitutional arrangement were important in this regard. However, it appears 
that the potential success of these measures was to a great extent hampered 
by Russia’s domestic problems and her ‘unattractiveness’ as an alternative 
centre, but also by a US policy that focused increasingly on constraining 
perceived imperial impulses in Russia’s foreign policy. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Russian elite in 1992–93 convened around 
the idea that there was a need to reintegrate the FRSU and to make the post-
Soviet space a zone of continued Russian influence. Kerr (1995:978–981) 
found that this reflected certain recognition in Russia that geopolitics today 
entails not only military superiority and control of territory, but also a degree 
of political legitimacy and the effective use of institutional arrangements. 
However, to the extent that there have been present in Russia a political will 
                                                     
121  With regard to peacekeeping and conflict management in the post-Soviet space, the secu-
rity concept adopted in 1997 states explicitly that OSCE will be drawn on only ‘some 
time in the future’ (v perspektive) (NSC’97). 
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and diplomatic resources to pursue the goal of reintegration, Russia experi-
enced great difficulties with regard to institutionalising CIS relations in a 
way perceived favourable to Russian interests (Hagström 1998; Jonson 
1998).  
In a study of developments from 1991 to 1997, Hagström (1998) identi-
fied both integrative and disintegrative tendencies in the CIS area. Yet the 
overall impression was that CIS lacks bodies and mechanisms that might fa-
cilitate the adoption and implementation of shared decisions, and that this 
institutional framework therefore remains a poor policy instrument for Rus-
sia (ibid.:35–37). The perhaps strongest factor inhibiting CIS integration has 
been the policies adopted by some former Soviet republics that were not ea-
ger to become subject to Russian dominance in the wake of newly won inde-
pendence (Hagström 1998; Jonson 1998). With the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, some CIS states looked more to the West and to Western institutions 
as ‘anchors’ in their external relations. Arguably, there has emerged a group 
of ‘core states’ that counts Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which are generally positive to CIS integration 
(Hagström 1998:19–21). Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Moldova and 
Ukraine have been more reluctant in this regard.122 With this in mind, the 
consensus principle of decision-making has greatly inhibited integration of 
CIS into a unified structure. As states have pursued various initiatives per-
ceived favourable to their own interests, a great number of bilateral and mul-
tilateral arrangements have come into being, with CIS looking like a com-
plex ‘web of relations’ (Jonson 1998). Thus, CIS remains an ineffective and 
weak institution and only a poor policy instrument for Russia (ibid.; Hag-
ström 1998).123 
This general observation concerning a lack of effective decision-making 
bodies and procedures appears valid also with particular regard to matters of 
military security (Jonson 1998:29–40; Zagorski 1998). The Tashkent Collec-
tive Security Pact from May 1992 represented a first attempt to establish a 
joint CIS defence organisation. By December 1993, all CIS states minus 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Moldova were signatories to this treaty. Never-
theless, the parties did not substantiate the treaty with close military coopera-
tion or integration of armed forces and command structures. Russian efforts 
in this direction were intensified from 1994 (Oldberg 1999a:14). Yet al-
though some success was achieved with regard to common air defence and 
border control, Russia failed to facilitate integrated bodies and joint com-
mands also here (ibid.; Jonson 1998:38–39).124 Additional Russian initia-
tives forwarded in 1996–97 were met by the same cool attitude. In fact, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, which were generally more pro-
Western than pro-Russian regarding their institutional affiliation, responded 
                                                     
122  Although this categorisation is a simplification, it appears to grasp one central tendency 
in intra-CIS relations. See Hagström’s appendix for a detailed overview of the commit-
ments made by various states to agreements within the CIS framework (1998:40–41). 
Turkmenistan has joined a number of these agreements, but has declared itself a ‘neutral’ 
state and is often considered to pursue a (partly) isolationist policy.  
123  This is of course not to say that Russia is left without possibilities to influence develop-
ments in neighbouring CIS states. Bilateral ties to some extent compensates for the lack 
of an effective CIS framework, with Russia possessing considerable political, economic 
and military leverages in this regard (Hagström 1998; Jonson 1998).  
124  Oldberg (1999a; 1999b) sees a close link between plans for NATO enlargement and 
more intense Russian efforts aimed at CIS integration from 1994.  
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by establishing a separate framework for security consultations (GUAM). 
Although the latter remains a relatively loose body, it contributes to under-
mine the role of CIS as envisioned by Moscow. Thus, also in terms of (mili-
tary) security, CIS remains largely an empty structure and consequently also 
a poor policy instrument for Russia (Zagorski 1998).125  
To be sure, CIS meetings on various levels have served as instruments for 
consultations on a wide range of security issues. Russia largely shares with 
the other CIS states threat perceptions associated with growing problems re-
lated to smuggling, organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal trespassing 
(Jonson 1998:39). Of shared concern are also perceived challenges from Is-
lamic fundamentalism/extremism in adjacent areas (ibid.:30). However, 
Russia faces a dilemma that strongly inhibits the potential for CIS integra-
tion and close military cooperation in particular. On the one hand, Russia is 
in a sense needed in order to facilitate order and stability in the post-Soviet 
space. Russia’s relative superiority in power creates a rationale in the CIS 
states for having Russia engaged in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. 
Seen from Russia, the CIS area is a buffer against external threats and dan-
gers stemming from Islamic fundamentalism. Yet the CIS states may them-
selves represent a source of instability and fertile soil for the ‘Muslim threat’. 
In either view, there is also a Russian rationale for involvement in terms of 
intervention or attempts to influence developments in the region. Arguably, 
this partly shared rationale for Russia’s political and military engagement in 
the CIS area can be ascribed to the same security logic of chaos that has dic-
tated Western policy vis-à-vis CEE, and is reflected in the establishment of 
CIS peacekeeping forces, which, although they serve under CIS auspices, are 
essentially Russian-led and dominated by Russian contingents (Baev 1998; 
Jonson 1998). 
On the other side, Russia is often perceived by some CIS states to be pur-
suing interests that go beyond the goal of stability. As discussed in Chapter 
3, conflicts on former Soviet territories were instrumental in bringing to the 
surface ambiguities in some CIS states regarding Russia’s role in the post-
Soviet space. Russia is herself party to some intra-CIS conflicts. This facili-
tates unease in some CIS states regarding Russia’s role in the region. For 
them, integration poses a danger of increased dependence on Russia. Ac-
cordingly, as I have sought to convey in the sections above, Russian claims 
for a hegemonic role and a special responsibility in the CIS area also reflect 
Russia’s great power identity and the security logic of power balance vis-à-
vis the West. This greatly inhibits CIS integration beyond being a loose net-
work for consultations and undermines the CIS framework as a policy tool 
for Russia.126 
Institutional developments in the CIS area were conditioned also by ex-
ternal developments and by the policies of other actors. For instance, Jonson 
                                                     
125  This is of course not to say that Russia is left without possibilities to influence develop-
ments in the CIS area. As Hagström (1998:35–37) argues, Russia’s bilateral agreements 
with CIS states compensates to some extent for the lack of a unified institutional struc-
ture. My point here is that CIS has failed to develop into a strong policy instrument for 
Russia that might potentially serve to fence off or balance Western influence. 
126  Russia faces an additional challenge with regard to accentuation of the ‘Islamic threat’. 
According to several estimates, Muslims constitute 15-20% of the Russian population 
(Glinski-Vassiliev 2001). This dictates a clear distinction between Islam as such and Is-
lamic fundamentalism in Russian security discourse and foreign policy. 
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(1998:30ff) suggests that the Taliban take-over of Kabul was an important 
factor facilitating more intensive Russian efforts aimed at military integra-
tion from 1996–97. Yet of particular importance as a constraint on CIS inte-
gration were developments in US policy vis-à-vis Russia. Arguably, signs of 
‘soft containment’ had by 1996 developed into ‘geopolitical pluralism’ as 
the guiding concept for Washington’s approach to the CIS area (Feffer 1999; 
Migranyan 1998). This policy is associated with US analyst and former 
presidential security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who in 1994 wrote an ar-
ticle in Foreign Affairs that basically argues that consolidation of geopoliti-
cal pluralism in the post-Soviet space is the best strategy available for the US 
in a situation where the prospect for Russia’s democratic development was 
still in doubt (Brzezinski 1994).127  
This prescription was important in facilitating institutional fragmentation 
in the CIS area (Migranyan 1998:73–75; Feffer 1999). To the south of Rus-
sia, Washington now started to pursue closer ties with Uzbekistan, Kazakh-
stan, Georgia and Azerbaijan (Feffer 1999). Symbolic to this development, 
Uzbekistan in April 1999 joined the GUAM states in a ceremony that took 
place in Washington on the fringes of NATO’s summit. In a European con-
text, Ukraine became an important US partner. In 1997, Ukraine signed a 
separate agreement with NATO intended for development of closer ties. Al-
though the NATO–Ukraine Charter was less ambitious than the NATO–
Russia Founding Act, the document in some sense reduced the significance 
of Russia’s agreement with the alliance. Thus, Washington from 1996 in-
creasingly adopted policy measures that contributed to undermine CIS inte-
gration and Russia’s policy. 
Let alone CIS fragmentation and developments in US policy, several 
states in the West, in CEE and in the CIS area displayed an increasing inter-
est from 1994 in having OSCE become more involved in the post-Soviet 
space, not least as instruments for monitoring Russia’s peacekeeping behav-
iour (Zagorski 1997; Baev 1998). Over time, OSCE increased its physical 
presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia not only through monitoring mis-
sions and observers in some conflict areas, but also through the establish-
ment of centres or agencies dealing with ‘soft’ security issues like human 
rights, inter-ethnic dialogue, education and development of democratic insti-
tutions.128 
It appears that this development was regarded with some discomfort in 
Moscow. In a speech to the Russian Diplomatic Academy in June 2000, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Gusarov argued that there had emerged a ‘func-
tional and geographical imbalance’ in the role of OSCE (Gusarov 2000). In 
functional terms, OSCE focuses predominantly on ‘third basket’ issues like 
                                                     
127  In brief, Brzezinski (1994) asserts that Russia’s imperial impulse remains strong and that 
Russia cannot be both democratic and imperial. Since it is in the US interest to have Rus-
sia become a democratic state, he argues that Washington should seek to constrain 
Russia’s imperial impulse by encouraging Moscow to develop good neighbourly rela-
tions to the post-Soviet states independent of the ‘final fate’ of Russia’s democratic tran-
sition. In terms of policy measures, this should also entail increased US receptiveness to 
calls made by some CIS states to engage in the post-Soviet space and more active US po-
litical and financial support to forces inside the CIS area that might potentially serve as a 
counterbalance to Russian political and military influence. 
128  An overview of OSCE presence in these regions and of the mandates of various offices, 
agencies and missions is available on: http://www.osce.org/field_activities/ (2002-08-
10). 
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the protection of human and minority rights. Despite its role as sponsor for 
the CFE process and other CSBMs in the military sphere, the organisation 
largely fails to address important security challenges in the politico-military, 
economic and ecological sectors. Also, in terms of geography, OSCE con-
centrates on three sub-regions: the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
There are, as Gusarov points out, no OSCE missions or assistance groups in 
Western Europe or North America (ibid.). This tendency is regarded as nega-
tive for Russia, since the Western states apparently prefer to handle impor-
tant issues inside the ‘closed circles’ of NATO and EU, and since Russia’s 
former allies are becoming increasingly attached to the West and to the 
Western institutions (ibid.). Accordingly, Gusarov goes quit far in suggest-
ing that OSCE is essentially being turned into an instrument in a Western 
strategy aimed at undermining Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space 
and traditional zones of Russian interests (ibid.).129 
Gusarov’s speech points to the essence of Russia’s ambiguity vis-à-vis 
OSCE. With regard to the European region as a whole, Russia has an interest 
in expanding the functional scope of OSCE to include a greater number of 
‘hardcore’ security issues and thus increase the relative institutional weight 
of OSCE vis-à-vis NATO and other arenas to which Russia has no access or 
where Russia’s voice is only marginal. This would secure a high level of 
Russian participation in a greater number of decision-making processes and 
give Moscow the right to veto decisions perceived to be detrimental to its 
interests. However, with regard to the more limited post-Soviet space, Russia 
has an interest in delimiting the functional scope of OSCE and particularly in 
preventing a Vienna takeover of the institutional responsibility for peace-
keeping in the post-Soviet space from the loose CIS umbrella. In other 
words, it is perceived in Moscow not to be in Russia’s interest to have a 
greater say-so for the ‘old’ and ‘new’ West with regard to the handling of 
hardcore security issues in the CIS area. 
It is arguably in this perspective that we should understand ambiguities in 
Russia’s policy, but also Russian–Western tensions and disagreements re-
garding institutional handling of security challenges both in Europe proper 
and in the post-Soviet space. To a great extent, developments can be traced 
to the complex interplay between the two security logics of ‘chaos’ and 
‘power’ respectively. Facilitation of relative order and stability in the post-
Soviet space is a shared interest for Russia and the West. Yet in light of per-
ceived ‘spill-over’ potential, geographical proximity makes stability in the 
Caucasian and Central Asian sub-regions a more expedient matter for Russia 
than the West. This may largely explain why the West has been rather reluc-
tant with regard to becoming too heavily involved in developments in these 
areas and particularly concerning military involvement in peacekeeping and 
conflict management. Increased OSCE commitments to the post-Soviet 
                                                     
129  The text of Gusarov’s speech is available on the official website of Russia’s Foreign 
Ministry under the rubric ‘Russia–OSCE’ (www.ln.mid.ru/website/ns-dos.nsf/) (2002-
06-25). Several other documents and press releases available on this site show that 
Gusarov since 1999 on several occasions has raised with his OSCE colleagues the issue 
of a functional and geographical ‘imbalance’ in the work of OSCE (See for instance his 
‘Remarks’ at the OSCE Council meeting of foreign ministers in Vienna on 28 November 
2000). More recently, the observed imbalance has entailed Russian proposals for a more 
active role for OSCE in the West. 
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space in the late 1990s have been dominated by relatively inexpensive policy 
measures. 
Thus, Russia’s policy vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space reflects the same se-
curity logic of chaos that dictated Western military interventions in the Bal-
kans. Russia wanted to facilitate order and stability in Russia’s own periph-
ery. Yet Moscow’s concern with balance of power was also important in 
shaping developments. As the Russian elite increasingly came to regard Rus-
sia as a great power and as an alternative centre to the widely recognised 
Western one, the security logic of power prescribed facilitation of an institu-
tional environment that would ensure Russian influence on developments 
and prevent a relative decline in Russia’s institutional weight vis-à-vis the 
West. To Russia’s west, this logic dictated Russian opposition to emerging 
NATO-centrism and initiatives aimed at making OSCE a cornerstone in the 
emerging architecture. However, as Russia went from integration to shield-
ing and adaptation as the basis for policy vis-à-vis the West, there was a 
strictly instrumental rationale behind Russian calls for a greater role for 
OSCE, central to which was Moscow’s strategic goal of sustaining a level of 
Russian influence on developments in Europe. 
To Russia’s south, the security logic from around 1993 prescribed reinte-
gration of the CIS area into a unified structure under Moscow’s leadership. 
Attempts to limit the physical presence of external actors in the post-Soviet 
space and to fence off Western influence in the CIS area by confining the 
functional scope of OSCE followed logically from the new reading of rela-
tions with the West in terms of a zero-sum game of power between two 
competing centres. This greatly inhibited the potential for Russian–Western 
security cooperation, and is reflected in tensions not only over the division of 
competence between OSCE and the loose CIS structure with regard to au-
thorisation of peacekeeping operations and conflict management, but also 
concerning the role and mandates of various OSCE missions in the CIS area. 
By 1996, Russia’s policy had developed into something of an obsession 
with being internationally recognised as a great power. Despite an evident 
collapse in Russia’s material power basis, multipolarity and the resurrection 
of Russia as an independent pole in world politics became guiding principles 
for foreign policy. This development only cemented a perceived need in 
Moscow for institutional structures that might ensure a certain level of Rus-
sian influence and potentially undermine the institutional powers of the 
West. Yet the policies of other actors, which often reflected a combination of 
suspicion vis-à-vis Russian policy motives and low receptiveness to Russia’s 
views and interests, to a great extent countered Russia’s own efforts and am-
bitions. Most importantly, unwillingness in the West and particularly in the 
US to include Russia in decision-making processes and to let OSCE become 
a preferred security tool to a great extent curbed the potential success of 
Russia’s policy.  
In fact, the observations above indicate that from around 1996, both Rus-
sia and the US were driven by the security logic of power. Seen from Wash-
ington, closer ties with Uzbekistan and Ukraine and political support to the 
GUAM/GUUAM network might contribute to balance Russian influence in 
the CIS area. During the latter half of the 1990s, the US also became more 
forthcoming with regard to prospects for NATO membership for the Baltic 
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states. Thus, as Russia adopted the notion of multipolarity and as the Clinton 
administration gradually started to pursue Brzezinski’s prescriptions of geo-
political pluralism in the post-Soviet space, both started to regard the con-
struction of Europe’s security architecture in terms of a zero-sum power 
game and were driven by the motive of balancing the institutional weight of 
each other. This left them with incompatible interests and greatly inhibited 
their potential for security cooperation.130 
Evidently, Washington was more successful than Moscow with regard to 
realising its preferred security order. This arguably reflects a reduction in 
Russia’s power or ability to affect external developments in a way perceived 
favourable to Russian interests. For instance, the Baltic states did not con-
cede to a combination of Russian pressure and conciliatory moves to keep 
them from developing closer ties with NATO (Oldberg 1999b:34–42). Rus-
sia also failed in her efforts from 1995–96 to bring about a shift in the deli-
cate balance between a Russian and a Western orientation in Ukraine’s for-
eign policy and to change Kiev’s largely positive outlook on NATO and 
NATO enlargement (Oldberg 1999b:50–57). And despite some integrative 
successes and close bilateral ties with some CIS states, including a union-
like bond to marginal and politically isolated Belarus, Russia became ‘invol-
untary disengaged’ in the CIS area (Jonson 1998). States in Russia’s periph-
ery apparently gravitated more to the West and to a NATO-centred security 
structure than to the Russian centre. 
Thus, developments put on display a substantial gap between Russia’s 
foreign policy capabilities and ambitions (Garnett 1997; Fyodorov 2001). 
Russia was in some sense forced to make concessions with regard to the stra-
tegic goal of resurrecting Russia’s role as a great power, which necessitated 
an increase in Russia’s institutional weight in the emerging European secu-
rity architecture. She did not succeed in her attempts to strengthen the role of 
OSCE vis-à-vis NATO. Although the Contact Group reflects a successful 
external resource move vis-à-vis the West, she largely failed also to facili-
tate alternative institutional bases for Russian influence. In the post-Soviet 
space, CIS never became a strong, unified structure or an effective policy in-
strument for Russia. In fact, Russia suffered from a ‘deficiency in allies and 
reliable partners’ (Baranovsky and Arbatov 1999:48), which reflects the ob-
servation that Russia not only lost many of her former allies, but also failed 
to attract any (significant) new ones. Thus, adding to a relative decline in 
military capabilities, these developments reflected a relative decline also in 
Russia’s institutional powers.131  
Accordingly, disposed by domestic problems and the lack of other feasi-
ble policy options (i.e., isolation from the West, military build-up etc.), this 
largely left Russia with the difficult task of adapting to an institutional envi-
                                                     
130  A more active US and Western policy in the post-Soviet space in the latter half of the 
1990s should also be regarded in light of Western economic interests attached to petro-
leum resources in the Caspian Sea.  
131  Although commercial interests and economic considerations are also a part of the pic-
ture, Russia’s ‘no allies’ situation led Moscow to pursue development of ties with actors 
outside the Euro–Atlantic region, perhaps most importantly with China and India, but 
also with some states commonly perceived as ‘rogue states’ or ‘enemies’ of the West 
(Baranovsky and Arbatov 1999:48; Oldberg 1999a:18–19). Yet these ties have yet to de-
velop into deeply cemented institutional structures or anything close to integrated poli-
tico-military alliances. 
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ronment that Moscow didn’t like at all. Since a momentum had been created 
in favour of NATO-centrism that Russia was simply unable to stop, devel-
opments left the self-defined great power in a ‘take it or leave it’ situation 
with regard to cooperative institutional arrangements proposed by the West. 
At various stages, this led to some humiliating Russian ‘retreats’, with Rus-
sia finding herself being hostage of her own loud and frequent criticism of 
that same NATO-centrism to which she de facto conceded. 
4.3.2 Humiliation self-imposed? On the implications of ‘speaking’ secu-
rity  
The sections above suggest that the ‘objective’ weight of Russia and of 
‘Russian’ institutions were in relative decline. To some extent, this reflects 
the political will of the powerful West and, most importantly, the United 
States. Yet there is reason to ask whether Russia’s own policy has been to 
some extent counterproductive with regard to the stated goal of resurrecting 
Russia’s role as a great power. Some Russian statements and policy meas-
ures evidently fostered concern in the West and among states in Russia’s pe-
riphery about her potential imperial motives. These worries facilitated ‘anti-
Russian’ policies in some CIS states and among former Soviet allies. Con-
cerns regarding Russia’s imperial legacy were also important in bringing 
about US policies of containment vis-à-vis Russia and areas of Russian tradi-
tional influence. From time to time, Russian politicians and diplomats also 
fostered sourness in Russian–Western relations by adopting an extremely 
confrontational language in their interactions. This was reflected not least 
with regard to NATO enlargement and in the handling of Balkan issues. It is 
hardly far-fetched to assume that this may have contributed to undermine the 
West’s confidence in Russia’s allegedly constructive or cooperative ap-
proach and potentially also its receptiveness to Russia’s proclaimed interests. 
Developments around NATO have been crucial in shaping Russia’s pol-
icy. Signs of emerging NATO-centrism from around 1993 were interpreted 
in Russia in terms of a zero-sum Russian–Western game of power and influ-
ence. The West did not succeed in convincing Moscow that projection of 
stability, which was derived from the security logic of chaos, was the ‘real’ 
and only rationale behind NATO’s enlargement and out-of-area activities. 
The West obviously had an interest in facilitating a non-confrontational rela-
tionship with Russia. Western leaders also came to recognise that a certain 
formalisation of relations with Russia might not only ease the enlargement 
process itself, but also facilitate more workable relations with Moscow alto-
gether. This is reflected in various institutional arrangements proposed to 
Russia for consultations and cooperation with NATO (NACC/EAPS, 
PfP/IPP, PJC/Founding Act).  
However, the West had no interest in fostering a role for Russia that was 
in accordance with the rather exorbitant place Russia ascribed to herself. To 
Russia’s obvious disfavour served also the fact that only a limited number of 
European actors regarded Russia as an attractive centre of her own. Recep-
tiveness to Russian views has been limited in both the West, in CEE and to 
some extent also in the post-Soviet space. In one sense, therefore, Russia’s 
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place in the still emerging security architecture reflects the outcome of a 
number of ‘best deals’ feasible at various stages in the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, there is reason to ask whether Moscow could have struck 
better deals at some stages in this process if policymakers and the political 
elite in Moscow had been less obsessed with having the world recognise 
‘great power’ as an appropriate label for Russia and less outspoken with re-
gard to the strategic goal of resurrecting Russia’s ‘natural’ role in world poli-
tics – i.e., that of a great power. Arguably, it might also have been helpful if 
Russia had managed to present a rationale for why she should be regarded as 
a great power. When Primakov in January 1996 took over as foreign minis-
ter, he assumed that ‘Russia was and is a great power despite its present 
hardships, and its foreign policy should be tailored to this status’ (quoted in 
Oldberg 1999a:16). Likewise, in a recent book on Russia’s foreign policy, 
Foreign Minister Ivanov concludes his introductory chapter by asserting that 
Russia over the last decade has become – i.e., already is – ‘one of the influ-
ential centres of the contemporary world’ (Ivanov 2001:51). Yet he also ar-
gues that Russia possesses the resources necessary to assume – in the future 
– a ‘worthy’ (dostoynyy) place in the new world order (ibid.). This appar-
ently reflects certain confusion between the current situation and a possible 
development in the future, and between the notions of Russia’s great power 
status, role and potential. The evidence studied here has far from convinced 
me that the policymaking elite in Moscow has managed to keep these ana-
lytically apart when formulating policy. The observed gap between Russia’s 
capabilities and ambitions, which presumably caused both irritation and frus-
tration in Russia, may probably cast light on the ‘status at any price’ mental-
ity and on the anti-Western rhetoric that was adopted from time to time by 
high-ranking Russian officials, and which was not always helpful in bringing 
about positive results for Russia.132 
Ivanov’s argument invites me to reflect upon a final issue that is relevant 
to any state in its external relations and which should be present in the minds 
of all makers of foreign policy. In politics, agents can (relatively) easily as-
cribe various labels onto objects and seek to ‘sell’ them to an audience as le-
gitimate or natural traits of the object in question. Yet there is no saying that 
the audience (an electorate, other politicians, etc.) will ‘buy’ this link be-
tween label and object or respond to the move in a manner expected by the 
agent in question. In world politics, states’ identities are – at least to some 
extent – in flux and contingent upon the views or perceptions of other actors. 
A state may certainly look upon itself as a great power. Yet the status and 
role of great powers are not questions of states’ self-definitions alone. They 
do not emerge in a social vacuum, and can be regarded instead as reflections 
of intersubjective understandings. Accordingly, a state’s position in the in-
ternational system depends on acceptance by other states of a particular role 
as ‘appropriate’ to the state in question.  
This assertion seems to capture a dilemma and a challenge for Russian 
policymakers at the current stage of Russia’s development. Around 1993, the 
Russian elite largely adopted the idea that Russia – almost by definition – is 
a great power. This was arguably a political choice that entailed particular 
readings of what was to be regarded as Russian national interests. Russia 
                                                     
132  The phrase ‘status at any price’ is taken from Baranovsky and Arbatov (1999:55). 
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could have been defined as ‘Russia’ only, or as a ‘normal’ great power more 
in the reading of early Russian liberals. Yet debate in Russia on her new role 
in world politics and the use of terms like ‘great power’, ‘worthy place’, 
‘special responsibility’ and ‘zones of legitimate interests’ appear to have suf-
fered either from the imprecise and confusing meaning attached to these no-
tions by various actors, or from attachment of meanings to these that were 
strange to the intra-Western security discourse and which would obviously 
cause suspicion and concern in the West. In other words, Russia appears to 
have had no clear conception of what makes Russia a great power: Is it Ter-
ritory? Culture? Weapon arsenals? History? Population size? I defined 
‘power’ as an actor’s ability to influence the behaviour of other actors and to 
have these take oneself and one’s own interest into account in their behav-
iour. Although Russia still possesses considerable military capabilities, the 
relative importance of these as ‘power factors’ in a European context was 
significantly reduced with the end of the Cold War. In economic terms, Rus-
sia’s weakness became ever more obvious throughout the 1990s and was 
also recognised in official policy documents. The relative decline in institu-
tional powers and the low receptiveness to Russian views detected in this 
study only contribute to the impression that Russia’s overall position in the 
international power structure has been ‘objectively’ weakened. In this per-
spective, and in light of some openly revanchist motives advocated by 
prominent figures in Russia with regard to areas of newly won political in-
dependence from Moscow, the failure to give any credible rationale for Rus-
sia’s great power status could only stimulate suspicion and concern about her 
policy motives.133 
Russian politicians and diplomats needed not – and need not – accentuate 
Russia’s heritage and notions like ‘great power’ and ‘legitimate zones of in-
terests’ as guiding principles in the country’s foreign policy, at least not in 
the manner and to the extent that they have in the past. As one observer puts 
it: ‘True greatness…does not need advertising’ (Adomeit 1995:35). On some 
‘objective’ parameters, Russia is a great power (i.e., territory, military capa-
bilities, population size). To some extent, this is also reflected in the way 
other states, including many Western ones, approach her. Yet one may argue 
that Russia’s obsession with being recognised as a great power and a per-
haps excessively outspoken dislike of the emerging institutional environment 
in Europe have made it difficult for both Russia and other actors in the re-
gion. For Russia, it put on display an obvious gap between capabilities and 
ambitions or a lack of correspondence between Russia’s stated goals and her 
ability to influence external developments. This gap can largely be assigned 
to the failure by Russian authorities to realise that a permanent seat in the 
UNSC notwithstanding, Russia does not possess power instruments (i.e., in-
stitutional access, economic strength, normative attraction a.o.) that may se-
cure Russian influence on the behaviour of other actors in a European, post-
Cold War context, but also that the utility of Russia’s main power instru-
ments – military capabilities – is reduced in the sense that they can seldom 
                                                     
133  In a 1993 newspaper article, Kozyrev (1993c) quoted the following message conveyed to 
him on a visit to a former Soviet republic: ‘You are not a great power, you are only Rus-
sia.’ This sentence elegantly captures Moscow’s enduring concern that Russia’s status as 
great power has not been sufficiently recognised. 
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be transferred into political influence. Thus, Russia’s great power identity 
and the (often related) reading (in Moscow) of the international power struc-
ture in terms of military capabilities have to some extent been out of touch 
with other actors’ perception of Russia and of her power position and ‘ap-
propriate’ role in the European region. 
This brought the self-proclaimed great power into some rather humiliat-
ing situations. Since Moscow failed to prevent decisions perceived to be det-
rimental to Russia’s loudly and frequently expressed interests, she also failed 
to influence developments in a way that one might expect from a ‘real’ great 
power. Thus, by regurgitating Russia’s being a great power, Moscow actu-
ally came to advertise Russia’s obvious weakness. And since Russia’s secu-
rity was explicitly linked to her influence in world affairs, developments in 
the late 1990s unavoidably had to cause strong reactions in Moscow, be-
cause they reflected this very decline in Russia’s ability to influence the 
course of events. Also, by adopting a language that involved frequent refer-
ences to NATO as an aggressive alliance directed against Russia, Russian 
diplomats and politicians caused some embarrassment for themselves when 
Russia retreated in the next round from harsh criticism of NATO and con-
ceded to institutional ‘deals’ or partnership arrangements that were largely 
dictated by the West. Humiliation, whether or not self-imposed, is seldom a 
good starting point for constructive cooperation. 
Developments in Russia’s policy raised several questions and dilemmas 
also for the West. In Western readings, Russia could be perceived both as a 
political and economic partner, as a source of chaos, and as a (potential) 
military enemy. History and geography contributed to make ‘the Russian 
question’ a very difficult one. It is beyond the scope of this study to explain 
policies adopted in the West. Yet I have argued that Western policies came 
about at least partly as a result of developments in Russia and in Russia’s 
foreign policy. Moscow’s proclaimed ambition to resurrect Russia’s status as 
a dominant pole in world politics and to be an active player on the European 
stage dictated a delicate balance in the West between policy measures aimed 
at fencing off Russian influence and constraining perceived imperial im-
pulses, while at the same time contributing to political and economic integra-
tion with the West and a broader world community.134  
Yet in one sense the West has not accepted Russia’s role as a great 
power. Even though a certain modus vivendi has developed in Russian–
Western security relations, the West has largely denied Russia’s access to 
NATO as the perhaps most important arena for decision-making on Euro-
pean security affairs and thereby also limited the level of Russian integration 
into Europe’s institutional environment in a broader sense (Haslam 1998).135 
It should be clear from the above that the Western decision to go ahead with 
construction of a NATO-centred security architecture that essentially ex-
cluded Russia from important decision-making processes was one of the 
most important factors shaping Russian security thinking and foreign policy 
                                                     
134  This is not to say that the West has always succeeded in managing this delicate balance 
in a way that fostered European security and a positive development in Russian–Western 
relations. Nor do I claim that the West could not have been more receptive to Russian 
concerns or taken on a more accommodating attitude vis-à-vis Russian stances and inter-
ests at various stages in the processes discussed in this study. 
135  For a contrary view, see Odom (1998). 
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in the latter part of the 1990s. Russia at the turn of the century remained dis-
content with the emerging order and could essentially be regarded as a revi-
sionist state.136 
                                                     
136  By ‘revisionist state’ I understand a state that feels threatened by, or at least hard done 
by, status quo or the existing pattern of interstate relations (Buzan 1991:304). Revisionist 
motives largely derive from a feeling of being denied the enjoyment of core national val-
ues. Accordingly, ‘revisionists tend to view security in terms of changing the system, 
and/or improving their position within it (ibid.). This seems to capture the main rationale 
behind Russia’s foreign policy in the late 1990s. 

5.0 Concluding remarks 
5.1 Central findings: Two arguments restated 
A main objective of this study has been to answer recent calls for linking the 
study of Russian foreign and security policy closer to contemporary debates 
on IR theory. The analysis above suggests that realism, liberalism and con-
structivism may all – in their very different ways – contribute to understand 
Russia’s foreign policy and some related institutional outcomes in Russian–
Western security relations. In particular, findings here indicate that construc-
tivism may be helpful in revealing the link between events and developments 
on different levels of analysis; how Russia’s post-Soviet identity took shape 
and affected the formulation of Russia’s interests and foreign policy; and 
under what conditions hypotheses from realism and liberalism about Rus-
sia’s behaviour and institutional outcomes (i.e., Russian–Western security 
cooperation) find empirical support. 
The theoretical framework applied here is eclectic in the sense that it 
draws on different IR perspectives. Some would argue that it is non-
scientific in the sense that it cannot be falsified and that its theoretical com-
ponents are incommensurable since they rest on different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and reflect different normative programs. There 
may be some truth to these claims. However, the current framework should 
be regarded more as a conceptual lens for interpretation of policies and out-
comes than as a ‘theory’ in a strict, (positivist) scientific sense. There exists 
no single, all-encompassing IR theory from which we can derive undisputed 
explanations of state behaviour and international outcomes. And since any 
theory or modelling of state behaviour ultimately rests on empirical observa-
tions and will fail to incorporate some aspects of the study object, we need 
not be constrained by the notion of incommensurability as such (Wæver 
1996). By advocating the concepts of ‘security logic’ and ‘international 
power structure’, this study represents a humble attempt to contribute to de-
bate on the relevance of different IR paradigms under various systemic con-
ditions.  
The second objective of this study has been to examine the link between 
Russia’s national identity and foreign policy with the aim of understanding 
Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War security architec-
ture in Europe. The conceptual model applied here seems to capture some 
central facets of Russian identity formation and foreign policy in the 1990s. 
At the outset (1991–92), the liberal foreign policy leadership depicted Russia 
as a normal, democratic and explicitly European state. It also accentuated 
shared Russian–Western interests and a shared identity based on affiliation 
with a Christian ‘civilisation’, and downplayed Russia’s (potential) role as 
an alternative centre to the West. The security logic derived from this read-
ing of Russia’s identity and of the international power structure largely dic-
tated integration with the Western centre and adaptation to the Western insti-
tutional arrangements. 
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Accordingly, Russia was initially not opposed to a prominent role for (a 
reformed) NATO in the emerging security architecture. Both NATO and 
CSCE were regarded as viable arenas for addressing issues of common con-
cern, with NATO-affiliated bodies (de facto and potentially) dealing with 
‘hard’ security issues even in traditional areas of Soviet influence. I have 
also argued that the attachment of Central Asia to CSCE reflects a shared 
Russian–Western interest in preventing ‘chaos’ and in constraining the po-
tential advance of Islamic fundamentalism in their shared periphery. 
From 1992–93 the policymaking elite increasingly came to conceive of 
Russia as an alternative centre. To be sure, leading figures in the government 
never seized to look upon Russia as a great power. Yet it was only after 
some time that they started to accentuate this identity trait as an important 
premise for Russia’s foreign policy. The ‘new’ conception of Russia as an 
alternative centre entailed demarcation of the CIS area as an ‘exclusive’ zone 
of Russian influence and a reading of relations with the West more in terms 
of conflicting interests and a zero-sum game of power. 
Thus, I assert that from around 1993, there has been a rather consistent 
Russian line in trying to affect the weight, functional scope and geographic 
domain of NATO and OSCE respectively. With regard to NATO, the goal 
has been to undermine and limit its role. This is reflected in opposition to 
NATO enlargement and its role out of area, but also in proposals and de-
mands to have the West handle a greater number of security issues in bodies 
where Russia’s voice will be heard (i.e., the UNSC, OSCE, Contact Group 
a.o.). Although Cold War enemy perceptions were manifest in large seg-
ments of the Russian society, policymakers regarded NATO-centrism pri-
marily in terms of a relative decline in Russia’s institutional powers and her 
possibility to influence European and global developments. In fact, the ques-
tion of sustaining a level of influence was essentially regarded as security 
matter for Russia, and was explicitly linked to the goal of resurrecting Rus-
sia’s role as a great power in world politics. Accordingly, emerging signs of 
NATO-centrism, which threatened to undermine Russia’s veto in the UNSC, 
were in direct opposition to Russia’s security interests. 
As for OSCE, Russia has sought to increase the relative weight and func-
tional scope of this institution in Europe as a whole, while at the same time 
seeking to limit its role in the post-Soviet space. This ambiguity arose al-
ready around 1992–93, and reflects Russia’s conception of the CIS area as 
Russia’s ‘exclusive’ periphery. Even though a modus vivendi was achieved 
with regard to the handling of peacekeeping and conflict management in the 
post-Soviet space, certain discord surfaced between Russia and the West in 
the latter half of the 1990s concerning the functional scope of OSCE in the 
CIS area, with Russia seeking to constrain the role of this ‘external’ actor. 
With regard to Europe proper, Russian pro-OSCE initiatives have largely 
failed or at least not been materialised in accordance with the underlying 
Russian intentions. I have argued that developments in the late 1990s re-
vealed limitations in Russia’s ability to influence the external environment 
and that this was reflected in the ‘shape’ of the European security architec-
ture at the turn of the century. In conceding to realities, Russia has continu-
ously sought to adapt to the emerging order and to compensate for a relative 
decline in institutional powers by obtaining more limited access to European 
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decision-making arenas and by committing to institutional arrangements that 
were perceived as better than having no security cooperation with the West 
at all. Thus, Russia’s policy largely supports the hypotheses derived from the 
model in section 2.4. 
5.2 Reassessing basic assumptions: Russia’s policy coher-
ence 
I shall refrain from an in-depth assessment of the validity or quality of this 
study and only direct attention to questions that were raised in section 1.3 
and which may be relevant in this regard. There is always the danger of 
oversimplifying through assumptions and of overestimating the significance 
of a study object or a ‘case’. Here I have focused on Russia’s relations with 
NATO and OSCE. There are some related issues that have not been elabo-
rated in detail, and which might contribute to ‘correct’ the overall impression 
of Russia’s decline in power and of its significance for Russia’s foreign pol-
icy. For instance, I have treated the West largely as a single entity and 
downplayed Russia’s bilateral relations with states in Europe and beyond. 
Also, by focusing mainly on two institutions, I largely ignored Russia’s posi-
tion vis-à-vis other ‘components’ of the European security architecture. 
Nonetheless, I believe that central findings in this study would be supple-
mented rather than rejected in a more detailed account. 
Another important simplification here has been the assumption that Rus-
sia can be regarded as a rational actor or that her policy reflects cost–benefit 
analyses. Some authors claim that Russia’s foreign policy is still in a ‘state 
of flux’, and that it remains ‘puzzling’, ‘unstable’, ‘incidental’ and is often 
affected by ‘arbitrary’ factors (Bluth 1998:323; Zagorski 1997:521). The 
time period studied here has been characterised by economic decline, mili-
tary collapse and domestic political turmoil, all of which have constrained 
Russia’s foreign policy capacity. Adding to this, ‘policy’ in the early 1990s 
was only weakly institutionalised, which was reflected in frequent shifts in 
both formal competence and real influence on decisions between various 
domestic figures, bodies and institutions (Arbatov 1997). These factors may 
have contributed to undermine policy coherence, perhaps even rendering it 
meaningless to speak of one Russian foreign policy. 
However, Russia’s foreign policy is hardly unique in being puzzling, un-
stable and arbitrary, or in displaying ambiguities. Arguably, these traits do 
not undermine the basic assumption that at the point where Russian leaders 
had to make policy decisions, these ultimately reflected calculation of ex-
pected costs and benefits derived from available policy options. Although 
several institutions have been involved in decision-making, the Foreign Min-
istry has from 1993 served as the most important institution shaping Russian 
decisions (Shearman and Sussex 2000; Malcolm et al. 1996). And although 
there still exists great diversity in Russian views with regard to questions of 
security, national identity, foreign policy and Russia’s place in world poli-
tics, integral to which are also different perceptions of Europe and the West, 
I have detected here a fairly consistent policy line aimed at constructing a 
European security architecture perceived favourable to the pursuit of Russian 
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interests. This arguably strengthens the rationale for treating Russia as a ‘ra-
tional’ actor in analyses of her foreign policy. 
5.3 A look ahead: Questions for further research 
The new doctrinal basis for Russia’s foreign and security policy adopted in 
the spring of 2000 to a great extent reflect developments in ‘official’ Russian 
views from the late 1990s. Central to these were discontent with US domi-
nance in world affairs and the related Russian calls for multipolarity.137 
However, already from the outset of his service as president, Putin started to 
convey rather sober assessments of the severity of Russia’s economic, finan-
cial and military problems. He basically argued that foreign policy should be 
dictated more by domestic demands and less by lofty ambitions, and advo-
cated concentration of state resources on a few vital tasks.138 This apparently 
reflects Putin’s recognition of the current limitations and constraints to Rus-
sia’s power. Arguably, developments in Russia’s foreign policy during the 
last couple of years reflect an attempt to close the observed gap between 
Russia’s policy capabilities and ambitions. In contrast to what we observed 
in the late 1990s, the new Russian president has sought to do this by adapt-
ing the latter to the former instead of vice versa, and by accentuating Rus-
sia’s need to seek security (and other) dividends through rapprochement with 
the West. It appears, therefore, that Putin has a rather moderate conception 
of the ‘real size’ of the Russian centre, and that this disposed him in direc-
tion of a more Western-oriented foreign policy. 
11 September marked a shift in Russian–Western relations (Godzimirski 
2002). Events this day called new attention to threats stemming from inter-
national terrorism, and have facilitated a shared Russian–Western interest in 
adopting measures to counter these threats. This is reflected both in coopera-
tion in the ongoing war on terrorism and in the establishment of a new body 
for Russian–Western consultations on security issues (i.e., NRC/The NATO 
Russia Council/NATO ‘at 20’). Recent controversies over Iraq notwithstand-
ing, it appears that 11 September made Western leaders more receptive to 
Russian arguments about the link between international terrorism and Is-
lamic fundamentalism. Thus, there is a component of shared security identity 
underlying their recent rapprochement.139 Events following 11 September 
also displayed Russia’s potential as an external resource for the West in the 
fight against international terrorism. This may arguably increase Western re-
ceptiveness to Russian views and interests altogether. Seen from Russia, 11 
September provided an opportunity to contribute in the global war on terror-
ism and thus (potentially) to increase Russia’s status in world affairs. If the 
                                                     
137  See ‘Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (2000), ‘Kont-
septsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (2000), and ‘Voennaya doktrina Ros-
siyskoy Federatsii’ (2000). 
138  See for instance his letter to the Russian voters prior to the presidential elections: ‘We 
need to recognise the superiority of internal goals over external ones. If this or that inter-
national project is not in the interest of our citizens…then we should stay out of it.… We 
must weigh up our possibilities and maybe wait’ (Putin 2002). 
139  With regard to the case of Chechnya, Foreign Minister Ivanov said in a speech to the 
Council of Europe in 1999: ‘In essence, Russia is protecting the common borders of 
Europe against the barbaric advance/intrusion (nashestvie) of international terrorism, 
which is persistently and step by step strengthening its axis of influence: Afganistan – 
Central Asia – the Caucasus – the Balkans’ (Ivanov 2001:195). 
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West is willing to let Russia cash in for participating in the war against inter-
national terrorism by providing political or economic dividends, 11 Septem-
ber may in fact prove instrumental in facilitating resolution of some domes-
tic problems in Russia and thereby (potentially) contribute to increase her 
influence on world affairs in the future. 
It appears, therefore, that developments under President Putin both prior 
to and after 11 September can be related to the conceptual model applied in 
this study. Still, these questions need more research. Two issues stand out for 
further inquiry. First, more work could be done to refine and develop the 
theoretical framework applied here, a task that goes right into contemporary 
debates on IR theory. Beyond some intriguing questions concerning meta-
theory and normative implications, the conceptual model used in this study 
has some limitations with regard to ‘measurement’ of the ‘real’ and ‘per-
ceived’ size of the two centres, let alone also the problem of identifying 
other relevant dimensions, including centres and peripheries on various sys-
temic levels, that should be accounted for in analyses of state behaviour. 
These and other theoretical issues could be addressed more thoroughly.  
Second, on the empirical level, although relations with NATO and OSCE 
are important, in-depth studies of Russia’s foreign policy and of her security 
relations with the West should perhaps be more sensitive to the role of the 
EU, which contributes to a feeling in Russia of institutional isolation from 
(the rest of/the Western part of) Europe, and which is increasingly taking on 
security tasks that may have implications for Russia and for Russia’s role in 
European security affairs. Also, recent developments around Iraq may pro-
vide a strong rationale for looking more closely at Russia’s relationship with 
the US as a separate, and politically perhaps increasingly controversial, en-
tity inside a more broadly conceived ‘West’.  
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Partnership and Discord 
Russia and the construction of a post Cold War 
security architecture in Europe 1991–2000  
This study analyses Russia’s approach to the construction of a post-Cold War 
security architecture in Europe from 1991 to 2000. The author examines tensions, 
contradictions and ambiguities in Russia’s policy that contributed to making both 
partnership and discord ingredients to Russian–Western security relations. For 
instance, how can we understand Russia’s intense opposition to NATO enlargement 
and NATO’s out-of-area operations in light of Russia’s own formalised cooperation 
with the Western alliance (i.e., NACC/EAPC; PfP; PJC/the Founding Act)? And 
how can we conceive of Moscow’s enduring position that theOSCE should be the 
‘cornerstone’ of Europe’s security architecture, considering what many observers 
have interpreted as Russian obstruction of, and non-compliance with, OSCE decisi-
ons and norms?  
The author seeks to answer these questions by tracing the Russian debate on 
national identity and foreign policy that emerged in the wake of Soviet dissolution. 
The theoretical framework draws on some central ideas from the realist and liberal 
IR traditions, and uses the concept of ‘securitisation’ as a means to show how and 
under what conditions ‘expectations’ from these two camps about Russia’s behavi-
our and related institutional outcomes (i.e., Russian–Western security cooperation) 
may find empirical support. The author also applies a conceptual model for security 
thinking that incorporates three dimensions: Centre–Periphery, East–West, and 
Christian–Muslim. The first dimension  premises that Russia can be depicted both as 
periphery to a dominating Western centre and as a centre in its own right. The East–
West dimension reflects residuals of Cold War antagonism. The third dimension 
mirrors an identity component derived from (perceived) Russian–Western cultural 
and civilisational kinship based on the notion of a Christian civilisation. 
Findings from this study largely confirm hypotheses derived from this model: 
Whereas one identity component (Western/Christian civilisation) fostered shared 
Russian-Western security interests and the use of the OSCE to promote ‘soft’ secur-
ity in Europe’s peripheries, the two other dimensions produced incompatible or con-
tradictory security logics as basis for Russia’s behaviour. These security logics can 
be derived from two different readings (in Russia) of Russia’s ‘identity’ and of its 
place in the international power structure. A depiction by the government in 1991–
92 of Russia as Europe’s periphery dictated westward integration and adaptation to 
the Western security arrangements. However, from 1992–93, the policy-making elite 
increasingly came to look upon Russia as an alternative centre of power. This dic-
tated a shielding strategy and Russian policy measures aimed at balancing the insti-
tutional weight of the West.  
Accordingly, whereas Russia was initially not opposed to a prominent role for 
NATO and NATO-affiliated structures even inside the post-Soviet space and in 
areas of former Soviet influence, the security logic from around 1993 dictated Rus-
sian attempts to undermine the role of NATO and to increase the relative weight of 
the OSCE in Europe as a whole, while at the same time limiting the functional scope 
of the latter (and thereby: Western influence) inside the post-Soviet space, which 
was regarded as Russia’s ‘exclusive’ periphery. This contributed to making both 
partnership and discord ingredients to Russian–Western security relations in the late 
1990s. 
